Oral Answers to Questions

CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT

The Secretary of State was asked—

Iraq

Harry Cohen: If she will make a statement about cultural objects recently stolen from Iraq.

Tessa Jowell: The Government deplore the criminal looting and theft of Iraq's cultural heritage. The treasures belong to the Iraqi people and form a vital part of their democratic future. With other countries, we are engaged in a range of measures to safeguard against further theft, to see the return of stolen artefacts and to develop an international database of stolen items. We also support domestic legislation, introduced by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan), to create a new criminal offence of dealing in stolen treasure.

Harry Cohen: I welcome that response, but the Secretary of State will be aware that the director of the British Museum, Neil MacGregor, wrote in the New Statesman this week that he frantically telephoned No. 10, the Secretary of State for Defence and herself before the war to say that measures should be in place to protect Iraq's cultural heritage. He said that the response was nothing in particular and his calls did not lead to any action. Will the Secretary of State give the House an account of the response? Can we now have a co-ordinated worldwide effort to recover the artefacts? Has she spoken to her US counterpart about US citizens, including soldiers, who may have stolen these items? Could they be prosecuted under UK law?

Tessa Jowell: I thank my hon. Friend for his continuing interest in this important issue. Having read the director's interview, rather than the authored piece in the New Statesman, I simply do not recognise the attributed comments from the many conversations that I have had with him, or from the collaboration with the Government that he has so fulsomely praised. Yes, there is an international effort to achieve the restitution of stolen artefacts, to repair the destroyed treasures and to support the Iraqi teams in Baghdad and other parts of the country to restore the cultural heritage. We are wholly committed to that purpose and we will do everything necessary to achieve it. As part of that effort, I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary for undertaking to ensure that a new draft resolution under discussion includes proper protection, in the event of sanctions being lifted, for stolen and looted treasure.

Boris Johnson: In view of the heavy lobbying before the war by powerful organisations representing American collectors for what was euphemistically called a "less retentionist" policy towards treasures in Iraq—and given the vital importance of the treasures in rebuilding the Iraqi tourist industry after the war—what steps will the Secretary of State take to ensure that we have a policy of 100 per cent. retention of Iraq's treasures, whether stolen or not?

Tessa Jowell: I hope that the House can unite in affirming that artefacts from the Baghdad, Basra or Mosul museums are the property of the Iraqi people. Where, by whatever route, they have been removed from Iraq—either before or since the conflict—they should be returned. At the international level, action is being taken, particularly through UNESCO, to secure that outcome. Measures are being taken to produce a database of stolen artefacts, and we shall soon have in place domestic legislation that closes an outstanding loophole and makes dealing in stolen or looted artefacts a criminal offence.

Gerald Kaufman: What protest has the Secretary of State made to the US Administration about the way in which American troops burst into the great museum in Baghdad, making its contents a prey for looters, organised art thieves and—if precedents following the second world war and the invasion of Grenada are anything to go by—American troops? If that is George Bush's new world order, what hope is there for civilised values?

Tessa Jowell: I thank my right hon. Friend for that question. In fact, the account of the events that led up to the looting of the Baghdad museum is slightly different from the account that he provides. The account by Donny George, the director of the Baghdad museum, sets out three material facts. First—it is worth recording this—something like 90 per cent. of the 170 artefacts taken from the museum were removed for safekeeping before the action started. Secondly, there was clear evidence of theft by organised criminal gangs of a number of the remaining treasures. Thirdly, of course, there was the despicable looting, and it will be for history to judge whether sufficient steps were taken to protect the museum during those critical days. We are now where we are, though, and I hope that the House will accept the assurances that I have given and the undertakings, given through UNESCO, that the world is united in its determination to repatriate stolen artefacts and to support the Iraqis in the restoration of their cultural heritage—a crucial part of a free Iraq in the future.

Nick Harvey: I welcome the steps that the Government have taken, and in particular the positive response to the Bill promoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan), but will the Secretary of State pursue further her dialogue with the Treasury about our Customs precautions? In particular, will she urge officials to contrast the steps being taken in America, where a lot of information is coming from the Government about the import or smuggling of cultural artefacts, with our own precautions, as it seems to be assumed that passengers are responsible for acquainting themselves with the regulations? More vigilance is needed.

Tessa Jowell: We will pursue the case for vigilance in any areas where it is shown that loopholes still exist, and I have written to my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to raise precisely the importance of vigilance by Customs and Excise in the event of attempts to import stolen artefacts into this country. Similarly, the British Art Market Foundation and the trade organisations have promised their unstinting collaboration, but where loopholes exist we will seek to close them.

Tam Dalyell: What is the truth or otherwise of reports that the 6,000-year-old ziggurat at Ur has been sprayed with paint? Is not the uncomfortable truth that, whereas British forces have been very disciplined, American forces have often behaved like yobs?

Tessa Jowell: We are in the process of securing reports and feedback from those on the ground about what has happened, not only to Baghdad museum but to other museums and sacred sites. An official from my Department is already based in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to help to ensure that that co-operative assessment is undertaken. This is a matter of great concern to many in the House, and I will take all the steps that I can to ensure that, as more information becomes available, I keep the House informed.

Hugo Swire: I refer the House to my declaration in the Register of Members' Interests. The Secretary of State has talked about establishing a database. Given the fact that the ministerial advisory panel on illicit trade recommended, back in December 2000, that there should be such a database and given the fact that, in March 2001, that was accepted by the then Minister of State, does she not feel that her Department could have done something more between then and now? Can she assure the House that she has sufficient resources and the determination to see this through? Does she not believe that if she had done something earlier we could have done something to avoid this cultural catastrophe in the aftermath in Baghdad?

Tessa Jowell: No, I do not think that the action that the hon. Gentleman outlines would have prevented what Neil MacGregor describes as a catastrophe in Baghdad. Yes, I think that more progress should have been made in establishing the domestic database to which he refers, but we are in negotiation with UNESCO and the other countries represented in UNESCO to secure the establishment of an international database. I simply reiterate that we have moved very fast, both domestically and with other countries, to take the necessary measures to safeguard the Iraqi treasures leaving Iraq and to ensure that we have the necessary mechanisms in place to maximise the chances of their being returned if they turn up here or in any other country that is a member of UNESCO.

Kevin Brennan: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a cross-party group of Back Benchers recently visited the British Museum to see some of the Iraqi treasures that it acquired at a period when the policy may have been less retentionist and that, during that visit, the director of the museum expressed particular concern about the lack of co-operation with UNESCO from the Americans in Iraq, especially their refusal to allow access to the site at Ur? Is UNESCO now being granted full access to all cultural sites in Iraq?

Tessa Jowell: I am not aware of any obstacles to UNESCO's access, but as I said earlier, the situation is constantly developing as more facts become clear. I shall ensure that I keep the House informed of both problems and progress, as they occur.

Lottery Funding

Cheryl Gillan: What proportion of lottery funding has been spent on projects and good causes in the constituency of Chesham and Amersham in each of the last five years; and if she will make a statement.

Richard Caborn: The following figures are the amounts awarded for the hon. Lady's constituency in each of the last five years. In 1999, the amount was £1.775 million; in 2000, it was £423,000; in 2001, £1.272 million; in 2002, £398,000; and in 2003, £380,000. That puts her constituency 134th from the bottom of the per capita table of constituencies.

Cheryl Gillan: I thank the Minister for that answer, but is he aware that smaller charities in Chesham and Amersham find increasingly that bureaucracy and the length of time that it takes to leap through the hoops set up by the various distributing bodies are a positive disincentive to applying for lottery funding? Will he consider our proposal, which would give a fair deal to smaller charities by allowing players to specify a local charity on their lottery ticket, or by turning it into a gift token that could be given to a local charity of the player's choice? I hope that the Secretary of State is giving the Minister the inspiration that he needs to answer my question.

Richard Caborn: I do not need inspiration, as it was my right hon. Friend's idea and we put it out for consultation some months ago. Indeed, we have pronounced on the matter on several occasions and we shall report to the House in due course. While I am on my feet, I can point out that the hon. Lady's constituents did far better under Labour than under the previous Administration; between 1995 and 1998, the figures were considerably lower.

John Whittingdale: I welcome the right hon. Gentleman's remarks, but does he accept that one of the problems is that people purchasing lottery tickets in Chesham and Amersham, as elsewhere, are losing confidence that the money for good causes will actually reach genuine good causes? Our proposal is that people should be able to indicate specific local charities, rather than the tick-box scheme that the Government were suggesting, so that people can have complete confidence that they know where the money is going. I hope that he will give that proposal some consideration.

Richard Caborn: We will give the proposal consideration, just as we have given consideration to the wide-ranging consultation and the responses to it. As I said, we shall report back, and I hope that hon. Members will engage in constructive debate. I think that all Members appreciate the institution of the lottery for the role that it plays, so I hope that we can have constructive dialogue and discussion about how to proceed when we make our report to the House.

Libraries

Anthony D Wright: What action she is taking to encourage public lending libraries to open at times suitable for (a) working people and (b) parents of school age children.

Richard Caborn: On 10 February, we published the first ever national strategy for public libraries, "Framework for the Future". The whole thrust of that strategy is that local authorities must ensure that they meet the needs of their local communities and that consultation takes place. Opening times are always a prime concern of users.

Anthony D Wright: I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. Norfolk county council has recently announced a package to increase access for working people at some libraries in the county, which is welcome. However, will he join me in condemning that same council for announcing the imminent closure of Bradwell parish council library, which will take away access not only for working people but for the elderly, the young and the disabled? Bradwell parish council has set up a steering committee in an attempt to reopen the library, but the county council appears constantly to be moving the goalposts. For example, the county council has informed us that it has removed not only the computers and books but the shelving, too, leaving the building an empty shell.
	Will my right hon. Friend join me in making a last-minute plea—

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Richard Caborn: I answered a similar question from my hon. Friend previously. I must repeat what I said then: the responsibility for the operations of libraries is with the local authority. We have looked at the case that he has raised, and it is not in contravention of its legal responsibilities. We are trying, however, through "Framework for the Future", to make sure that we can respond to the needs of his constituents and others in ensuring that the library service is flexible and meets their requirements. I hope that the county council will revisit its decision.

Peter Luff: Does the Minister agree that public lending libraries now do a great deal more than lend books? Evesham public library, for example, is home to one of the Learn Direct centres, which is intended to help mothers of school age children who may wish to return to work and retrain. Against that background, will he do all that he can to ensure that county councils and other library authorities throughout the country understand the importance of offering the kind of hours that enable such people to attend?

Richard Caborn: I very much agree with what the hon. Gentleman says, which is absolutely true. Many local authorities have taken the opportunity offered by the ideas in "Framework for the Future" and are using them extremely creatively. For example, in Stockton-on-Tees, the library service is helping to break the cycle of offending by working with inmates and their families on reading skills. That is very important in enabling them to come back into society. A number of libraries are now opening on a Sunday, too, to fit in with the communities that they serve. Many good examples exist, and I hope that libraries examine those, as they are doing through the various professional bodies, so that we have not only libraries in the conventional sense but major resource centres for the communities that they serve.

Arts Funding

Peter Pike: What support her Department is giving to arts centres and theatres in smaller towns in the north-west.

Kim Howells: My hon. Friend knows that this Government have done more to support the arts in this country than any of our predecessors. He also knows that Arts Council England North West will see its overall allocation increase from £20.8 million to £28.4 million by 2005–06, which is an increase of 37 per cent. That new money will benefit a wide range of artists, organisations and communities across the region, including those in Burnley.

Peter Pike: I thank my hon. Friend for that answer. Does he accept, however, that it is important that not only big cities but small non-unitary authorities, such as Burnley, have arts centres and theatres? We find it difficult to preserve what we have: an excellent theatre, the Mechanics, and the Mid-Pennine Arts Centre. With small budgets, non-unitary authorities have extreme difficulties in that regard.

Kim Howells: Yes, there is a problem, and it is often a problem of knowing how to frame bids and having the aspirations to bid in the first place. Knowing what support is available, and ensuring that the expertise exists to help excellent small theatres such as those in my hon. Friend's constituency to make those bids is a real problem, which we recognise. We are making sure that the organisation is aware of those deficiencies in some areas and that it does all that it can to help people to make those bids.

Nicholas Winterton: Will the Minister go further and share my concern that in many places, in small towns such as Macclesfield and Burnley and the surrounding areas of those towns, a huge wealth of artistic talent exists that is not able to display itself because of the lack of adequate theatres to put on amateur productions? Cannot the Government act directly, or through the lottery, to provide more funds for the establishment of adequate theatres, so that the United Kingdom can display its huge wealth of talent?

Kim Howells: That was a passionate defence of some of the excellent theatres in the north-west. I remind the hon. Gentleman, however, that there has never been as much money for theatres, whether in the regions, in rural areas, in small towns or big cities, as is available at the moment. Combined with that is the fact that many of those theatre companies have recognised that they have a great task in trying to tap the talent, about which he has spoken so eloquently, in our schools and in our communities generally. That is where much of the money is being directed. It is not simply about being able to put on great performances in theatres, or even about the upkeep of the theatres themselves. It is also about trying to nurture that talent so that the next generation of actors, directors and writers can emerge. If we do not do that, we kill great theatre at birth.

Geraldine Smith: Will my hon. Friend offer his full support to Friends of the Winter Gardens theatre in Morecambe, who have been campaigning for years to restore the town's theatre? Does he accept that it is important for a seaside resort to have a theatre? I know that he is aware of the Winter Gardens theatre, because he visited it when he visited Morecambe recently.

Kim Howells: The theatre is a magnificent building and has been kept in that state mainly by the work of volunteers. I know that my hon. Friend has been active in that respect. The theatre is also in a unique position, with a magnificent view across to Lakeland. Nevertheless, all funding agencies have to be extremely careful about the allocation of large amounts of capital money, in view of the record of buildings being financed in the absence of plans to build up audiences and make performances sustainable. If the theatre in Morecambe could be rejuvenated in every sense, it could be one of the great attractions of a town that has been one of the north-west's great resorts over the years. I know that my hon. Friend is speaking to a great many people about how it can be part of a more holistic approach to redeveloping that resort, which she has the privilege to represent.

Licensed Premises (Children)

Brian Iddon: What recent discussions she has had with child welfare organisations about children's access to licensed premises.

Tessa Jowell: In March I convened two meetings with children's organisations, including the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and the Children's Society, and the police, to discuss children's access to licensed premises and the implications of the Licensing Bill. Officials from my Department held a further meeting with the relevant organisations. The outcome of those meetings was an agreed way forward on an issue that everybody regards as sensitive. That is reflected in the Bill as currently drafted, and also in the statutory guidance that will accompany the Bill. In practical and effective form, it achieves a means of protecting children from harm—one of the four key objectives of the Licensing Bill.

Brian Iddon: Traditionally, many political and social clubs, including Labour clubs in my constituency, welcome families with children on Sundays. I am sure my right hon. Friend knows that some of those clubs are in financial difficulty. Is she aware that the statement that she has just made will be welcomed by those clubs if it means that that tradition is not in jeopardy?

Tessa Jowell: I can assure my hon. Friend that that tradition is not in jeopardy. It would be extraordinarily unlikely that, for any pub or club where there have not been any problems in the past, there would be any greater restriction on the terms of licensing in the future. I hope that he will be reassured by that.

John Bercow: As a modern and socially liberal Tory, may I put it to the right hon. Lady that it is modernisation and social liberalism taken to absurd lengths to suppose that children should be allowed to enter licensed premises entirely unsupervised?

Tessa Jowell: I think that the hon. Gentleman is making a long journey to cross the Floor of the Chamber. He will be welcome on the Government Benches whenever he chooses to join us.
	It seems that the hon. Gentleman misunderstands the present situation. Any child of five or over can enter, unsupervised, any licensed premises as long as that child does not go into the bar area. Some of the absurdities of the existing regime that we are seeking to address include, for instance, the circumstance where a young child can go unsupervised into a pub and then be bought by an adult a gin and tonic, a whisky, or anything else that would be unsuitable to be consumed by a young child. Such instances do not happen more often because at present, and in future, admission of children into a pub is at the licensee's discretion.
	We have worked hard with children's charities and with the police to develop the right sort of statutory framework that addresses the need for different approaches in different circumstances. There needs to be a different regime to protect children in pubs or clubs in the middle of Soho, as opposed to children who may live next door to a country pub. The regime that we have proposed reflects precisely that discretion and that flexibility.

Malcolm Moss: In the Licensing Bill as it stands, and as the Secretary of State has said, the presumption is in favour of allowing children of any age unaccompanied access to licensed premises unless the licensee is either unwilling or unable to guarantee their protection from harm. Should it not be the other way round?

Tessa Jowell: The hon. Gentleman must understand that in the licence application the licensee must make it clear how he will protect children if they come into his pub or other licensed premises. In the statutory guidance, as I have already stated, we have proposed four different sorts of premises, ranging from those where there should be a presumption by the licensing authority that unsupervised children will not be allowed access, to those where there is an expectation that children will be welcome. It is precisely that sort of flexible approach that will ensure that children are properly protected.

Press Complaints Commission

Clive Soley: If she will make a statement on her meeting with the chairman of the Press Complaints Commission to discuss its work.

Tessa Jowell: I met Sir Christopher Meyer, the new chairman of the PCC, on 7 April, and we discussed a number of ways in which the PCC might improve self-regulation. Sir Christopher has recently announced a list of eight proposals, which I am glad to say broadly concur with the issues that we discussed, including areas for reform. He has made clear his open-mindedness on the case for reform and his wish to canvass opinion on that and other suggested areas for improvement.

Clive Soley: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for the efforts that she has made. Did she tell Sir Christopher that the PCC will continue to fail to inspire public confidence until such time as it changes the committee that writes the code so that we no longer have it made up of 100 per cent. newspaper employees? Secondly, does she agree that the commission should develop a proactive stance so that members of the public can begin to have a reasonable expectation that what they read in news columns will have at least some accuracy and some impartiality, with creative literature being kept to the comment columns?

Tessa Jowell: I thank my hon. Friend and pay tribute to him for his staunch and long-standing defence of press freedom, and for the way in which he has campaigned over many years.
	My discussion with Sir Christopher Meyer was broadly in the terms that my hon. Friend suggests. It took place within a context that recognises clearly that self-regulation is just that. The Government have no intention of seeking to interfere with the self-regulation of the press—that is a matter for the press—but in parallel with that, as my hon. Friend describes, is the importance of public confidence and trust in self-regulation. Sir Christopher took both those points seriously.

Creative Partnerships Scheme

Michael Clapham: What plans she has to extend the creative partnerships scheme.

Kim Howells: The creative partnerships programme is giving children and teachers in 16 pilot areas in England the opportunity to develop their creative talents by working on sustained projects with creative professionals. The programme has been warmly welcomed both by schools and the cultural community, and more areas are eager to join in. We have pledged to double the size of the programme by 2006, and investment in creative partnerships is set to grow from £25 million in the current year to about £50 million in 2005–06.

Michael Clapham: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that answer. As he knows, Barnsley is at the forefront in putting creativity at the very centre of the educational experience for children. May I very quickly tell him about three projects in my constituency? At Worsborough primary school, children are designing a learning environment extending from the classroom to the playground; at Hoyland, children are working with the Barnsley performing arts department to increase and improve communication; and at Springvale in Penistone, a multi-faceted approach has been taken in which children are working with film, sculpture and storytelling to explore the ideas and life of a man called Saunders, a 17th century mathematician from the area. That clearly shows that creativity at the centre of educational experience is worth while. Will my hon. Friend therefore work with the Department for Education and Skills to ensure that creativity is bedded down in the curriculum so that it can give all children the benefit of such experience?

Kim Howells: I am glad to hear that my hon. Friend is so enthusiastic about those projects, which are very important. I heard some sneers from the Opposition Benches as he spoke, but the creative industries in this country are responsible for hundreds of thousands of jobs and for earning billions of pounds of revenue. Opposition Members might sneer at that because they are living in the 19th century, not the 20th century. [Hon. Members: "21st."] We are in the 21st century; they are not even in the 20th. Like my constituency, Barnsley has suffered enormously as a result of the decline of heavy industry, but is rebuilding its own future. It is doing much of that on the basis of creative industries. I congratulate teachers, pupils and parents in his constituency on embracing this great programme and taking it forward very successfully.

Patrick Cormack: What about some lessons in creative brevity?

Kim Howells: I was waiting for somebody to say that, but I did not think that it would be the hon. Gentleman. The cheap cracks are always the ones that get into the news, and I expect that that is why he made that one.

John Mann: Bearing in mind the success of Barnsley, will my hon. Friend consider rolling out the project to areas such as Bassetlaw, which are crying out to redress the balance in terms of the lack of creative input in schools over recent decades and could happily mirror the brilliant success of the partnership in Barnsley?

Kim Howells: I have no doubt that the brilliance of Yorkshire will carry that success forward out of Barnsley and into Bassetlaw.

Olympic Games

Bill Wiggin: If she will make a statement on the Government's policy on a London bid for the Olympic games.

Tessa Jowell: The hon. Gentleman will be aware that I made a statement to the House last Thursday announcing the Government's wholehearted backing for an Olympic bid to bring the games to London in 2012.

Bill Wiggin: I welcome that and I think that we are all looking forward to a successful Olympic bid, but there will be huge opportunities across the rest of Britain, as countries competing in the Olympics will need training camps. What will the Secretary of State do to ensure that those camps are spread across the UK? May I recommend Herefordshire and Worcestershire as excellent places where they may be situated?

Tessa Jowell: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. Had he been in the House for my statement last Thursday, he would have heard me say that we want the whole country to benefit from the Olympics. One of the practical ways in which the whole country can benefit is to locate training camps in different parts of the United Kingdom for athletes before the games, which will benefit their communities afterwards.

Dave Watts: May I inform my right hon. Friend that not all Members are jumping for joy at the idea of an Olympic bid? Many of us are concerned that areas such as the north-west will lose out because of the bid, so can she assure me that sports funding will be maintained in those regions during the course of the bid?

Tessa Jowell: The opinion polling that the Government undertook before announcing the Olympic bid showed a wide measure of support, including in the north-west, for bidding for the Olympics. However, my hon. Friend has underlined the important point that although the games would be held in London they must be games for the whole United Kingdom. That is why, in our costing of the Olympics, we took care to ensure that, in addition to the development of elite facilities in London, all parts of the country would benefit from facilities for their grass-roots sports.

John Greenway: May I reiterate the support of the Conservative party for the bid? Can the Secretary of State say anything further about the cross-party ministerial group that I suggested to her some weeks ago? Is she prepared to authorise briefings to shadow Ministers about the bid, and when does she expect to introduce legislation specifically to provide for a new lottery game? If the House gave its support to such a game, that would demonstrate to the country and the world at large that our bid is a serious one.

Tessa Jowell: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. We will introduce at the earliest opportunity legislation for a new lottery game, some details of which Camelot have announced today. The hon. Gentleman or one of his hon. Friends raised the issue of a cross-ministerial group with me on Thursday but I am sure that he accepts that in the intervening three days I have had a heavy reading load, provided by the Treasury, of 18 studies on the euro. However, as a matter of priority, I shall certainly turn my attention to the important issue of ensuring that cross-party support for the Olympic bid is maintained as much as possible.

Stephen Ladyman: I am delighted that we are going ahead with the bid, and I congratulate my right hon. Friend on her decision. Given that we have the only royal harbour in the country and also have expertise in hosting world championship sailing events, can she assure me that she has already pencilled in Ramsgate for the sailing?

Tony Banks: The sailing will be in the royal docks.

Stephen Ladyman: In the event that the Secretary of State has not yet done that, how will decisions be made about the ancillary events? Will that be done behind closed doors or will there be an opportunity for the public to express their own ideas and for local communities to make bids?

Tessa Jowell: I thank my hon. Friend, and am struck by the number of hon. Members who have world-class sailing facilities in their constituencies. I am sure that my hon. Friend will ensure that the facilities in his constituency are considered, when the time comes, as part of the array of Olympic facilities that will have to be put in place. He made an important point about the transparency of decisions, which will be an important part of ensuring that the games are not just for London but involve the constituents of right hon. and hon. Members across the country.

Tony Banks: Dream on.

Libraries

Helen Jones: What plans she has for improvements in library services.

Richard Caborn: I note in passing that my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham (Mr. Banks) asks that the sailing should be in the royal docks.
	We want to help library services transform themselves to meet the needs of the public and prospective users in the 21st century. Many public libraries are developing new ideas and offer an excellent service. As I said earlier, we want to spread good practice. Public libraries now offer computer and internet access for everyone, and are ideally placed to help deliver improvements in reading and other skills. As I said when answering an earlier question, they can be major resource centres for the communities in which they are located.

Lynne Jones: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that reply. I acknowledge the progress that has been made, especially in providing internet access, but coming as I do from a town that had one of the first public libraries in the country, I still believe that libraries are primarily about books. Does he agree that owing to years of underinvestment, most of the book stock is in a very dilapidated and unattractive condition? What can be done to encourage more investment in providing a good book stock in libraries to encourage all the people who are attracted in to do more reading?

Richard Caborn: It is up to local authorities to dispense the moneys that are available. Some £780 million is invested annually into our library service, and it is incumbent on local authorities to make judgments on where that money should go. I accept what my hon. Friend says. However, within the resources that they have available, some libraries are trying to ensure that they present a first-class service—for example, by using the internet and other developments to access books that are out of publication. As I say, three-quarters of a billion pounds annually is invested into our library service.

CHURCH COMMISSIONERS

The hon. Member for Middlesbrough, representing the Church Commissioners, was asked—

Redundant Churches

Tom Cox: How many redundant churches there are in the Greater London area.

Stuart Bell: Since 1969, a total of 131 churches have been declared redundant in the diocese of London, 72 in the diocese of Southwark, 27 in the diocese of Chelmsford and five in the diocese of Rochester.

Tom Cox: I note my hon. Friend's reply. In many parts of London—certainly in my constituency—there are religious groups that are extremely popular within our communities, but the sad fact is that it is often very difficult for them to find suitable premises to follow their beliefs and to develop their congregations. Will my hon. Friend stress to the Church Commissioners that instead of letting empty and redundant churches stay in that condition for long periods, they should offer them to our religious groups? That would be greatly appreciated by those groups, by their local communities and most certainly by the local Members of Parliament.

Stuart Bell: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He will be happy to know that more than 900 former churches have been found new uses. More than two-thirds of those continue to serve the community by providing facilities for worship, social facilities, educational opportunities or low-cost housing. Uses by another Christian body or for wider community purposes are generally regarded as the most suitable. I shall be happy to consider whether we can be helpful in that respect in my hon. Friend's constituency.

Employment Tribunals

Andrew Selous: If he will make a statement about the use of employment tribunals for clergy.

Stuart Bell: At present, the jurisdiction of employment tribunals does not apply to the majority of clergy, because they have the status of office holders in law and are not employees.

Andrew Selous: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that reply. Can he give me an assurance that employment tribunals will not get dragged into ruling on doctrinal matters in disputes between clergy and churches? Can he also assure me that clergy will not have to stay in parishes where there has been a clear case of pastoral breakdown, which would be inappropriate both for the parish and for the clergy concerned?

Stuart Bell: The question of pastoral breakdown is probably not for the Church Commissioners, but I shall refer the hon. Gentleman's question and view to the Archbishops Council. On the point about employment tribunals and any review of employment law, the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal took the view in the past that clergy were ecclesiastical office holders, not employees. We welcome the review under the auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry. The cure of souls in parishes and employment rights are not mutually exclusive, and the Church will do what it can to bring the two together.

Ben Chapman: Employment tribunals are only one aspect of the Employment Rights Act 1996 that does not apply to the clergy. Many hon. Members believe that that should be corrected as soon as possible. When is the McClean committee, which the Archbishops Council set up, likely to report? Will the hon. Gentleman accept that many of us would like it to be soon?

Stuart Bell: My hon. Friend knows that I pay close attention to those matters. I also take account of the campaign that he has maintained since 1997. The McClean committee will provide its conclusions soon; it has already been made a submission to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. I am confident that we will reach some conclusions that take into account the unique role of a parish priest and employment rights and tribunals.

David Taylor: I welcome my hon. Friend's answer. Does he agree that an excessively rigid contractual relationship for the clergy could damage the sense of vocation and duty that is so important to many ministers?

Stuart Bell: That is certainly the case, and the Church is dealing with that problem through its review group and subsequently the Department of Trade and Industry.

ELECTORAL COMMISSION COMMITTEE

The hon. Member for Gosport, representing the Speaker's Committee on the Electoral Commission, was asked—

Turnout

Kevin Brennan: What recent representations the Electoral Commission has received on voter turnout at elections.

Peter Viggers: In conducting its statutory reviews of the conduct and administration of elections, the commission has received representations from a range of organisations, academics and individuals on turnout and what might be done to improve it.

Kevin Brennan: Is the hon. Gentleman and the commission aware that on Wednesday, the Hansard Society is holding a seminar to examine the difference in attitudes between people who are interested in politics but do not watch "Big Brother" and those who watch "Big Brother" but have no interest in politics to ascertain whether there are any lessons on turnout in the fact that fewer people voted in the recent local elections than in many reality TV game shows? Do the Electoral Commission or the hon. Gentleman have any views on whether we have anything to learn from reality TV game shows in trying to improve turnout in elections?

Peter Viggers: An interesting question. In its statutory report on the 2001 general election, in which it tried to learn lessons from the turnout, the commission presented the view that the main responsibility for persuading the public of the relevance of voting must rest with politicians. They must make it interesting and attractive for individuals to vote.

Simon Thomas: Before we follow the route of reality TV shows, in which one can vote once or 100 times for the same contestant, can we consider improving voter turnout through more traditional means, including postal votes and holding elections on other days such as Saturdays and Sundays and siting polling stations in non-traditional places such as supermarkets? Surely that would help improve the turnout, which was low in the recent Welsh Assembly elections.

Peter Viggers: Indeed, the purpose of the pilots that took place in local government elections is to test the way in which different voting systems can encourage turnout and thereby participation. The commission believes that changes in process have a role in making voting more convenient. However, it is important to be realistic about what that can achieve on turnout, given that many other factors have an impact on that.

Kevan Jones: Will the hon. Gentleman draw to the Electoral Commission's attention the experiment in Chester-le-Street and Derwentside in the recent local elections? Turnout increased by 20 per cent. through a postal ballot. An experiment in electronic counting meant that the count was covered in less than half an hour. Will the hon. Gentleman ensure that the Electoral Commission evaluates the experiments?

Peter Viggers: The Electoral Commission will present its conclusions on the pilots that were held in the May elections. It will publish the results on 31 July.

Patrick Cormack: Does my hon. Friend agree that the integrity of the electoral process is even more important than the turnout, and will he bear in mind that large-scale postal voting is open to abuse?

Peter Viggers: Obviously the risk of abuse is one factor that the commission takes into account, but there has been no evidence of widespread abuse.

Postal Voting

Martin Linton: What comparative research has been commissioned by the Electoral Commission on the levels of postal voting in (a) local and (b) parliamentary elections (i) in this country and (ii) overseas.

Peter Viggers: The commission has examined levels of postal voting at local and parliamentary elections, and its report "Absent voting in Great Britain" was published in March. A copy has been placed in the Library. No detailed research into comparisons with overseas levels of postal voting has been undertaken, partly because the legal framework of postal voting varies significantly between countries.

Martin Linton: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that since the publication of that report in March the May local elections have shown a dramatic increase in turnout, from around 30 per cent. to 50 per cent. in areas with all-postal ballots—including Derwentside, mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr. Jones)?
	Although the level of postal voting has nearly doubled, from about 4 per cent. to 8 per cent., there is scope for a far greater increase—in some countries it is over 30 per cent.—through the simple expedient of allowing people to vote wherever they are in the country on polling day, at a local post office.

Peter Viggers: The hon. Gentleman has made some good points. There has been a significant increase in the uptake of postal voting since it first became available in Great Britain early in 2001. At the 2001 general election, the number of postal votes issued was almost double the number issued at the 1997 election, as the hon. Gentleman said—rising from less than 1 million to more than 1.75 million. At the 2002 local elections some 7.7 per cent. of the electorate cast their votes by post. That is almost double the proportion of such votes in England in the 2001 general election, and probably three times the proportion at the previous local elections.

Steve Webb: I unreservedly welcome the greater availability of postal voting, but will the commission bear in mind that all postal ballots deny the electorate the opportunity to choose how to convey their votes? Some will want the privacy that they may not necessarily have in their own homes. Can my hon. Friend assure us that the commission will not just take account of a higher turnout?

Peter Viggers: I am confident that the commission will bear that in mind. A number of factors are involved: for instance, any move to all-postal voting would no doubt change the pace of a general election, which would no longer reach a climax at the end of the campaign.

Harry Barnes: I hope the Electoral Commission will not go over the top with postal voting. There should be as common a system as possible in the United Kingdom, but in Northern Ireland, because of fraud problems, there has been a move towards photo-identity cards at polling stations. Should that not be taken into account within the general pattern?

Peter Viggers: Indeed. Let me repeat the timing of the Electoral Commission's plans. It will produce its report on the local election pilots on 31 July. That will give the House, and all who are interested, an opportunity to consider carefully whether it is appropriate to table the primary legislation that will be needed if changes are to be made.

Sydney Chapman: Can my hon. Friend assure us—or, if that is not possible, pass the question to the appropriate quarters—that come the next general election, whatever method or process is used will be uniform throughout the 659 parliamentary divisions in the United Kingdom?

Peter Viggers: My hon. Friend's comments will be noted.

Parliamentary Constituencies

Andrew MacKinlay: What plans the Commission has to discuss with the boundary commissions the population sizes of parliamentary constituencies.

Peter Viggers: None, because, as the hon. Gentleman will know, the commission has no responsibility for the matter at present. Section 16 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 provides for the transfer of the boundary commissions' functions to the commission, but those provisions have not yet been implemented.

Andrew MacKinlay: The commission will eventually have this power, though. We should look forward 10 years. Is it not about time that—in the review that follows what is now being enacted—we did away with the disproportionate effect that the geographical criterion has on our constituency boundaries? Surely there should be just one commission for the United Kingdom, rather than four for the four nations. How can we justify the existence of constituencies with 100,000 voters along with others with only 21,000 or 33,000? Surely everyone's vote should be of equal value in the ballot box. We really should not have the disparities that are caused by some spurious geographical consideration. If a person represents a large area, he should be given more sledge teams and dogs.

Mr. Speaker: Order. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could apply for an Adjournment debate.

Peter Viggers: As I have already explained, the Electoral Commission currently has no responsibility in this field, but that did not prevent the hon. Gentleman from making his point forcefully in his usual way.

Bill O'Brien: On the population of constituencies, does the hon. Gentleman agree that the identification of constituency boundaries is most important, so that the electorate can identify with certain boundaries and therefore take a greater interest in the activity of the constituency in question? Does he therefore accept that the Boundary Commission should take greater cognisance of constituency boundaries when reviewing constituencies?

Peter Viggers: The hon. Gentleman has expressed his point of view on this issue before, and I know that we all very much value the cohesion of the areas that we represent.

CHURCH COMMISSIONERS

The hon. Member for Middlesbrough, representing the Church Commissioners, was asked—

Church Repairs (VAT)

Anne McIntosh: What recent discussions the Commissioners have had with the Government on revision of the sixth VAT directive.

Stuart Bell: As the hon. Lady knows, we have made a detailed submission via the Churches Main Committee to the European Commission and we have had briefings with interested MPs, MEPs and EU officials.

Anne McIntosh: Could the hon. Gentleman possibly move things along a little further, because, as yet, we have had no decision? As he has explained, the churches are being put off by the mountain of bureaucratic paperwork involved in applying for the grants relating to this measure. Will he please press the Chancellor to act quickly to reduce VAT on church repairs?

Stuart Bell: I am grateful for the hon. Lady's tenacity. All I can say is that, if the European Commission had such tenacity, we would be further along the road than we are now.

Point of Order

Simon Thomas: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. As you know, parliamentary awaydays are all the rage at the moment. Could you possibly organise an awayday for Cabinet Ministers, so that they can learn how to be a bit more succinct in their responses to questions in the House? In that way, more Back-Bench Members could contribute to Question Time, which might also improve the turnout in the House.

Mr. Speaker: Perhaps when the Ministers have an awayday, they will invite the Speaker along. I can tell them that we are not getting through the questions fast enough. May I say that they are far too long-winded? Sometimes the questioners can also be too long-winded. We have to get down the Order Paper; it is only fair to those who have bothered to put their names into the ballot and who appear on the Order Paper that they should be called. I hope that the awayday takes place in the not too distant future.

Criminal Justice Bill (Programme) (No. 5)

Paul Goggins: I beg to move,
	That, in accordance with the Resolution of the Programming Committee of 14th May, the Order of the House of 2nd April 2003 (Proceedings on consideration and Third Reading of the Criminal Justice Bill) be amended by omitting the entries in the Table for the second and third day and inserting the following:
	
		TABLE
		
			 Day Proceedings Time for conclusion of proceedings 
			 Second day New Clauses relating to Part 1, Clause No. 7, Clauses Nos. 9 and 10. One and a quarter hours after the commencement of proceedings on the motion for this Order. 
			  New Clauses relating to Part 2, Clauses Nos. 11 to 17, New Clauses relating to Part 5, Clauses Nos. 27 to 34, New Clauses relating to Part 9, Clauses Nos. 50 to 62. Two hours after the commencement of those proceedings. 
			  New Clauses relating to Part 7, Clauses Nos. 36 to 43. Four and a half hours after the commencement of those proceedings. 
			  Clause No. 63, Schedule No. 4, Clauses Nos. 64 to 81, New Clauses relating to Part 10. Six and a half hours after the commencement of those proceedings. 
			 Third day New Clauses Nos. 30 to 39 and 46 to 51. Two and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the Bill. 
			  Remaining New Clauses relating to Part 12, Clauses Nos. 127 to 163, Schedule No. 7, Clause No. 164, Schedule No. 8, Clauses Nos. 165 to 171, Schedule No. 9, Clauses Nos. 172 to 176, Schedule No. 10, Clauses Nos. 177 to 201, Schedule No. 11, Clauses Nos. 202 to 206, Schedule No. 12, Clauses Nos. 207 to 211, Schedules Nos. 13 and 14, Clause No. 212, Schedule No. 15, Clauses Nos. 213, to 221, Schedule No. 16, Clauses Nos. 222 to 246, Schedule No. 17, Clause No. 247, Schedule No. 18, Clause No. 248, Schedules Nos. 19 and 20, Clauses Nos. 249 to 251, Schedule No. 21, Clause No. 252, Schedule No. 22, Clauses Nos. 253 and 254, Schedule No. 23, Clauses Nos. 255 to 258, Schedule No. 24, Clause No. 259, New Clauses relating to Part 6, Clause No. 35, Schedule No. 3, Clauses Nos. 260 to 265, Schedule No. 25, Clauses Nos. 266 to 268, Schedule No. 26, Clauses Nos. 269 to 273, Schedule No. 27, Clause No. 274, Schedule No. 28, Clause No. 275, Schedule No. 29, Clauses Nos. 276 to 280. Four hours after the commencement of those proceedings. 
			  Remaining New Clauses, New Schedules, any remaining proceedings on the Bill. Five and a half hours after the commencement of those proceedings. 
		
	
	It is probably good advice for new Ministers speaking in that capacity for the first time to keep their contributions short. The House will be pleased to know that I intend to follow that advice, not just for the obvious reasons but because I believe that we need to get on and debate the many important issues before us over the next two days. Indeed, the proposed programme has been drawn up to help the House make the best use of the 13 hours of debate on the Bill that we shall have today and tomorrow. These 13 hours follow the six and a half hours on 2 April, as well as 32 sittings in the Standing Committee. In that connection, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in recording our appreciation for the part played in those deliberations by the Minister of State, Department for International Development, my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, Central (Hilary Benn).
	I am reliably informed that few Bills have had as many days as this on the Floor of the House on Report. It is important, therefore, that we should use the time wisely to debate the substance of the Bill, rather than lingering on procedure. The Government have tabled several new amendments and policy provisions. In some cases, the timing was unavoidable—for example, the murder sentencing provisions respond to a court ruling at the turn of the year. In others, the amendments respond to the valuable and constructive points raised on both sides of the Standing Committee. I am thinking here, for example, of measures relating to the Sentencing Guidelines Council and to retrial for serious offences.
	I believe that the programme motion strikes the right balance, and I commend it to the House.

Dominic Grieve: First, I welcome the Minister to his appointment and congratulate him on it. If he can conduct his relations with the opposition parties in the manner of his predecessor, amicable relations in all parts of the House will be maintained.
	The hon. Member for Leeds, Central (Hilary Benn) will be missed very much. We certainly appreciated his approach to consideration of the Bill and the conciliatory way in which he dealt with timetables and matters in Committee. With a certain note of sorrow, therefore, I have to say to the Minister that, despite fully accepting that the Government have sought to co-operate with the Opposition in allowing time for proper scrutiny, so many more proposals have been tabled by the Government that, perhaps inevitably, the allocation of three days for consideration on Report, which was a generous offer when it was made, is, I am afraid, insufficient.
	After considering the number of amendments before us and the number that we have to debate tomorrow, I am sure that the Minister will acknowledge that, in reality, we have a grossly overloaded timetable. I might say that that is no fault of the Government Whip, who has done his very best throughout to squeeze the quart into the pint pot, but the truth is that the quart will not go into the pint pot. There is insufficient time to do justice to the legislation.
	In particular, one has only to consider the diversity of the amendments to realise that tomorrow, as will be the case today, we face a situation in which very different proposals are grouped, which will inevitably result in a lack of focus during the debate. I regret that because there are important matters to discuss. Therefore, although we have sought to co-operate with the Government in managing the Bill's timetable, this is an occasion on which we part company with them. I do not want to take up much of the House's time as I want to get on with the debate, but we shall oppose the timetable motion.

David Heath: I entirely agree with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) in his welcome for the Minister and his comments on the hon. Member for Leeds, Central (Hilary Benn), who did an excellent job in Committee. I wish him well in his new responsibilities.
	Having said that, I entirely accord with the view that the programme motion is an admission of defeat by the Government in that it is clear that this important measure—what we are told is the flagship criminal justice Bill of this Parliament—will not receive the scrutiny it requires. It was already a substantial Bill of 280 clauses and 29 schedules, so it was always going to be difficult to give these important matters proper scrutiny, even in the three days originally allotted. Since then, the Government have come back to the House, with the result that there are nearly 500 amendments before us, and 28 Government new clauses.
	These are not lightweight matters of detail. They include fingerprint and DNA samples, sentencing for murder, gun crime, increases in the penalty for causing death by dangerous driving, membership of the Sentencing Guidelines Council, abolition of committal proceedings, reporting restrictions, jury service, outraging public decency, the Criminal Records Bureau and extending powers of detention without charge. Those are matters of life and liberty. They deserve the House's proper attention, which is precisely what they will not receive under the programme motion.
	Like the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, I do not want to take up valuable debating time, but the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) was absolutely right last Monday when she referred to
	"increasingly poor policy initiatives being rammed through Parliament".—[Official Report, 12 May 2003; Vol. 405, c. 38.]
	QED, this is an example of exactly the tendency to which she drew attention, and we must do everything we can to resist it in this Chamber.

Douglas Hogg: Last Thursday, at business questions, the Leader of the House made it plain that he was willing to look again at programming. He said that there should be a little more time for consideration, so as to reflect on our experiences. I hope that when he comes to do that, he will reflect on what will happen with this Bill, which incidentally will replicate what happened with the Finance Bill last week.
	It is inevitable that many important new clauses and amendments will not be discussed in this place; they will go to the other place wholly undiscussed. As the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) and my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) have said, those matters are of considerable importance. They include, and I will cite just three, jury trials, the way we deal with those sentenced for murder, and corporate manslaughter, the latter being the subject of a Back-Bench amendment.
	Apart from the general points that I usually make on these occasions, there are others points that we should keep in mind. For many of us, this is the first opportunity to participate in debate on the detail of the Bill. It will perhaps be revealing a secret when I say that I volunteered to serve on the Standing Committee. The Whips did not find my offer very attractive and I do not wholly blame them. I was one of those who was willing, on my own terms, to serve on the Standing Committee and I was rejected, but now I would like to participate fully in the debate and I find that the Government timetable motion prevents me from doing so.

John Bercow: As one who was similarly underprivileged and down-trodden to the extent that I was denied a place on the Standing Committee upon the Bill, and in view of the importance of the public understanding why we are inveighing against the programme motion, will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that, even if we were to have six and a half hours uninterrupted debate without a single vote, which is wholly implausible, there would be under two minutes to debate each of the almost 200 amendments and new clauses today?

Douglas Hogg: I am sure that my hon. Friend will not misunderstand me when I say that I do not suppose that six and a half hours would entirely accommodate my hon. Friend. I see why our Front-Bench team was uneasy at the prospect of a Hogg-Bercow axis. None the less, we are here today and we want to participate in the debate.
	There are other serious points. I do not think that it is right to allow the Executive to determine the business of the House. They are entitled to come before the House and to place legislation before it, but what they are not entitled to do is to regulate the timetable. That seems to be a matter for us. I hope that, in the fullness of time, a business committee of the House, not the Executive, will regulate the timetable.
	While I recognise that there are discussions between the Front-Bench teams as to what particular clauses and new clauses people want to focus on, Back Benchers do not always agree with Front Benchers. Therefore, it is important when the timetable is being regulated, that the interests of all hon. Members, Back Bench, Front Bench and minority parties as well, be properly taken into account. That is not happening in these timetable motions.
	I see, Mr. Speaker, that you are going to call me to order in a moment. I come back directly to the question. A lot of important matters will remain unaddressed. We will send them to the other place undiscussed. That is a denial of democracy. Ultimately, we bring democracy into disrepute.

Lady Hermon: My colleagues from the Ulster Unionist party are with me in spirit, although not in reality. On this occasion, they are united with me. I welcome the Minister to the Dispatch Box and am delighted to see him here today. However, I wish to commend warmly his predecessor, now the Minister of State, Department for International Development, the hon. Member for Leeds, Central (Hilary Benn). When we began the 30 or so sittings in Committee—for which I had the great privilege to be selected—I was not familiar with the criminal law, but I came away from it greatly educated on double jeopardy, hearsay evidence and other matters, thanks to the Minister's predecessor.
	My concern with the motion relates to the amendments on Northern Ireland. Five months ago in Committee—plus two or three days—the then Under-Secretary said:
	"I confirm . . . that Northern Ireland Ministers intend that the Bill should apply to Northern Ireland".—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 16 January 2003; c. 390.]
	As I understand it, only part 10 of the Bill will extend to Northern Ireland. It grieves me terribly, on behalf of the 1.6 million people of Northern Ireland, that we are only today—five months later—seeing the amendments extended to Northern Ireland, and done so selectively. I urge the Home Office to think about joined-up government, involving Northern Ireland Ministers and Home Office Ministers. Other parts of the Bill should be extended to Northern Ireland and should have been extended to it in good time.

Mike Hancock: Unlike the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) and the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow), I did not volunteer to serve on the Standing Committee, because I fully expected, as a Back Bencher, to be given the opportunity to talk about the Bill, the 500 amendments and 25 Government new clauses. To be denied that, means that Back Benchers have been denied the opportunity of voicing the criticisms and concerns of constituents on vital issues that will affect many of them for years to come.
	Surely it is to neglect the responsibilities of the House towards the general population to have the debate curtailed in such a way and for so many important issues to be squeezed out. As the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said, many of the amendments will not even be discussed in this place. That cannot be doing justice to the Bill. If the Bill is to do justice to the nation, the House should at least be given the courtesy of doing justice to it.

Patrick Cormack: This brief debate has already produced three rather interesting contributions. The first—from the Minister, whom we all welcome most warmly—was extremely brief, concise and to the point. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) then revealed something of which I was not aware: that there are occasions on which Whips can be truly discerning. There was also a remarkable contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), who revealed something even more unusual; that there are occasions on which the Ulster Unionist party can be united. I suspect that that is because she spoke for them; the others are all absent.
	We are debating an extremely serious matter this afternoon; the Government's timetable, which was never generous, but has been transformed into a guillotine of severe proportions. The subjects that the House will be called upon to debate today and tomorrow are so important that none of us should speak in this debate for more than a few seconds or minutes. However, we will not be able to go back to our constituents this weekend and say that there was a proper discussion on trial by jury and the other important matters, a litany of which were read out by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) in his pertinent contribution.
	Frankly, this is a disgrace. The Executive should not be able to put the Commons in a straitjacket in this manner. In future, if we are to have proper programming of Bills that allows adequate discussions of important issues, the timetables must be properly agreed. There must be flexibility if the Government subject us to an avalanche of extra amendments. Otherwise, we are going to turn this place into a total non-entity, which it is close to being already.

Question put:—
	The House divided: Ayes 283, Noes 160.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Orders of the Day
	 — 
	Criminal Justice Bill
	 — 
	[2nd Allotted Day]

As amended in the Standing Committee, further considered.

Government New Clause 14
	 — 
	Taking Fingerprints Without Consent

'(1) Section 61 of the 1984 Act (fingerprinting) is amended as follows.
	(2) For subsections (3) and (4) (taking of fingerprints without appropriate consent) there is substituted—
	"(3) The fingerprints of a person detained at a police station may be taken without the appropriate consent if—
	(a) he is detained in consequence of his arrest for a recordable offence; and
	(b) he has not had his fingerprints taken in the course of the investigation of the offence by the police.
	(4) The fingerprints of a person detained at a police station may be taken without the appropriate consent if—
	(a) he has been charged with a recordable offence or informed that he will be reported for such an offence; and
	(b) he has not had his fingerprints taken in the course of the investigation of the offence by the police."
	(3) In subsection (3A) (disregard of incomplete or unsatisfactory fingerprints) for the words from the beginning to "subsection (3) above" there is substituted "Where a person mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (3) or (4) has already had his fingerprints taken in the course of the investigation of the offence by the police".
	(4) In subsection (5) (authorisation to be given or confirmed in writing) for "subsection (3)(a) or (4A)" there is substituted "subsection (4A)".
	(5) In subsection (7) (reasons for taking of fingerprints without consent) for "subsection (3) or (6)" there is substituted "subsection (3), (4) or (6)".'.
	—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
	Brought up, and read the First time.

Bob Ainsworth: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
	Amendment (a) to the proposed new clause, in subsection (3)(a) after 'offence', insert
	'and an officer of at least the rank of inspector authorises them to be taken'.
	Government new clause 15—Taking non-intimate samples without consent—
	'(1) Section 63 of the 1984 Act (other samples) is amended as follows.
	(2) After subsection (2) (consent to be given in writing) there is inserted—
	"(2A) A non-intimate sample may be taken from a person without the appropriate consent if two conditions are satisfied.
	(2B) The first is that the person is in police detention in consequence of his arrest for a recordable offence.
	(2C) The second is that—
	(a) he has not had a non-intimate sample of the same type and from the same part of the body taken in the course of the investigation of the offence by the police, or
	(b) he has had such a sample taken but it proved insufficient."
	(3) In subsection (3)(a) (taking of samples without appropriate consent) the words "is in police detention or" are omitted.
	(4) In subsection (3A) (taking of samples without appropriate consent after charge) for "(whether or not he falls within subsection (3)(a) above)" there is substituted "(whether or not he is in police detention or held in custody by the police on the authority of a court)".
	(5) In subsection (8A) (reasons for taking of samples without consent) for "subsection (3A)" there is substituted "subsection (2A), (3A)".'.
	And the following amendments thereto: (a), in subsection (2A), after 'appropriate consent if' leave out 'two' and insert 'three'.
	(b), at end of (2C) insert
	'(2D) The third is that an officer of at least the rank of inspector authorises them to be taken.'.
	New clause 20—Arrest without warrant for arrestable offences—
	'.— After subsection (5) of section 24 of the 1984 Act there is inserted—
	"(5A) Any person may arrest, without warrant, any person who is accused by an apparently credible witness of having committed an arrestable offence shortly before the accusation is made.".'.
	New clause 55—Destruction of fingerprints and samples—
	'(1) Section 64 of the 1984 Act (destruction of fingerprints and samples) is amended as follows:
	(2) In subsection (3) the words ', except as provided in the following provisions of this section,' are omitted.
	(3) Subsections (3AA), (3AB) and (3AC) are omitted.'.
	Amendment No. 122, in page 5, line 18 [Clause 7], leave out 'and' and insert—
	'(ba) The Law Society of England and Wales,
	(bb) The Bar Council,
	(bc) The Institute of Legal Executives, and'.
	Amendment No. 167, in page 5, line 18 [Clause 7], leave out 'and' and insert—
	'(ba) the Home Affairs Committee'.
	Amendment No. 54, in page 5, line 21 [Clause 7], at end insert—
	'(6) No code or revised code issued under this section shall have effect until approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.'.
	Amendment No. 55, in page 5, line 36 [Clause 7], at end insert—
	'(7A) No code or revised code issued under this section shall have effect until approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.'.
	Amendment No. 169, in page 6, line 2, leave out clause 9.
	Amendment No. 57, in page 6, line 7 [Clause 9], leave out second 'a' and insert 'such'.
	Amendment No. 58, in page 6, line 7 [Clause 9], leave out second 'drug' and insert 'drugs'.
	Amendment No. 59, in page 6, line 8 [Clause 9], at end insert—
	'as are identified as cannabis or cannabis resin'.
	Amendment No. 170, in page 6, line 41 [Clause 10], leave out 'different' and insert 'higher'.
	Government amendments Nos. 231 and 109.

Bob Ainsworth: I shall speak mainly to Government new clauses 14 and 15 and Government amendments Nos. 231 and 109, and deal with the other amendments in a diverse group as briefly as I can.
	Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the police may currently take fingerprints from all those charged with, informed that they will be reported for, or convicted of, a recordable offence. With the authority of an inspector, the police may also take fingerprints from those suspected of a criminal offence where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the fingerprints will tend to confirm or disprove the suspect's involvement.
	PACE also permits the police to take a person's fingerprints when they have reason to believe that they will confirm, disprove or assist in ascertaining the suspect's identity. An inspector's authority is required and the person must have refused to identify himself or herself or the officer must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is not who they claim to be. So the police can miss the opportunity to establish a detained person's true identity if they lie about who they are and the police have no reason to suspect that they have lied.
	The problem presents itself even more acutely now that we have the new Livescan technology, which can check a fingerprint against national records while the detained person can be reasonably expected to be in custody. New clause 14 will enable those who seek to evade justice by giving the police a false identity to be properly identified and dealt with through the due process of law. There will be a link to the police national computer, which may reveal whether the person is believed to be a danger to themselves or to others, or perhaps requires medication or an appropriate adult to be present during an interview.
	New clause 14 has been welcomed by the police. The power to take fingerprints pre-charge has civil liberties implications. I recognise those concerns, but the intrusion on personal liberty is both necessary and proportionate to the benefits for the victims of crime and society generally, in detecting crime and protecting the public from criminals.
	The Court of Appeal has recently considered those issues in a judicial review brought by a juvenile known as S and an individual known as Michael Marper against the chief constable of South Yorkshire. Both had their fingerprints and a sample of DNA taken when they were charged and each asked the chief constable to destroy their fingerprints and DNA samples and to remove their DNA profile from the national database. When proceedings against them had finished, the chief constable decided to retain the fingerprints. The Court of Appeal found that, although limited interference under article 8(1) of the European convention on human rights took place, it was proportionate to the benefits that accrue to the victims of crime and society as a whole and to the prevention and detection of crime.
	New clause 15 would allow non-intimate samples to be taken from anyone arrested for a recordable offence and detained in a police station. A non-intimate sample is defined by section 65 of PACE and includes hair, mouth swabs, saliva and skin impressions. Currently, the police may take non-intimate samples from all those charged with, informed that they will be reported for, or convicted of a recordable offence. On the authority of an inspector, a non-intimate sample may be taken from those suspected of a recordable offence where reasonable grounds exist to believe that the sample will tend to confirm or disprove the suspect's identity.
	The new power to take non-intimate samples from people arrested for a recordable offence and detained at a police station will enable a DNA profile to be obtained and a search to be made on the database for matches with a crime-scene stain.

Humfrey Malins: If this problem has been known for some time, why was not such a clause included in the original Bill or introduced in Committee?

Bob Ainsworth: New clauses 14 and 15 have been introduced after discussions with the police. I have talked about the new fingerprinting technology that is now available, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would agree, if he agrees that the proportionality is reasonable, that we should not delay introducing these changes because they will clearly help in the detection of crime.

Graham Allen: So that hon. Members on both sides of the House are clear about this, may I say that this issue was raised in Committee? I did so myself, and the Minister of State, Department for International Development, my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, Central (Hilary Benn)—who conducted himself so superbly in Committee—agreed that the Government would consider it, so I am very grateful to them for introducing the proposal.

Bob Ainsworth: I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. He had the benefit of serving on the Standing Committee. Of course I did not do so. Knowing that the issue was discussed with some concern in Committee adds to my argument for us to get on and deal with it.

Dominic Grieve: Are there not two issues? The first is the propriety of taking samples, whether DNA or fingerprints, from someone who has been arrested but not charged, for the purpose of checking whether they might be wanted for, or implicated in, some other offence. The second is the decision to add that material to a national DNA database. If what we are really doing is extending the criteria for addition to the DNA database to people who have been arrested and not charged, would it not be better simply to say that it is the Government's view that everybody in the country should provide fingerprints and DNA samples for crime-prevention purposes? That is in fact what the Government are slowly moving towards by stealth.

Bob Ainsworth: There is no justification for saying that. I read out the decision taken by the Court of Appeal on the retention of fingerprints. I see no reason, in principle, why the same decision would not be reached on DNA. There is a good case for taking samples, whether DNA or fingerprints, in the circumstances that have been described. Having taken them, should they be destroyed? Other evidence gathered in the course of an investigation is not necessarily destroyed. It would be a big step to move from that to the hon. Gentleman's idea that there should be a complete database with everybody's fingerprints and DNA. There are wholly different issues to think about in that regard.

John Bercow: In a completely non-partisan context, may I raise a different matter that relates to the experience of one of my constituents? My constituent lost his daughter in a road accident in 1984 as a result of reckless driving. On the occasion of the accident, the person who was subsequently proved to have been the culprit was, for a relatively brief period, unconscious. Under the law, was it right—my constituent does not think so—that there was no subsequent opportunity to breathalyse the defendant, who was subsequently convicted of dangerous driving? My constituent will never know whether, as he suspects, the man concerned was under the influence. I am not saying that that is the point of the provision, but is there any intention to address that issue?

Bob Ainsworth: We have talked about such issues and tried to deal with them. I am not insensitive to the issue raised by the hon. Gentleman, but we have only a relatively short time to debate this group of amendments, after Opposition Members discussed the programme motion and voted against it. I have taken interventions, and I do not want to extend the debate to an issue that is not covered by the amendments and new clauses that we are discussing.

Simon Hughes: rose—

Bob Ainsworth: I will give way to the hon. Gentleman but then I must make some progress, as other Members want to contribute.

Simon Hughes: May I take the Minister back to an earlier point that is central to the debate? Will he explain why someone who is not convicted of a criminal offence, and someone who is arrested but against whom no further action is taken and who is thus also not convicted of a criminal offence, should be treated differently in the criminal justice system? Why should the state record details in one case where a person who is completely innocent and not in the other? What is the logic?

Bob Ainsworth: The logic is to provide proportionality and to deal with crime and to protect our communities from crime. The hon. Gentleman cannot have been listening when I read out the Court of Appeal decision in the judicial review of decisions to retain the DNA and fingerprints of the two individuals concerned. The Court of Appeal does not find that problem insurmountable, even if he does so, there is no huge matter of principle. The point is whether it is proportionate to the size of the problem to allow those records to be kept. I believe that it is, and that a clear case can be made for keeping both DNA samples and fingerprints. For the reasons that I set out in relation to the new clause on fingerprints, the extension of police powers to retain DNA samples is both necessary and proportionate.
	I now turn to the Opposition amendments to new clause 14. In response to amendment (a), it is important that the police can act quickly and systematically, and the amendment would introduce an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. The same applies to amendments (a) and (b) to new clause 15. Imposing a restriction whereby the taking of a sample must be authorised by an inspector or above could result in crimes going undetected and introduce an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy.
	On Opposition new clause 55, which deals with destroying fingerprints and samples, it is important for the police to be able to retain all the information assembled during an investigation of an offence, not least to enable them to investigate a possible miscarriage of justice in the future. The police can already retain other information gathered as part of an investigation, such as witness statements, photographs and so on, and samples and fingerprints taken from a person who has been arrested during an investigation are not fundamentally different from those. Samples will be available to the police in the event of that suspect committing an offence in the future. Law-abiding citizens should have nothing to fear, as they will be used only for the prevention and the investigation of crime.

Mike Hancock: Will the Minister give way?

Bob Ainsworth: I have given way a great deal, and I need to get on and deal with this group of amendments, to allow other Members, perhaps including the hon. Gentleman, to speak.
	In relation to new clause 20, on citizen's arrest, it seeks to extend the circumstances in which a citizen may make an arrest. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 already allows a citizen's arrest in circumstances in which an arrestable offence has in fact been committed. The new clause could be interpreted as extending that scope for arrest to cover circumstances in which there is no certainty that an arrestable offence had been committed, but only a believable accusation. Powers to arrest when there is merely a suspicion are best left to the judgment and experience of a police officer.
	Amendment No. 54 would require the retention of the affirmative resolution procedure for new and revised PACE codes. I understand that there was extensive discussion of the issue in Committee, and following that discussion, trying to take into account the views of the Home Affairs Committee, we have considered the procedural options for dealing with new and amended codes. We accept that the affirmative procedure is justified for new codes and for significant amendments. We have been trying, however, to devise a quicker route for handling minor and straightforward changes. We have looked at the scope for involving the Home Affairs Committee in advising on whether specific changes warrant detailed parliamentary scrutiny, but substantial difficulties exist in terms of specifying a role for the Committee in the Bill.
	A more workable alternative might be to amend the legislation so that there is effectively a choice between affirmative resolution and merely laying any proposed changes before Parliament. Ministers could then undertake in Parliament to seek to be bound by the Home Affairs Committee advice in each individual case. That might effectively ensure that the Committee had oversight of which procedure should be adopted, without referring to the Committee in the Bill, and might be a way of resolving the conflict between the need for flexibility and the need for proper scrutiny. It is therefore a difficult problem, which needs more consideration. We would be grateful to hear further views in the light of what I have just suggested, and against that background I would ask that the amendments be withdrawn, although we would be happy to return to the issue to deal with other Members' views in another place.
	Amendment No. 55 would require the affirmative resolution procedure for analogous codes covering the work of military police forces. Currently, such codes are subject only to negative resolution. They tend to follow the PACE codes, and we think that there is a good case for exempting them from specific parliamentary procedure. I therefore ask the Opposition to withdraw the amendment.

Douglas Hogg: The Minister says that the military code tends to follow PACE. If so, I follow his points, but given the degree to which it diverges from PACE, it seems that the Minister is on a bad point.

Bob Ainsworth: I have said that, by and large, the code tends to follow PACE. I do not know whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman considers it useful to take up the time of the House discussing what are effectively duplications in most cases. I shall be happy to listen to views on that. However, we do not believe that there is a case for the affirmative resolution procedure to be used, certainly in regard to analogous codes.

James Clappison: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The Minister has repeatedly adverted to the inadequacy of the timetable motion. Is there any way in which the Minister and the Government can return to a further programming committee to seek more time so that we can properly debate the Bill? The Minister keeps saying that inadequate time is the reason for not debating matters in this place. That is the message that is coming from the horse's mouth. Can you help the Government out of the fix of their own making?

Mr. Speaker: It is not a matter for the Minister because the House has decided to agree to the programme motion, and therefore it is the property of the House.

Bob Ainsworth: The hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison) should listen to what I say. I was talking about whether it would be useful for the House to spend time discussing changes to the military codes in future. I was not talking about the time that we spend dealing with the Bill now. We would have had a little more time today if Members had not spoken against the programme motion and divided on it. We would have had an extra hour and a quarter to discuss these matters rather than the truncated debate that will now take place.
	As for amendment No. 122, we believe that it is sensible to extend the consultation requirements to the Law Society and the Bar Council but that it is unnecessary to extend them to the Institute of Legal Executives. The Law Society and the Bar Council adequately represent a broad range of legal perspectives. The institute could be consulted where a particular need arose.
	Amendment No. 167 relates to consulting the Home Affairs Committee. That needs to be considered in line with what I said earlier about potential changes to the code.

Dominic Grieve: Will the Minister give way?

Bob Ainsworth: I would like to give way to the hon. Gentleman, but Conservative Back Benchers are demanding that I take less time at the Dispatch Box. The hon. Gentleman speaks for the Opposition Front Bench, and I will give way to him if he wishes me to do so. However, I hope that I do not get—

Dominic Grieve: Will the Minister give way?

Bob Ainsworth: I will not give way. I shall make some progress.
	I move on to the amendments to clause 9, which deals with powers of arrest for possession of class C drugs. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary announced his intention to bring forward reclassification of cannabis from class B to class C under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. In conjunction with that, my right hon. Friend announced that the police would continue to be able to arrest persons for offences of possession of cannabis where public order was threatened.
	Under guidance issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers, for most offences of cannabis possession, a police warning will be sufficient along with confiscation of the drug. However, where there is a public order problem or where children are at risk, the result could be an arrest. We do not believe that clause 9 sends mixed messages. The message that we are sending is that cannabis is harmful, but not as harmful as other class A or B drugs. That is reflected in law enforcement. The power of arrest for possession of cannabis will be used sparingly, and the penalties are different.
	On amendments Nos. 57 to 59, it would be inconsistent with the principles underlying the classification structure of the Misuse of Drugs Act to have a specific law for cannabis. The Government believe that it is right that cannabis should be in class C. The power of arrest would be used only in limited circumstances. In practice, we envisage very few cases indeed where the power of arrest would be appropriate in relation to other class C drugs. The problem is more apparent than real.

Dominic Grieve: With regard to new clauses 14 and 15, the Opposition fully understand the concern of the police that it may be a powerful tool in the detection of crime if they have the opportunity, when somebody is arrested and brought into the police station for another matter, to obtain, prior to charge, non-intimate DNA samples and to take fingerprints, so as to check whether that person might be wanted in connection with some other, possibly far more serious, matter. It is a pragmatic approach, but it is based on the knowledge that often, when police officers pick up somebody for some minor matter, something far more serious may be lurking behind.
	If that were the sole purpose of the new clauses, we would be willing to go along with it. But the Government are seeking through the new clauses to add to a mischief that they introduced in the 2001 Act and to provide that, although somebody may have no criminal conviction against their name and may never even have been charged with any offence, the material collected from them by way of a non-intimate DNA sample or by way of fingerprint when they are brought into the police station will be retained and added to the national database. That potentially involves a very large number of people. Some 1.2 million people per annum are arrested for possible recordable offences, although that does not mean that that number are charged.
	The Minister seemed to miss the point when he answered the intervention earlier. There may well be a thoroughly sound argument that matters have moved on so much in the possibilities of scientific analysis and detection that the time has come when, for the sake of the prevention of crime, all of us, law-abiding and non-law-abiding, should voluntarily or compulsorily provide our DNA and our fingerprints to the state, so that if an offence is committed, rapid checks can be carried out. There are some who would oppose that on civil liberties grounds. It would undoubtedly be a considerable intrusion into civil liberties, but it is perfectly capable of rational justification, if that is what the Minister wishes to do.
	However, what is being done through the new clauses is yet again to create a new category of—excuse me using the word—Untermenschen, a sort of sub-people who, although they may have done nothing wrong, must figure in the national database, whereas other people are excluded from it. I find that, as a philosophical position, deeply unsatisfactory and offensive. The Conservatives objected to the 2001 extension for that reason. Whatever the Court of Appeal may say or do, I disagree with it. The court is there to interpret the law. Parliament passed the law. In this context, it was a thoroughly bad law, and now the Minister's proposals would compound the matter.
	Law-abiding people who have never been in trouble with the police in their life, who were taken into the police station for some minor matter from which they may be totally exonerated half an hour or 45 minutes later, will find, to their deep resentment that their DNA and fingerprints have been added to the national database. The opportunities for abuse of the measure are obvious. The police can easily arrest somebody and release them afterwards. The chances of anybody having some subsequent recourse or bringing proceedings are slight. People do not normally act in that way. I say to the Minister that there will be a new class of people who are dissatisfied and discontented with the way in which policing is carried out in this country. As my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) recently pointed out, the state is good on the easy cases—it arrests and criminalises people who are usually law-abiding—but poor at dealing with those whom society requires should be dealt with. For those reasons, we object to the new clause, and if the Government are not prepared to accept an amendment ensuring that the DNA and fingerprints would be destroyed, we will oppose it.

Lady Hermon: As the hon. Gentleman, too, was present at the many Standing Committee sittings, he will recall clearly that the Minister who was then responsible for the Bill frequently prayed in aid experience, practice and procedure in other common-law jurisdictions. Is he aware of any other common-law jurisdiction in which such provision is the practice or procedure?

Dominic Grieve: I am not aware of any such jurisdiction. Indeed, on normal common-law principles, the provision is highly offensive. It runs contrary to every aspect of our national tradition, because law-abiding individuals who do not bring themselves into trouble by being successfully prosecuted and convicted should not have any personal details about them retained on police files—in particular, their fingerprints and DNA.
	I object fundamentally to the proposal and I do not understand the rationale behind it. Indeed, when I met the Association of Chief Police Officers to discuss the proposal when it was first raised, it did not suggest that such material had to be retained. It wanted power to obtain fingerprints and DNA to make the comparison, but there was no suggestion that it wanted to add those data to the national database.

Douglas Hogg: Might I suggest what may be a motive and is undoubtedly a vice? On recognising that the new clauses allow the acquisition of non-intimate samples and/or fingerprints, the police might go on a fishing expedition and make an arrest for which there is no adequate justification in order to use the powers and obtain the samples to further their inquiries. While there may be a case for such an approach, if it is to be taken, it needs to be made overt. The provision is a panacea for fishing.

Dominic Grieve: I agree entirely with my right hon. and learned Friend. Indeed, I sought to make that very point earlier. The system could be open to abuse and lead to claims that people have been persecuted for the sake of getting them into the police station under a pretext of arrest.
	In the limited time available, I shall not speak any further about new clauses 14 and 15, except to say that we oppose them and will press new clause 15 to a vote. I wish now to turn to the other matters that have been touched on, as there are other very important matters to be considered, although, frankly, we do not have the opportunity to do them justice.
	I am delighted to hear from the Minister that he is in favour of consultation with groups about any changes to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. He specifically mentioned the Bar Council and the Law Society. Am I to take it that the Government propose to table an amendment in another place specifically to provide that they should be consulted? I see the Minister nodding, but he had better put it on record.

Bob Ainsworth: I make it clear that, if the hon. Gentleman does not press his amendment, we will table an amendment to do precisely that.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister. I appreciate the point that he makes, but the reason why we seek to add the Institute of Legal Executives to the list is that those who attend at police stations for the interview of suspects are frequently members of that organisation and not qualified solicitors. In those circumstances, people in that single category probably have the most experience of the way in which the police operate PACE on a daily basis. Of course, the Bar may be involved in unravelling the problems of PACE if there is a challenge in the courts afterwards, and there will be occasions when solicitors attend. We will not press the amendment to a vote. I am grateful to the Minister, but I urge him to think about the Institute of Legal Executives. I think that the Government will find that they have to consult it during any revision of the codes, because it plays an important part in their operation.

David Cameron: As my hon. Friend is talking about reviewing the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, does he agree with new clause 20, which is in my name and would ensure a proper review of security guards' powers of arrest? It is clear that they have the power to arrest someone when they see an offence committed, but it is not clear whether they would be able to do so if another security guard saw it on closed circuit television. Does my hon. Friend agree that this is an important issue? If we are to crack down on shoplifting, the Government should give my new clause a fair hearing, not the time that we have been allowed this afternoon.

Dominic Grieve: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. I did not take his new clause in sequence, because I wanted to leave it to the end and take more time over it. As he has raised it, I might as well deal with it now.
	My hon. Friend raises an important point. We talk about the police officer being a citizen in uniform, but we give the police very great powers reasonably to carry out an arrest on suspicion. We are very short of police officers at the moment—

Ian Lucas: There are more now than there have ever been.

Dominic Grieve: We are very short of police officers who can carry out the necessary work of policing, but we are disempowering individuals so that they cannot take perfectly reasonable action to prevent crime or apprehend criminals.
	My hon. Friend's new clause merits serious consideration. It would certainly make it easier for someone to carry out a citizen's arrest. After all, the Minister and the Government have been extending the categories in which hearsay evidence is allowed in court. Oddly enough, however, if one's granny says that she has been mugged, but one was not at the scene and did not witness the mugging, one's ability to arrest the individual will be limited. That is an important matter, and we cannot do justice to it in the time available.

John Mann: In one of his amendments, the hon. Gentleman wants to give powers of consultation to his own trade union—the Bar Council. Would he like to extend such powers to the shop workers' trade union—the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers?

Dominic Grieve: That needs to be debated at greater length, which shows what a mockery the timetable is. However, let me move on, because I want to give other hon. Members time to speak.
	On the approval of the codes, I am grateful to the Minister for accepting the strong representations that the Opposition made in Committee on the need for the affirmative procedure. I am delighted about that, and I shall say no more about the issue. We shall look at the details when they appear in the other place.
	Finally, I turn to the question of class C drugs. I do not want to get bogged down on whether cannabis should be a class B or a class C drug. The Government have made their decision, which has been both criticised and approved, depending on people's standpoint. What is extraordinary, however, is that by moving cannabis into the class C category, the Government have made all offences involving class C drugs arrestable. That is complete nonsense because those offences encompass such banal things as walking around in the street with ordinary prescription drugs or, indeed, drugs that may be banned nationally, such as steroids, which are not exactly abused on a large scale. There is absolutely no justification for making such things arrestable, when the Government accepted in Committee the fact that other class C drugs were not arrestable and had never caused a problem. Indeed, in the last year for which figures were available, there were only, prior to cannabis being made a class C drug, 450 prosecutions for possession of a class C drug in England and Wales. The problem is minute, and the Government are taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

Bob Ainsworth: Surely the hon. Gentleman accepts that we are giving a power of arrest that will have to be limited in its use by guidance to be drawn up by ACPO. The problem that he raises is an apparent problem only, in that I cannot envisage circumstances in which the power of arrest will be used for any other class C drug. He should address the reality of what is being done, not seek to dress it up differently.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister is doing something that the Government do all the time nowadays. They say, "This is a power that we need to have, but it will be exercised in a particular way." I see no reason why they should take a power that they do not intend to exercise. The class C list includes 117 substances other than cannabis and cannabis resin, and more have been added in the past week or two. Having moved cannabis and cannabis resin to class C, the Government are completely distorting the mechanisms of class C to accommodate it. Much better than that ludicrous tinkering would be simply to make cannabis and cannabis resin a discrete drug that is arrestable within class C.

Douglas Hogg: Does my hon. Friend agree that what the Minister said—namely, that the power of arrest shall depend on ACPO, an unaccountable body—is deeply offensive to this House?

Dominic Grieve: I entirely agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. That is why we would have sought, but probably will not have the opportunity, to put our amendments to the vote.

David Heath: The folly of the timetable is clearly demonstrated by the fact that we have six minutes left with many hon. Members wishing to contribute to the debate on a group of amendments that covers fingerprints, citizen's arrest, retention of DNA samples, consultation, the important disputed issue of drugs—about which we should like to say a great deal more—and the rules under which PACE will operate.
	The Government may have a case for testing prior to charge for DNA samples or for fingerprints. They do not, however, have a case for retaining that evidence solely for those who happen to have crossed the portals of a police station under arrest, but not for the rest of the population. One is either innocent or not innocent: we cannot establish a new category of people whom we do not like the look of and on whom we will retain evidence sine die for use on a future occasion. The problem is that the police will inevitably use that provision, which is on a par with those in the rest of the Bill. Increasingly, someone who has been convicted of an offence that may or may not be relevant, accused of or charged with an offence, or arrested is considered to be the likely suspect and no longer has the same standards of liberty as the rest of the population. I know that the Home Secretary has a somewhat Laodicean view of human rights, but that is not good enough, and it is time that the House made that clear. If a national database is to be established, let the Government come clean and say that that is what they intend.

Graham Allen: Would a national database established under independent auspices, rather than the auspices of the state or the police, allay some of the hon. Gentleman's fears? Would he consider allowing voluntary entries to the DNA database so that people could be checked when necessary? I hope that he would concede that a lot of good has come from DNA testing.

David Heath: Of course I would concede the latter point. We need to have a debate about the matter. It is interesting that when it was first raised in 2001, police officers were invited to provide DNA samples. A great number did not wish to do so: perhaps that tells its own story. I do not accept, however, the halfway house that the Government propose.
	The group covers other important matters. We have already debated future procedure for amendments to codes of conduct under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The Government are moving in the direction that we wanted, for which I am grateful. I look forward to the outcome of those deliberations. The Minister rejected my view that an inspector's agreement should be required for taking samples in a police station. That is the position under PACE. The Minister claims that it is bureaucratic and unnecessary, but I believe that it may be a useful safeguard.
	I want to speak briefly about amendments Nos. 169 and 170, which Liberal Democrat Members tabled. They relate to the point that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) made about the unholy mess that the Government have made of their position on drugs law. Irrespective of one's views on cannabis reclassification, it is especially absurd that at the same time as the Government do that, they introduce it as an arrestable offence together with possession of a variety of other substances that should never be included in that category.
	We support a clearly defined drugs policy, with objectives that people understand, that is not undermined by inconsistency but that points people in the direction of the treatment that they need. The Bill does nothing to help that process. If we have the opportunity, we should like to test hon. Members' opinion of amendment No. 169. The debate has been wholly inadequate on such an important subject. It underlines the inadequacy of today's programme motion.

Graham Allen: We need a national debate on DNA and whether there should be a national database. We should also hold a further debate, which I hope the Government will sponsor, on whether we can extend DNA databases on a voluntary basis.

Douglas Hogg: I want to reinforce the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) on new clause 15, which will enable the police to go on fishing expeditions. When I first became a Member of Parliament, there was much debate about the vagrancy Acts and the power to arrest people on suspicion. We are now giving the police precisely the same sort of power, which they will use to obtain fingerprints and/or intimate or non-intimate samples from people against whom there is insufficient evidence.

It being one and a quarter hours after the commencement of proceedings on the programme motion, Madam Deputy Speaker, pursuant to Orders [4 February, 5 March, 2 April and this day] put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.
	Question accordingly agreed to.
	Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
	Madam Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.
	Amendment proposed: No. 169, in page 6, line 2, leave out Clause 9—[Mr. Heath.]
	The House divided: Ayes 40, Noes 317.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 15
	 — 
	Taking Non-Intimate Samples Without Consent

'(1) Section 63 of the 1984 Act (other samples) is amended as follows.
	(2) After subsection (2) (consent to be given in writing) there is inserted—
	"(2A) A non-intimate sample may be taken from a person without the appropriate consent if two conditions are satisfied.
	(2B) The first is that the person is in police detention in consequence of his arrest for a recordable offence.
	(2C) The second is that—
	(a) he has not had a non-intimate sample of the same type and from the same part of the body taken in the course of the investigation of the offence by the police, or
	(b) he has had such a sample taken but it proved insufficient."
	(3) In subsection (3)(a) (taking of samples without appropriate consent) the words "is in police detention or" are omitted.
	(4) In subsection (3A) (taking of samples without appropriate consent after charge) for "(whether or not he falls within subsection (3)(a) above)" there is substituted "(whether or not he is in police detention or held in custody by the police on the authority of a court)".
	(5) In subsection (8A) (reasons for taking of samples without consent) for "subsection (3A)" there is substituted "subsection (2A), (3A)".'.
	—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
	Brought up, and read the First time.
	Motion made, and Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—
	The House divided: Ayes 323, Noes 178.

Question accordingly agreed to.
	Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 52
	 — 
	Absconding by Persons Released on Bail

'(1) For paragraph 6 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the 1976 Act (defendant need not be granted bail if having been released on bail he has been arrested in pursuance of section 7) there is substituted—
	"6 (1) If the defendant falls within this paragraph, he may not be granted bail unless the court is satisfied that there is no significant risk that, if released on bail (whether subject to conditions or not), he would fail to surrender to custody; but this does not require the court, if so satisfied, to grant bail (disregarding other considerations).
	(2) Subject to subparagraph (3) below, the defendant falls within this paragraph if—
	(a) he is aged 18 or over, and
	(b) it appears to the court that, having been released on bail in or in connection with the proceedings for the offence, he failed to surrender to custody.
	(3) Where it appears to the court that the defendant had reasonable cause for his failure to surrender to custody, he does not fall within this paragraph unless it also appears to the court that he failed to surrender to custody at the appointed place as soon as reasonably practicable after the appointed time.
	(4) For the purposes of subparagraph (3) above, a failure to give to the defendant a copy of the record of the decision to grant him bail shall not constitute a reasonable cause for his failure to surrender to custody."
	(2) In section 6 of the 1976 Act (offence of absconding by person released on bail) after subsection (9) there is inserted—
	"(10) Section 127 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 shall not apply in relation to an offence under subsection (1) or (2) above.
	(11) Where a person has been released on bail in criminal proceedings and that bail was granted by a constable, a magistrates' court shall not try that person for an offence under subsection (1) or (2) above in relation to that bail (the "relevant offence") unless subsection (12) or (13) below applies.
	(12) This subsection applies if an information is laid for the relevant offence within 6 months from the time of the commission of the relevant offence.
	(13) This subsection applies if—
	(a) subsection (12) above does not apply,
	(b) none of the events mentioned in subsection (14) below occurs during the period mentioned in subsection (12) above, and
	(c) no later than 3 months from the time of the occurrence of the first of those events to occur after the end of that period, an information is laid for the relevant offence.
	(14) Those events are—
	(a) the person surrenders to custody at the appointed place;
	(b) the person is arrested, or attends at a police station, in connection with the relevant offence or the offence for which he was granted bail;
	(c) the person appears or is brought before a court in connection with the relevant offence or the offence for which he was granted bail."'
	—[The Solicitor-General.]
	Brought up, and read the First time.

Harriet Harman: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
	The following amendments to the proposed new clause:
	Amendment (a), in proposed new paragraph 6(1), leave out from 'custody' to the end of the paragraph.
	Amendment (b), leave out proposed new paragraph 6(4).
	Government new clause 53—Supplementary amendments to the Bail Act 1976.
	Government amendments Nos. 443 to 448, 232 and 449.
	Amendment No. 171, in page 12, clause 16, line 20, leave out 'not' and insert 'only'.
	Amendment No. 172, in page 12, clause 16, line 20, leave out 'unless' and insert 'if'.
	Government amendments Nos. 450 to 454.

Harriet Harman: It is not as bad as it sounds, Madam Deputy Speaker. I shall speak to new clauses 52 and 53, together with a number of consequential and technical Government amendments, and comment on the relevant Opposition amendments.
	New clauses 52 and 53 tighten up bail for people who have been granted bail but breach it. They are being introduced at this stage because this issue has been raised under the street crime initiative and brought to the fore by those considering how to tackle street crime. I know that hon. Members are familiar with the issue and that it will have been raised with them.
	The problem is that people feel strongly when someone is granted bail by the court but then breaches it. Nearly one defendant in four offends while on bail, and one in eight fails to turn up in court. That wastes time and resources, but more importantly it leads to delays that frustrate and often upset victims and witnesses. Victims, in particular, find it hard to understand how, despite all the efforts invested by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service in apprehending and charging the alleged perpetrator of a crime, he can fail to appear and yet be given bail again. Basically, they turn up but he does not, which undermines public confidence in the criminal justice system.
	At the moment, a defendant arrested for breach of bail loses the usual presumption in favour of bail, but the Government believe that it is necessary to send a more powerful deterrent message to defendants who, for no good reason, do not turn up in court.New clause 52(1) therefore goes one step further than the current position by creating a presumption against bail in those circumstances. It requires the court to refuse bail to an adult defendant—this applies only to adults—who fails without reasonable cause to surrender to custody in answer to bail in the same proceedings, unless the court is satisfied that there is no significant risk that he would again fail to surrender if released on bail.
	Conscious as we are of our obligations under the European convention on human rights, the Government are satisfied that the proposal is compatible with those obligations.

Graham Allen: My right hon. and learned Friend says that the measure relates to adult offenders; will she take evidence from me, as it were, on this issue? I met senior police officers on Friday and asked them what their most frustrating experiences with the criminal justice system were. In particular, they named young offenders who refuse to attend, or for some other reason do not attend, a court hearing when everyone else is present and ready to go, and the fact that such offenders can laugh at the court and just be given another date.

Harriet Harman: My hon. Friend is well aware of the challenge of young offenders as he raised it on many occasions in Committee, in which he played an active part. Like other hon. Members who served in Committee, he will know that many parts of the Bill seek to deal with the difficulty of tackling offending behaviour early on in a young person's life. However, we though it right to apply this new clause, which reverses the presumption of bail and requires the court to make a presumption that bail will not be granted, to adults and leave the situation as it is in respect of breach of bail for under-18s.

John Gummer: Will the Solicitor-General explain why it is necessary to make that distinction? I find it very difficult to understand why a 17-year-old should not be expected to behave in exactly the same way as an 18-year-old in this regard. It is all very well saying that the Government think it right, but I cannot understand on what possible grounds they can do so; perhaps she might explain to the House why she thinks it right. I think it wrong, and that the measure should apply to all persons who are given bail.

Harriet Harman: The point that the right hon. Gentleman raises—it is the same as that made by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen)—is an important one. All I can say is that no amendment before the House now would have that effect, but the Bill will go to the other place and it might be possible to consider the point there. For the moment I want to make it clear that the proposals currently before us deal with adults. If an amendment to make the bail regime much tougher on juveniles were necessary, my ministerial colleagues in the Home Office would want to reflect on it: it might then be available for discussion in the other place.

Graham Allen: Would my right hon. and learned Friend allow me to write to her so that she can advise me on the best way to proceed—perhaps, for example, by a pilot scheme for young offenders on bail? It might be helpful to develop the policy in that way.

Harriet Harman: I am sure that my colleagues in the Home Office would welcome a letter from my hon. Friend, putting forward that point for their consideration.

John Bercow: The Solicitor-General will know that I am a parliamentary virgin on this matter, because, as I explained earlier, I did not have the good fortune to sit on the Standing Committee that considered the Bill. I am flummoxed, but I am sure that the Solicitor-General is about to release me from my state of ignorance. Did the Government not consider the position of 17-year-olds, to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) referred, or did they consider the matter and not think it worthy of inclusion? I am perspiring to know which is the case?

Harriet Harman: The Government considered it, of course, but decided to introduce the new clause in its current form, which does not apply to juveniles. Provisions on juveniles have not been brought before the House, but that does not mean that further consideration cannot be urged in future. I say no more than that.
	Refusal of bail will not be automatic, because the court will still have to consider the risk that the defendant will again fail to appear. A previous failure to surrender to custody is not, of itself, reason for refusing bail, but it is highly relevant to assessing that risk.
	It may be convenient to deal with amendments (a) and (b), tabled by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), who has yet to speak.

Lady Hermon: I am most grateful to the Solicitor-General for taking another intervention. I listened carefully to her introductory words, in which she said that, when people do not appear after being released on bail, it undermines public confidence and that a more powerful deterrent message should be sent out. I could not agree more. In those circumstances, given that we have again—quite rightly, in my view—suspended elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, making it impossible to devolve criminal justice and policing to the Assembly in the foreseeable future, will the Solicitor-General give an assurance that the bail provisions will be extended to Northern Ireland?

Harriet Harman: I shall have to come back to the hon. Lady on that. She has made her point and I shall try to be forthcoming with an answer in due course.

John Mann: Before the Solicitor-General moves on to the most important amendments, she described other amendments, such as amendment No. 232, as "tidying-up" measures? Amendment No. 232, which deals with drug offenders on bail, would add "(or both)" to "assistance or treatment". Is not such tidying up sheer nonsense, because the term "(or both)" is already contained in the meaning? What is required is the replacement of the word "or" with "and", because any drug offender requires medical treatment. Leaving the probation service or other qualified persons with an option not to incorporate medical treatment will only make re-offending more likely.

Harriet Harman: I shall deal with my hon. Friend's points when I come to the amendment in a moment. For the sake of those who are not as deeply cognisant of the issues as my hon. Friend, I shall continue with questions surrounding the presumption of bail, and return to his points later.

Dominic Grieve: Will the Solicitor-General assist the House by giving the Government's estimate of the increase in the remand prison population that will result from the amendments restricting access to bail? That information would be useful, if the Government have made such an estimate—and I hope they have.

Harriet Harman: The intention is that fewer people will be on remand, because the message will be clearly sent out that people cannot take a risk by not turning up to court, because it will be one strike if they are out, so to speak. There will be no misunderstanding in the minds of defendants, because it will be clear that if they have been granted bail by the court to return on a certain day, they have to return on that day. Otherwise, when they are later arrested and brought before the court, they will be remanded in custody. The aim is that people will be clear about the need to turn up to court. The aim is to bring offenders to justice so that the courts can deal with cases, instead of having more people on remand in custody.
	We do not want a situation in which the police witnesses, the lay witnesses, the victim and the prosecution are all present, and the only person missing is the defendant, so the case has to be adjourned. That undermines public confidence in the system, which is why we have brought the provision before the House. Those who advise clients can be clear that the presumption will be that the defendant will not get bail, unless they can show some good, overriding reason why they were not able to attend, such as being locked up somewhere else. With a really good reason, the person may escape being remanded in custody; otherwise, failure to appear will be an offence that is dealt with by imprisonment.
	Amendments (a) and (b) were tabled by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey and others. It might help if I explain the Government's view, although I anticipate that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) will speak to the amendments. I hope that I do not pre-empt him too much by saying that the amendments are modest, but—without wishing to exaggerate matters—they would certainly do some damage to the Bill.
	Amendment (a) would remove words that are designed to make it clear that when a court is satisfied that there is no significant risk of a defendant failing to appear, it is not under an obligation to grant bail irrespective of other considerations. That must make sense. If there are reasons for refusing bail other than the question of absconding—for example, a risk of interference with witnesses—the provision as it stands makes it clear to the court that it retains the power to refuse bail, notwithstanding that the defendant is not considered likely to abscond again. We did not want to create a situation in which, on clear evidence, it was apparent that a defendant was not likely to abscond again, and the court therefore felt that it should grant bail, irrespective of other issues that should have led it to refuse bail.

David Heath: I am grateful to the Solicitor-General for giving way, because this may be the only opportunity that I have to speak on the amendments. We have some sympathy with what the Government are trying to do, but we wanted to retain at least some vestige of the presumption in favour of bail and give the courts the discretion to make the decision. The problem with the Government's interpretation is that it reduces the discretion to a nugatory amount.

Harriet Harman: Clearly, if the hon. Gentleman's desire is to retain the presumption in favour of bail, I shall disappoint him because the whole point of new clause 52 is that, if someone is arrested, charged, brought before the court and bailed to appear on another day but simply fails to turn up, they will not have the presumption in their favour that bail will be granted. At that point, the presumption will be that bail will not be granted.
	The hon. Gentleman also mentions the court's discretion. Of course the court will still have discretion. If the defendant can show reasonable cause for his not turning up, he can rebut that presumption. So the presumption is rebuttable, but it must be included in the Bill. That is what new clause 52 will do, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman must think that that is right. People find it very undermining when the same issue is simply played over and again, but the presumption is still in favour of granting bail.
	Amendment (b) would remove the provision that states:
	"a failure to give to the defendant a copy of the record of the decision to grant him bail shall not constitute a reasonable cause for his failure to surrender to custody."
	Those words merely replicate those already used in section 6(4) of the Bail Act 1976 and are intended to avoid technical arguments that a defendant could not have been expected to know his bail date because the court had failed to give him the required copy.
	New clause 52(2) deals with a technical obstacle to proceeding against defendants who fail to answer to bail granted by the police. In those cases, unlike those involving police bail, section 127 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 applies. That prevents summary proceedings from being instituted more than six months after the commission of an offence, so if a Bail Act offence is committed and the offender manages to stay out of sight of the police for more than six months, it is not possible to prosecute that Bail Act offence. Surely that cannot be right. Therefore, subsection (2) will disapply section 127 in respect of offences under section 6 of the Bail Act 1976 and apply a new limitation period of three months from the defendant's surrender to custody, arrest or court appearance. So the time limit is three months from when the person is apprehended.
	Amendment No. 445 would insert into clause 12 a new provision—

Dominic Grieve: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I believe that time has now run out for this group of about 40 amendments, most of which are Government amendments, but the Solicitor-General has not even been able fully to explain important Government amendments to the House, leaving aside the amendments tabled by the official Opposition or the Liberal Demorats. Can any protection be provided to the House to enable us to give some rudimentary consideration to important measures, rather than being left with this complete pantomime, which brings the House into disrepute?

Several hon. Members: rose—

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. I shall respond to the point of order, but I am required under the programme motion to put the Question at this time. My reply to the hon. Gentleman is that, of course, I am governed by the programme motion, which was duly agreed to by the House, and I must therefore follow the directions in that motion.

John Bercow: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. I must put the Question now, but I will come back to the hon. Gentleman afterwards.
	It being two hours after the commencement of proceedings on the programme motion, Madam Deputy Speaker, pursuant to Orders [4 February, 5 March, 2 April and this day], put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.
	Question accordingly agreed to.
	Clause read a Second time and added to the Bill.
	Madam Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.

Clause 11
	 — 
	Grant and Conditions of Bail

Amendments made: No. 443, in page 8, line 11, leave out subsection (3).
	No. 444, in page 8, line 19, leave out '2' and insert '2(1)'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Clause 12
	 — 
	Offences Committed on Bail

Amendments made: No. 445, in page 8, line 36, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
	'(1) For paragraph 2A of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the 1976 Act (defendant need not be granted bail where he was on bail at date of offence) there is substituted—
	"2A (1) If the defendant falls within this paragraph he may not be granted bail unless the court is satisfied that there is no significant risk of his committing an offence while on bail (whether subject to conditions or not); but this does not require the court, if so satisfied, to grant bail (disregarding other considerations).
	(2) The defendant falls within this paragraph if—
	(a) he is aged 18 or over, and
	(b) it appears to the court that he was on bail in criminal proceedings on the date of the offence."'
	No. 446, in page 8, line 41, after 'defendant' insert—
	'(a) is under the age of 18, and
	(b) it appears to the court that he'.
	No. 447, in page 8, line 43, leave out '2' and insert '2(1)'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Clause 16
	 — 
	Drug Users: Restriction on Bail

Amendments made: No. 448, in page 11, line 22, at end insert 'Part 1 of'.
	No. 232, in page 11, line 41, after 'treatment' insert '(or both)'.
	No. 449, in page 12, line 10, leave out paragraph (a).
	No. 450, in page 12, line 22, after 'bail' insert—
	'(whether subject to conditions or not)'.
	No. 451, in page 13, leave out lines 25 to 27.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Clause 28
	 — 
	Defence Disclosure

Amendments made: No. 72, in page 18, line 26, after 'evidence', insert—
	'or an abuse of process'.
	No. 73, in page 19, leave out lines 1 to 3.
	No. 74, in page 19, line 9, after 'prosecutor', insert 'either—
	(a)'.
	No. 75, in page 19, line 10, at end insert
	', or
	(b) a statement of the kind mentioned in subsection (3A)'.
	No. 76, in page 19, line 14, at end insert—
	'(3A) Instead of an updated defence statement, the accused may give a written statement stating that he has no changes to make to the defence statement which was given under section 5 or 6.'
	No. 77, in page 19, line 16, after 'give', insert 'either'.
	No. 78, in page 19, line 16, after 'statement', insert—
	'or a statement of the kind mentioned in subsection (3A)'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Clause 29
	 — 
	Notification of Intention to Call Defence Witnesses

Amendments made: No. 79, in page 19, line 26, leave out
	'give or call any evidence at'
	and insert—
	'call any persons (other than himself) as witnesses at his'.
	No. 80, in page 19, line 28, after 'each', insert 'such'.
	No. 81, in page 19, line 29 leave out
	'(other than the accused himself)'.
	No. 82, in page 19, line 32, at end insert 'such'.
	No. 83, in page 19, line 41, after 'person', insert '(other than himself)'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Clause 31
	 — 
	Further Provisions About Defence Disclosure

Amendments made: No. 84, in page 20, line 23, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
	'(1) Where an accused's solicitor purports to give on behalf of the accused—
	(a) a defence statement under section 5, 6 or 6B, or
	(b) a statement of the kind mentioned in section 6B(3A),
	that statement shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to be given with the authority of the accused.'.
	No. 85, in page 21, line 7, at end insert—
	'(c) where he has given both an initial defence statement and a statement of the kind mentioned in section 6B(3A), to the initial defence statement.'.
	—[Mr. Heppell.]

Clause 34
	 — 
	Faults in Defence Disclosure

Amendments made: No. 93, in page 23, line 47, at end insert—
	'(iii) where he has given both an initial defence statement and a statement of the kind mentioned in section 6B(3A), to the initial defence statement;'.—
	No. 86, in page 22, line 30, after 'give', insert 'either'.
	No. 87, in page 22, line 30, at end insert—
	'or a statement of the kind mentioned in subsection (3A) of that section'.
	No. 88, in page 22, line 32, after 'statement', insert—
	'or a statement of the kind mentioned in section 6B(3A)'.
	No. 89, in page 23, line 3, leave out 'giving'.
	No. 90, in page 23, line 15 after 'witness', insert '(other than himself)'.
	No. 91, in page 23, line 21, at end insert—
	'(5A) Where—
	(a) this section applies by virtue of subsection (2)(f)(ii) (including that provision as it applies by virtue of subsection (3)(b)), and
	(b) the matter which was not mentioned is a point of law (including any point as to the admissibility of evidence or an abuse of process) or an authority,
	comment by another party under subsection (5)(a) may be made only with the leave of the court.'.
	No. 92, in page 23, line 36, at end insert—
	'(9A) Where the accused has given a statement of the kind mentioned in section 6B(3A), then, for the purposes of subsections (2)(f)(ii) and (iv), the question as to whether there has been a breach of the requirements imposed by or under section 6A or a failure to comply with section 6A(2)(a) or (b) shall be determined—
	(a) by reference to the state of affairs at the time when that statement was given, and
	(b) as if the defence statement was given at the same time as that statement.'.
	No. 93, page 23, line 47, at end insert—
	'(iii) where he has given both an initial defence statement and a statement of the kind mentioned in section 6B(3A), to the initial defence statement.'.[Mr. Heppell.]

Schedule 27
	 — 
	Further Minor and Consequential Amendments

Amendment made: No. 103, in page 302, line 22, at end insert—
	'33A (1) Section 77 (orders and regulations) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (5)—
	(a) after "No", there is inserted "regulations or" and
	(b) after "section" there is inserted "6A or".
	(3) In subsection (6)(b) after "regulations" there is inserted "(other than regulations under section 6A)".'

John Bercow: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. You kindly said that you would revert to me when you had gone through the proper course of action.
	In view of the fact that there were no fewer than 46 Government new clauses and amendments in the category that has just been discussed, which fell into two subdivisions, and that the Solicitor-General, despite her considerable eloquence and succinctness, had the opportunity to speak on only four of them, are you, Madam Deputy Speaker, able to advise me and other Members whether, in the history of our programming arrangements, there is any precedent for the violence to parliamentary opportunity that has been done today?

John Gummer: Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker, would you also bear in mind your important role of defending the rights of Back Benchers? This Back Bencher was hoping to speak on one particular amendment as it was the only one on which I do not find myself opposing the Government from the left, which is very embarrassing for me. I thus wanted at least to be able say that I thought bail ought to be extended to those aged under-18.

David Heath: Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker, I understand entirely the fact that, for one brief second, you thought that we had not yet addressed part 5, because in fact we have not addressed it. Part 5 deals with the important matter of disclosures in trials. Not only do we seek to defend the rights of Members of the House, but, more important, we seek to defend the rights of those who are arraigned in our courts. Is there no way in which a Committee of the House could have the opportunity even to see an explanation from the Government of the amendments before they go to another place, which is not elected?

Madam Deputy Speaker: I regret to say that I can save hon. Members from neither embarrassment nor from disappointment at being unable to contribute to the debate. I am governed by the programme motion, which, as I said earlier, was agreed by the House. I must, therefore, follow the instructions of the House.

New Clause 29
	 — 
	Rules of Court

'(1) Rules of court may make such provision as appears to the authority making them to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of this Part.
	(2) Without limiting subsection (1), rules of court may in particular make provision for time limits within which applications under this Part must be made or within which other things in connection with this Part must be done.
	(3) Nothing in this section is to be taken as affecting the generality of any enactment conferring powers to make rules of court.'.—[Mr. Blunkett.]
	Brought up, and read the First time.

David Blunkett: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take the following: New clause 1—Applications by prosecution for complex and lengthy trial to be conducted before a jury of experts—
	'(1) This section applies where one or more defendants are to be tried on indictment for one or more offences.
	(2) The prosecution or the defendant may apply to a judge of the Crown Court for the trial to be conducted before a jury of experts.
	(3) If an application under subsection (2) is made and the judge is satisfied that both of the following two conditions are fulfilled he must make an order that the trial be conducted before a jury of experts, but if he is not so satisfied he must refuse the application.
	(4) The first condition is that the complexity of the trial and its length—
	(a) is likely to make the trial so burdensome to the members of a jury hearing the trial that it is necessary in the interests of justice for the trial to be conducted before a jury of experts.
	(b) would be likely to place an excessive burden upon the life of a typical juror.
	(5) The second condition is that the complexity and length will be attributable—
	(a) to the fact that the issues likely to be material to the verdict of a jury hearing the trial relate to arrangements, transactions or records of a financial or commercial nature or which relate to property, and
	(b) to the likely volume of evidence relating to those issues.
	(6) In deciding whether or not he is satisfied that both of those two conditions are fulfilled, the judge must have regard to any steps which might reasonably be taken to reduce the complexity or length of the trial (or both).
	(7) But a step is not to be regarded as reasonable if it would significantly disadvantage the prosecution or the defendant.'
	New clause 2—Expert juries—
	'(1) A jury of experts shall be constituted by 12 members drawn from the following professional bodies—
	(a) The Royal Institute of Chartered Accountants;
	(b) The Society of Actuaries.
	(2) The Lord Chancellor may by order amend the list of professional bodies from which expert jurors are drawn.
	(3) The Lord Chancellor shall maintain a list of eligible persons willing to serve as expert jurors.
	(4) The Lord Chancellor may pay to any expert juror such remuneration as he may determine.'.
	New clause 23—Application by defendant for trial to be conducted without jury—
	'(1) This section applies where one or more defendants are to be tried on indictment for one or more offences.
	(2) The defendant, or any of the defendants, may apply to a judge of the Crown Court for the trial to be conducted without a jury.
	(3) The judge may make an order that the trial is to be conducted without a jury if satisfied that subsection (4) applies.
	(4) This subsection applies if the judge is satisfied there is a substantial risk that the defendant will not receive a fair trial if tried by a jury.
	(5) When deciding whether the subsection (4) applies the judge shall give consideration to the following—
	(a) the nature of the case;
	(b) any submissions made by the prosecution or the defence;
	(c) any other relevant factors.
	(6) Before making any submissions under subsection (5)(b) the prosecution shall take into consideration the wishes and interests of any witnesses.
	(7) If two or more defendants are to be tried and any of them opposes an application under subsection (2) then subsection (4) will not apply.'.—
	Amendment No. 1, in page 24, line 12, leave out Clause 36.
	Amendment No. 2, in page 25, line 10, leave out Clause 37.
	Amendment No. 3, in page 25, line 38, leave out Clause 38.
	Amendment No. 128, in clause 38, page 26, line 1, leave out 'satisfied' and insert 'convinced'.
	Amendment No. 5, in clause 39, page 26, line 20, leave out from 'applies' to end of line 24 and insert—
	'to any application under section (Applications by prosecution for complex and lengthy trial to be conducted before a jury of experts) above.'.
	Government amendments Nos. 203 and 204.
	Amendment No. 6, in clause 39, line 42, leave out
	'section 36, 37 or 38'
	and insert—
	'section (Applications by prosecution for complex and lengthy trial to be conducted before a jury of experts)'.
	Government amendments Nos. 205 to 207.
	Amendment No. 7, in page 27, line 17, leave out
	'section 36, 37 or 38'
	and insert—
	'section (Applications by prosecution for complex and lengthy trial to be conducted before a jury of experts)'.
	Amendment No. 8, in line 28, leave out '(or partly because)'.
	Amendment No. 9, in line 28, leave out 'appears to have' and insert 'has'.
	Government amendments Nos. 208 and 209.
	Amendment No. 10, in clause 40, page 27, line 35, leave out from 'must' to end of line 36 and insert 'terminate the trial'.
	Amendment No. 11, in line 37, leave out subsection (4).
	Amendment No. 12, in line 39, leave out '(4)' and insert '(3)'.
	Amendment No. 13, in line 41, leave out from 'that' to end of line 44 and insert—
	'if the retrial were to take place with a jury there is a real and present danger that jury tampering would again occur and that either,
	(a) (i) the danger of jury tampering is such that it would be necessary to provide police protection for the members of the jury hearing the trial and
	(ii) the level and duration of that protection would be likely to place an excessive burden upon the life of a typical juror, or
	(b) notwithstanding any steps (including the provision of police protection) which might reasonably be taken to prevent jury tampering the likelihood that it would take place was so high to make it necessary in the interests of justice for the trial to be conducted without a jury.'.
	Amendment No. 14, in page 28, line 3, leave out subsection (7) and insert—
	'(7) Any new trial by judge alone must take place in front of a different judge.'.
	Amendment No. 15, in clause 42, line 31, leave out subsection (1).
	Amendment No. 16, in line 33, leave out 'trial' and insert 'retrial'.
	Amendment No. 17, in line 34, leave out 'be continued' and insert 'take place'.
	Government amendments Nos. 210, 211, 214 to 222 and 213.

David Blunkett: First, may I take this opportunity to welcome officially my hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale, East (Paul Goggins)? I am convinced that this will encourage other Parliamentary Private Secretaries to believe that there is life after bag carrying. I sincerely hope so, as we approach the possibility of a forthcoming reshuffle.
	On Third Reading, I shall say a word about my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, Central (Hilary Benn), who is now the Minister of State, Department for International Development. He did a splendid job in the Standing Committee and I shall come back to that point tomorrow evening.
	May I also wish the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin), the shadow Home Secretary, a happy birthday? It is a miserable way to spend it. It looks as though I shall be spending my birthday in Cabinet discussing the euro, and I shall not take bets on which is worse—discussing trial by judge only or being judged on our decision on the euro.
	New clause 29 provides a standard power to make rules of court in respect of procedural matters relating to applications and appeals under part 7. One such matter is time limits for applications. That concern was raised in Committee and we wanted to address the issue to ensure that, under clause 36, individuals had no opportunity to undertake what has been described as "judge shopping", which is an entirely new phrase to me. That raised the fear, however, that without proper time limits and additional requirements and restrictions, which exist already in clause 36, opportunities may exist for people to pick and choose judges in the way that, as we shall discuss in a moment, some people, by intimidation, pick and choose the jury that they want. We hope that this measure will allay people's fears.
	In relation to clause 36, to which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) has tabled an amendment, fears were expressed in Committee that there may not be proper equality or opportunity for those with particular ethnic or gender needs to be dealt with fairly by jury, which is why some people would choose judge-only trials. We reject that proposition. We do not believe that new clause 23 is either necessary or desirable. I can confirm from discussions that Lord Falconer and I had with the Judicial Studies Board last week that substantial changes have been put in place for the training and choosing of judges in specific cases in which there may be concern. That is true of those who need proper training and sensitivity in relation to rape cases, and of those undertaking cases in which there may be racial undertones. That should be sufficiently trustworthy, in terms of the steps that have been taken, for us to acknowledge that judges would not place themselves in a position in which defendants would be at risk in that way.

Andrew Dismore: Another issue that arises in relation to this Bill, but which may not be selected for debate, is corporate manslaughter. Of course, emotions can run high in relation to that issue, especially if there has been a major disaster. Assuming that the press coverage today is accurate that the Government are to honour their commitment to bring forward legislation on corporate manslaughter, how does my right hon. Friend envisage such trials taking place? Would they take place with judge and jury or on an indictment in this way?

David Blunkett: My hon. Friend tries in an ingenious way to get me on to a subject on which I will say only one thing: we have made a decision that we should publish a draft Bill. We believe that it is right to have extensive discussions on the issues in relation to corporate manslaughter, and that it would be right and proper to listen to the strongly held views of those on all sides, including those most affected, and we will do that as soon as possible. I will not give either a timetable for the publication or an assurance about what mode of trial such cases would be dealt with under. I shall refine my English by the time that I have finished this afternoon.
	Clearly, this group deals with clauses Nos. 37, 38 and 40, and with new clauses 1 and 2 tabled by the Opposition. I shall take the opportunity briefly to address those matters so that I do not take up the time of the House later. I shall be brief, as I know that, even with the time that we have available, many Members will want to address what I consider to be an extremely important issue.
	In the last Parliament, we had two of what were described as mode of trial Bills. Some have suggested publicly—I hoped that we had overcome this—that with the proposition under consideration this afternoon, relating to less than 100 trials a year, we were returning to the mode of trial Bill and threatening trial by jury. I thought that we had got over that, until the shadow Home Secretary was quoted in two newspapers on Saturday—misquoted, I hope—as saying that
	"the home secretary believes that being tough on crime inevitably involves undermining institutions that have protected our fundamental liberties."
	I do not believe that at all. I have said in the House on a number of occasions, as well as publicly, that this is not a zero sum total: by protecting the interests of victims, witnesses, the justice system and truth, we do not in any way do damage to the rights of the defendant to a fair trial or to the vast majority of cases, which are not dealt with in a magistrates court, which will be heard by jury. We do not seek to undermine anyone's rights. Instead, we seek to extend them.
	The right hon. Gentleman went on to say:
	"We believe that trial by jury is an institution well worth preserving and the bulwark of liberty in this country."
	Taken alongside Parliament, I believe that as well. I have no intention of returning to the propositions that were debated in the House and defeated by Parliament as a whole on two occasions previously.
	We are not debating the withdrawal of the right to trial by jury. We have no intention of doing so. It is wrong for Members in this place or in the House of Lords, or for barristers who should know better, to imply that that is what we are doing.

Simon Hughes: I accept what the Secretary of State says but the propositions clearly propose the restriction in certain cases of trial by jury. Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether he believes that jury trial is not working or whether it still has his whole confidence? If we end up with certain cases in the higher courts being tried by judge alone and certain cases being tried by jury, do not we inevitably have a two-tier justice system, the people deciding in one instance and the professional judges deciding in the other?

David Blunkett: No, I do not. Given the limited number of instances that we are addressing where we should have trial by judge only, to suggest that my confidence in the jury system as a whole is undermined is entirely fallacious. We have a variety of hearings throughout our system from district judges through to the Court of Appeal and judges sitting in trio. We do not suggest that their right to hear appeals on jury trials undermines the previous trials that were undertaken by jury. It would be fallacious to suggest that it does.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: Will the Secretary of State give way?

David Blunkett: I will.
	We need to address the issues as they really are. I am always pleased to give way to my hon. and learned Friend, and I look forward to his pearls of wisdom.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for the gracious way in which he has given way.
	However small the number of cases, if we are giving to judges the right to decide whether someone should have a jury trial or not, how can we say that we are not removing the right to jury trial?

David Blunkett: In the thousands of cases that are currently held in front of a jury, and will continue so to be heard, there will be no change. The limited number of cases to which I have referred—somewhat fewer than 100 a year—are affected because they involve serious fraud or complex financial issues, or where there has been jury interference. We are suggesting that in those cases there can be a decision by the judge, having examined the cases, that it would be in the best interests of justice and of gaining the truth, and therefore getting to the root of the problem, that such a course should be taken.
	I make the case strongly that protecting the integrity of jury trials by not allowing others to destroy that integrity—by not allowing others to undermine confidence in jury trials and by not allowing others to use manipulation and interference to damage jury trials—we are strengthening the credibility and well-being, and the confidence in, jury trials and the criminal justice system.

David Heath: By the Secretary of State's comments earlier, in saying that he is now not seeking to introduce the provisions set out in a previous mode of trial Bills, is he accepting that the Government's arguments in support of introducing those Bills were erroneous and that the Opposition parties were right in their objections to them?

David Blunkett: I do not accept that the arguments put by my right hon. and hon. Friends were erroneous. I believe that they put their case with conviction, and that there was a substantial argument to be put. Parliament overturned those mode of trial Bills. We were prepared to listen. That is a strength, not a weakness. I took a further look at the issue, along with the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General, and we concluded that it would be better to proceed as I am describing. I make no apology whatever for that.
	On the evidence that we have, trials that have lasted months on very difficult cases involving complex financial issues have often led to considerable difficulty in dealing with the logistics and recruiting the jury. Over and over again, the same examples are thrown up, because they are excellent examples. In the Maxwell case, 700 jurors were called and 550 excused, with a range of arguments and reasons given for people withdrawing or being withdrawn, reflecting the inability of people to hold down their jobs or conduct their lives in such circumstances.
	Here we are, asking people to do that or, in the case of the Opposition's new clauses, to believe that there is another way of arranging matters—not through normal juries, not by drawing on 12 stout men and women and true, but by developing an expert jury service. It is an extraordinary way round the problem, to say that there is a major problem—I admit there is; that we need to deal with it—and we do; that we cannot continue with the present system because it does not work—and it does not; and that we will invent a new system, which is not jury service but effectively an expert panel. It is not quite the same as the proposal for expert assessors, which was debated some years ago when these matters were dealt with by the Roskill Committee and later by Lord Justice Auld.
	The proposal is for a coterie, not quite of our fellow men and women, but of some of them who would be able to develop their expertise in a way that would allow them to deal with cases that the official Opposition accept could not be dealt with adequately in the normal way, for the very reasons that we have enunciated and which led us to introduce these changes to the law, so that we can ensure that trials are fairly heard and fairly dealt with, in a way that does not make a mockery of the system, the collapse of trials or the inability to gain convictions where convictions would otherwise be justified.

Simon Hughes: I gather that last year there were 31 cases that lasted more than six months. Did the Home Secretary consider alternatives to removing jury trial—for example, smaller juries consisting of eight members, or jurors who had indicated that, because they were unemployed, retired or able to free, they would be available willingly to serve on longer cases? There is an argument for a more flexible system, but no case has been made for getting rid of the principle of a representative group of people judging cases.

David Blunkett: The whole argument for jury trial is its representative nature. It falls where it falls, so there is no way, we hope, that it can be manipulated. In some cases, as I shall explain in a moment, we are concerned about interference. We believe that there is a danger that people have learned how to do the job of interfering with the process of a fair trial. Anybody who has read John Grisham's excellent book—what was it called?

Humfrey Malins: "The Runaway Jury".

David Blunkett: Thank you. That was an excellent book—[Interruption.] I am glad to hear that John Grisham's latest book is excellent. I may one day have a chance to read a book again, rather than Bills and policy documents.
	The John Grisham book demonstrates clearly how we must avoid falling into the traps entailed in long jury trials. I shall answer the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) straight. Yes, of course we had to consider other options. Roskill and the debates around that led us to consider whether it would be sensible for assessors to sit with a judge. Once one gets beyond the discussion about having a normal jury trial, one has abandoned the jury and invented a new proposition, which is what the official Opposition are advancing.

Peter Lilley: Rather than calling upon fiction to find evidence for his case, will the Home Secretary look to facts and accept that although serious fraud cases may impose difficulties on jurors, they do not seem to have resulted in difficulties in securing convictions, since over the past four years the Serious Fraud Office has had a 92 per cent. success rate in obtaining convictions, as against 57 per cent. on average for contested trials?

David Blunkett: Such success is achieved only after a trial has been put together and a jury obtained. We are all painfully aware of that, because we are debating the best way forward for the investigation and presentation of serious fraud, and the best way of ensuring that we get more cases to trial, as well as getting more trials to successful conviction. They are two separate processes, but the right hon. Gentleman rightly and mischievously suggests that we address reality, rather than a mythical jury. I agree. That is the basis for our proposals. There have been instances of real difficulty in obtaining and maintaining a jury that is truly representative, picked from across the nation, not consisting of the unemployed or the long retired—

Gwyneth Dunwoody: What is wrong with that?

David Blunkett: Nothing at all is wrong with the long retired or the unemployed, so long as the jury is not made up only of those who are retired or unemployed, as the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey suggested. That is what I was responding to.

Lady Hermon: In introducing the proposal for non-jury trials in specific cases, could the Home Secretary enlighten the House and say whether his decision was informed by the experience in Northern Ireland of non-jury trials in serious criminal cases, which we have had for 30 years, and the moon and stars did not fall out of the sky during those years? In particular, would he consider two features of the Diplock courts? First, and importantly, there is a right of appeal not only on points of law, but on points of fact; and secondly, and importantly, the judge, who sits alone in those courts, must give a statement of his reasons for coming to his conclusions. That is why we have rarely had bad decisions from the Diplock process of non-jury trials in Northern Ireland.

David Blunkett: No, the stars have not fallen from the sky. There are obviously specific circumstances in Northern Ireland, which we should weigh. We have taken account of the range of experiences, including those that the hon. Lady enunciated, and we have learned a great deal from the Diplock courts, as I said 18 months ago when we debated the development of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The House had reflected on these matters in 1997, when it unanimously determined that way forward. I am grateful to the hon. Lady.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: When dealing with the constitution of juries in serious fraud cases, the Home Secretary points to the fact that people who are unemployed, either voluntarily or because of misfortune, form some part of those juries. Does he also accept that it is the universal experience of those who practise in such trials that the juries contain rather more women and rather more disabled people, both of whom are extremely desirable in our juries? Thus we arrive at a more, rather than less, representative jury than we otherwise would. While I have got the Secretary of State, may I also ask whether he is suggesting that a single judge is more representative than any jury in the circumstances?

David Blunkett: I am not putting that argument. Those arguing against me are saying that they want a representative jury, but undermining that argument by talking about changing its representative nature. That is the simple fact. I am suggesting that once one does away with the presumption of a jury drawn from the population as a whole in the normal way, one has reached a different argument and is on a different wicket all together.
	I did not get into the argument about retired people or women. I answered a question from the Liberal Democrat spokesman that presumed that we should be free to retain jury trial, but not the method of drawing on the population for such trial. That is what I am dealing with. Once we have moved away from the presumption of drawing freely on the population as a whole, we are arguing about a different sort of hearing.

Douglas Hogg: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether his primary reason for seeking to do away with jury trials in specialist cases is the complexity of cases relating to financial matters, or the fact that their likely length is such as to be intolerable for a typical juror? They are not the same point. Which one is he making?

David Blunkett: I did not confuse those two issues or suggest that one cancelled out or overrode the other. Indeed, I did not say that I was relying on one, but not the other. I do not know whether there is a text somewhere that I am not following, but on whose basis the right hon. and learned Gentleman intervened. If so, it was not mine and I have not said it. It is very difficult to answer a question that I have not addressed.

John Bercow: I am worried about the Home Secretary. I am not a lawyer—I say that as a matter of pride—but it seems to me that he thinks that he can make his case purely by sweeping assertion, rather than by any sort of reliance on evidence. Why does he think that the contrast is between the total representativeness of the established jury and the complete unrepresentativeness, as the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) put it, of the single judge? Why is the choice not between a more or less imperfect group of people—more than one person and probably several people—and the dependence of the defendant on the views of one individual?

David Blunkett: I think that the argument is very interesting, and it will be put by the right hon. Member for West Dorset from the Front Bench, but it is not the argument about retaining the normal jury system. That is the point that I have been making, and it has to be made because the attacks on our proposition publicly have been about the destruction of the jury service. I read out the views of the right hon. Member for West Dorset from The Independent and the Financial Times on Saturday, and he has enunciated them on radio since.
	We need to be clear on what we are arguing about. If we are not arguing about retaining the normal jury system and its selection for particular trials, we are arguing about something entirely different. So let us argue about whether a panel or a wider set of assessors with expertise and training to deal with financial matters is the right way forward, presumably on the grounds that wider jury selection does not allow that to happen. Alongside that, let us argue the question of how much time people can devote to jury service without destroying their lives or undermining their jobs so that they seek to withdraw from the jury. I said earlier that more than three quarters of those called for jury service had chosen to find a way of getting out of it.

Gwyneth Dunwoody: My right hon. Friend will forgive me if, as I am not a lawyer, I do not follow some of the more esoteric arguments. To me, the issue is very simple. What we are suggesting is taking away from people an ancient right to be tried by however motley a crew is gathered in a court and giving that role to one person, professional though they may be. Is it not a principle in this House that we do not make laws that rely almost entirely either on exceptions or on the convenience of the Executive?

David Blunkett: I do not think that we should ever rely on the convenience of the Executive, and there is nothing convenient for the Executive about any of this. We are seeking to find a solution to a problem that now appears substantially to be acknowledged across the House. One option is to draw on a limited number of people, assessors or otherwise, who are financially expert in the areas in question. That is an option, and it is about to be put by the right hon. Member for West Dorset. We are not presuming that there is something clever about this; we are trying to find a solution to a genuine problem. Of course, there is nothing exceptional about judges either in magistrates courts or, as I have illustrated, in higher courts. I thought that I heard the world around me suggesting that we should be defending the rights, position and integrity of judges.

Simon Hughes: Yes.

David Blunkett: I commend the hon. Gentleman—I do not demur from that.

Elfyn Llwyd: I am much obliged to the Home Secretary for allowing me to intervene. The traditional role of the judge is to interpret the law. Juries have always interpreted the facts. That is the truth of the matter and that is what we are talking about.

David Blunkett: Yes, and in the vast majority of cases they will continue to do so.
	I want now to make my case about jury interference. If the principle at stake is that no trial at such a level should be conducted without a jury, the same principle would apply in relation to jury interference. I put the case that there are instances—again, there are only a few—in which it is necessary in the interests of justice, and not esoteric arguments, to protect ourselves from the jury interference, alteration or disbandment of juries and jury tampering that exist at the moment.
	In Committee, the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins), who used to serve on the Front Bench, referred to a drugs case that had taken place in Liverpool not many months previously. It had lasted six weeks. On the first day of the judge's summing up, one juror had been followed home and offered money to produce a verdict sympathetic to the defendant. He told the judge about it the following day and the judge said that he would discharge him and that the trial would continue. The next day, two more jurors were followed home. They were badly threatened and came into court trembling the following day. The jury had to be discharged and a new trial had to start. The hon. Gentleman said that that cost a lot of money—I think that he referred to £270,000—but much more expensive trials have arisen in very similar circumstances. A recent trial cost £1 million.
	I am arguing the case not on the basis of cost, but on the grounds of sheer intimidation and interference, where the process of justice is so damaged that it is not possible for either a fair trial to take place or for us, the public, to be assured that those who have committed offences are being held to account and that the interests of the public and the victims are being secured. That is what the House has to address this evening.
	In a limited number of cases, where there is felt to be a problem, it is right that the judge should respond, although a right of appeal is of course built into the provisions. When I was in Liverpool two weeks ago, I talked to the chief constable, who enunciated again and again the difficulty that he faced. The issue is not confined to Merseyside, but 80 per cent. of such cases collapse there. He told me that we needed to ensure that, once the police and the Crown Prosecution Service had done their job, it was possible to believe that interference would not damage the chance of getting a fair judgment and, therefore, of getting to the truth.

Humfrey Malins: I had a bit of a shock when the Home Secretary quoted me. I recall talking about jury nobbling, and I understand the difficulty of juries being severely threatened. Let me tell my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) through the Home Secretary that I hope that I was in accordance with party policy on the issue. However, I have always maintained that long and complex trials can be handled by a jury entirely satisfactorily. That is an entirely separate issue from jury nobbling.

John Bercow: Well, that's shot your fox, hasn't it?

David Blunkett: No, it has not, because I entirely accept what the hon. Member for Woking says. When I was dealing with complex trials, I quoted him on the issue that he describes as nobbling—interference with due process and the jury—so I am not at all abashed.
	A moment ago, I said that we were arguing that it was juries for everything or juries for nothing. I am not making that argument, but others are. Either there is a principle that holds the Executive to account for its particular nature, or there is not. Clearly, we are not making that argument. The hon. Member for Woking and I disagree. He believes that his party policy, adapted to provide expertise, is right. On balance, I believe that it is not. I believe, as he does, that where there is interference, there should be an opportunity—spelled out very carefully, and available only in the limited circumstances enunciated in the Bill—to protect the jurors and the public. That is what we are doing.
	To give another example, the Metropolitan police spent £9 million in 2001–02 protecting jurors in circumstances where intimidation would otherwise have damaged the process so greatly that it would have been impossible to ensure that those who undertook the intimidation were properly dealt with or sentenced. People interfere with juries not as a game, but because they want to get themselves or their friends off for something that they believe they will be convicted for. Some trials have taken place in interesting circumstances. One that took place in Birmingham just a few months ago, again about drugs, has been drawn to my attention. The defendant was found not guilty, but it is strange that the jurors should all have been invited to a lavish party in the city centre just two weeks later. As I told the Police Federation a few days ago, we all have to live in the real world.

Vera Baird: I can easily see a distinction between clause 38 and clauses 36 and 37, and I do not agree with the proposition that it is all in or all out on juries. If clause 38 is to be utilised only as a last resort, as we were assured it would be in Committee—the steps in it are very steep, at any event—I can see its purpose. However, will my right hon. Friend help me with two points? First, the prosecution must convince the judge that there is a real risk of jury tampering. By implication, that will have something to do with the defendant in most cases. How will the same judge then go on fairly to try that defendant? Secondly—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. and learned Lady cannot make a speech in an intervention.

David Blunkett: I am sympathetic to the point that my hon. and learned Friend made, as well as the one she was about to make. If a trial such as the one originally described by the hon. Member for Woking has been materially interfered with, there is clearly a presumption, given what happened to the first jury. In such circumstances it would be sensible for the judge to recommend that a different judge sit alone on the case. Where sufficient evidence has been presented to a judge, they should make a presumption that had they heard evidence prejudicial to a fair trial they should stand down. I have no problem enunciating that this afternoon.

Vera Baird: Will my right hon. Friend give way?

David Blunkett: I will oblige my hon. and learned Friend, who was cut off in her prime.

Vera Baird: I am glad to be regarded as in my prime by almost anybody.
	I should like to press my right hon. Friend on a related matter. Inevitably, it will be in the public interest to keep from the defence much information that has to be put to a judge to persuade him of the threat to the jury. How will that be accommodated? How can it be fair to allow the prosecution to pour such information into the judge's ear to get an outcome that the defence will not want? How can the defence be protected from the police simply deciding that they want this chap sent down so badly that they will get trial by judge alone?

David Blunkett: If there is a suggestion of trial by judge alone, there will be a right of appeal, which is right and proper. Let us not assume that there are not instances now in which representations are made by counsel to the judiciary behind the chair. My hon. and learned Friend will know a lot more about that than me, because no doubt she has experienced it. However, I am not sure that it could be described as pouring matters prejudicial to the defence into the judge's ear.

Douglas Hogg: The right hon. Gentleman referred to the right of appeal, but he will know that that can only be exercised with leave. Will he tell the House the circumstances that would restrict the right to grant leave? To return to the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird), how will the defendant be able to challenge information privately communicated to the judge that the jury has been nobbled?

David Blunkett: The defendant, of course, is claiming that he has nothing to do with the jury or the nobbling, and let us assume that they have nothing to do with him at all. However, in the real world, some people engaged in criminality have a great deal to lose from the way in which a trial proceeds. I think I am right in saying that the right hon. and learned Gentleman used to practise—[Hon. Members: "Still does."] Forgive me, I live in a world where we only practise politics, but I am surrounded by people who continue to practise law. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will accept that there are rare occasions in organised criminality when an individual acts alone and that there are people whose interests are affected by the outcome of a trial. We should therefore ensure that we get the right result by getting to the truth and ensuring that justice is done.
	We are clutching at straws if we argue that those who are trying to interfere with juries and change the nature of juries by doing so—we heard earlier about a jury that was disbanded—are not interfering with the course of justice. There may be esoteric arguments that that does not matter and it is for the wider good of us all to ignore it, but I do not believe that for a moment. Victims of crime do not believe it; those who are trying to tackle organised criminality, which is growing, do not believe it; and those who see what is happening in relation to cross-border crime and international organised activity, using the most modern techniques, do not believe it. I do not believe that the people whom we represent think that we should live in fairyland or be somewhere other than with our feet firmly on the ground. We can argue until we are blue in the face. So long as we are not taking away the right to a fair trial, and so long as we are ensuring that people have the right of appeal—of course, that right will depend on the grounds on which the appeal is lodged—the safeguards will be in place.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: I want to make an allied point to the Home Secretary. It is not a pejorative point: it relates to a matter that concerns us all very much. Not in jury-tampering cases, but in complex cases, long cases and cases involving property, very often—indeed, almost always—judges will hear in secret public interest immunity evidence that is brought to them by the prosecution, and rule upon it, after which the case goes through to the jury. How can a judge who has heard such evidence from the prosecution in secret possibly then continue to hear the case as a judge of fact and decide on guilt or innocence? In those circumstances, there cannot be two judges because the same judge must be in charge of public interest immunity from the beginning to the end of the case.

David Blunkett: I have established from my hon. and learned Friends the Members for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) and for Redcar that the prosecution often pour information into the ear of a judge, and that they are concerned that that will bias the judge or that he will direct the jury in a way that he would not have done had it not been done in secret.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: Will my right hon. Friend give way?

David Blunkett: I will, of course, but I am trying to establish what he is against—the pouring of information into the ear, its being done in private, or the judge being unable to make a judgment about whether it is material to the continuance of the trial. It is interesting how many lawyers and barrack-room lawyers are barracking me this evening; we are obviously getting somewhere.

Ian Lucas: I speak as a lawyer, but a humble one—a mere solicitor. I hope to assist my right hon. Friend by pointing out that in the magistrates court, when a solicitor makes a submission on a point of law and seeks to exclude evidence, he must do so to the bench that tries the case. Therefore the bench that decides whether the evidence should be excluded is the same bench that goes forward to determine the case. The process that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) presents as a difficulty is exactly the process that goes on in the magistrates court every day of the week.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: It is not done in chambers.

Ian Lucas: It is not a situation that is regularly dealt with by barristers, which is why it causes them so much difficulty.

David Blunkett: I thank my hon. Friend for that continuation of my excellent relations with the Law Society, for which I am grateful, as I need to have someone in the legal profession on my side.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway barracked from his seat that it is not done in chambers. I do not mind where it is done, so long as it is done fairly, the proper judicial process is undertaken, and the judge makes a sensible judgment on the validity of the evidence.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: Will the Home Secretary give way?

David Blunkett: Of course, given that I named my hon. and learned Friend.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: At the moment, the pouring into the ear of information that is heard only by the judge and the prosecution is validated by the fact that it is the jury who decide the issue of guilt and innocence. Where, however, a judge is privy to information that is known only by him and the prosecution, and he is to decide guilt or innocence, cannot the Home Secretary recognise, first, that that is completely different, and secondly, that it will inevitably contravene the European convention on human rights, because the two sides will not be even?

David Blunkett: No, I do not accept that it contravenes the European convention on human rights. Surrounded as I am by barristers and solicitors, those who would wish to be, and those who used to be, let me say this: we are here to represent the best interests of our constituents by ensuring that the course of justice finds the guilty guilty and acquits the innocent. That is what we are all here for. We have no desire whatsoever to have, even in a limited number of cases, a situation in which, despite evidence to the contrary, intimidation is shown and the case goes wrong. That would not be in anyone's interests, and it would have to be put right on appeal. We are all interested in finding solutions to real problems.

Vera Baird: My right hon. Friend has taken in very well the fact that one of the problems is that of secret information going into the judge's ear that the defence cannot challenge. To avoid any risk of injustice from that, would he consider making available special counsel of the kind with which he will be familiar through Special Immigration Appeals Commission proceedings?

David Blunkett: I am reluctant immediately to rule out such a possibility, even though it has already been discussed at length. I am reluctant to rule it out completely because I am keen to explore all areas and to find solutions wherever we can—I hope that we will be able to address problems in the House of Lords—rather than have a situation in which the Government put up a solution to a problem, then everyone gathers round to denounce it as the end of trial by jury and the end of justice as we know it. In their amendments, the official Opposition propose an alternative solution. I respect that, although I do not agree with their solution. On the serious issue of a small number of cases involving the most difficult criminality, we should try to unite to find a way forward.

David Winnick: Will my right hon. Friend give way?

David Blunkett: Given that my hon. Friend, who is normally not—

Simon Hughes: Backward in coming forward.

David Blunkett: Indeed. Given that he wishes to intervene, I shall give way once more.

David Winnick: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. Speaking as a non-lawyer serving on the Select Committee on Home Affairs, I went along with the recommendation that was made, which was more or less broadly in favour of the views that the Home Secretary expresses. Nevertheless, I am concerned that this may be a slippery slope. If the arguments against juries that are advanced are valid, perhaps in future we will be told that virtually all criminal cases should be heard by a judge alone. A system that has been part of our legal set-up for centuries should be defended. Although I am willing to go along with the Home Secretary's arguments to some extent, I am worried about the slippery slope.

David Blunkett: I am aware of the real dangers of the slippery slope. That is why we should listen to any suggestions about confining ourselves to dealing with tampering and interference with juries and to ensuring that we do not let the worst criminals get away with the worst abuse of the criminal justice system.
	I shall draw to a conclusion to allow the House to debate the issues. We are talking about the worst elements of society deliberately setting out to destroy the very system whose credibility we seek to defend and for which hon. Members are honourably arguing. We must not undermine that credibility or create a slippery slope that takes us away from the system that has stood us in good stead over the centuries. I accept that that is the case in relation to jury trial as a whole. I merely ask that we address the situation in the real world as regards the worst of society and what those people will do to innocents abroad in terms of destroying a system that otherwise serves us well.
	I hope that the right hon. Member for West Dorset will one day treat me to the Badger beer of Hall and Woodhouse—almost P.G., one would have thought—in the leafy lanes of West Dorset. I believe that it is known locally as "skunk ale". Perhaps when he and I have supped together, possibly after a Police Federation conference somewhere on the south coast, we will put our foot in it together.

Oliver Letwin: It may surprise the Home Secretary to know that I want to speak mainly about the topics that amendments Nos. 2 and 3 cover. He tried to present an interesting argument, which took the following form: the Opposition must have acceded to the general principle that something needed to be done but since they suggested an implausible or ineffective alternative or set of alternatives, the Government's proposals should stand. That neatly ignores amendments Nos. 2 and 3, which would remove the Government's proposals entirely. They are our first preference. I shall deal later with new clauses 1 and 2 and amendment No. 13, which move in the general direction that he advanced. The problem with his argument is that it did not tackle some points, with which I am about to deal.
	I am grateful for the Home Secretary's statement that the preservation of trial by jury is extremely important because it is true. Although that is a matter of agreement between us, it is important to set out for the record the extent of its significance and the reason for that. At first sight, the importance of trial by jury is not obvious. One could easily take the position that it has no intrinsic superiority over trial by judge. For reasons that I shall advance shortly, I believe that that is the Government's view. However, I believe that trial by jury is intrinsically superior. Its superiority arises from the relationship between the citizen, the state and the law.
	Trial by jury involves the participation of the ordinary citizen in the business of the law, thereby preventing the court from becoming a matter of the state opposing the citizen. That is critical to the deepest foundations of our liberal democracy. I do not say that that applies to any liberal democracy. Others do not have the system of trial by jury, but at least my hon. Friends—and perhaps some hon. Members on the Labour Benches—agree with the conservative sentiment that when we remove one of the foundation stones of our system of liberal democracy, we cannot expect the whole to survive simply because others have found different methods of supporting such a system.

Simon Hughes: The right hon. Gentleman knows that my colleagues and I support the view that he outlined. Does he accept an additional element that reflects the same constitutional principle: the importance of lay magistrates, especially when they deal with guilt and innocence in the lower courts? They are ordinary, non-professional members of the public. It is regrettable that the number of lay magistrates has decreased and the number of paid judges who do the job has increased. The public would have more confidence if matters were moving in the opposite direction.

Oliver Letwin: I am glad that I gave way to the hon. Gentleman because he brings me to my next point. I wholeheartedly agree with him. The principle of the layperson and the exercise of common sense in our courts is important. I agree that the lay magistracy is at least almost as important an institution as the jury in protecting the principle of the operation of common sense. I fear that although the Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor have aimed in the Bill and elsewhere at a genuine drive for efficiency, they thereby sacrifice the cause of common sense. In justice, when the chips are down, common sense matters more than straight efficiency.

John Gummer: My right hon. Friend pointed out that the jury or the magistrate is representative of ordinary people. That is the key part of the representation. The Home Secretary suggested that if the representation does not comprise a mixture that ranges across the board, it is not sufficiently representative. Of course wide representation is best, but the key point is that members of juries and lay magistrates are not professional paid people but ordinary people with whom the mass of the public can associate themselves and thus recognise that the system is not set up by authority against them.

Oliver Letwin: I entirely agree. My right hon. Friend better expresses the point that I was trying to make. Trial by jury reinforces to the general public the fact that justice in this country is a system not of the state opposing the individual but of society gathered to find out the facts. The jury represents society and finds the facts.

Douglas Hogg: rose—

David Blunkett: rose—

Oliver Letwin: I give way to my right hon. and learned Friend.

Douglas Hogg: Will my right hon. Friend follow up his point and face the fact that the proposition to which he has committed himself contradicts the new clause that he tabled? If we are considering judgment by one's peers, providing that a person charged with a financial offence can be judged only by actuaries or chartered accountants denies that person a trial by his peers.

Oliver Letwin: I shall deal with that at the tail end of my remarks. However, I stress for my right hon. and learned Friend's edification, and in seeking his agreement, that the first choice must be the preservation of trial by jury as we know it. Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 would provide for that. I hope that my hon. Friends will vote for them. The proposals in the new clauses are very much second best.

David Blunkett: I am especially glad that the right hon. Gentleman took the intervention of the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) first because it was enlightening. Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that he does not believe that the judiciary is the instrument of the state? He implied that he believed that it was.

Oliver Letwin: There is an important difference between reality and appearance. The appearance matters as much as the reality. It is true, thank goodness, that the judiciary remains independent of the Executive in Britain today.

David Blunkett: Very.

Oliver Letwin: The Home Secretary has cause to know that that is true. I celebrate the fact. Long may it remain so, but—an important but—the ordinary citizen does not perceive a judge in all his grandeur in the same light as a jury. The jury is representative of the ordinary citizen in a way in which a judge neither can nor should be. Judges are endowed with the majesty of the law and in that sense, although independent of the Executive, they represent the state. There is a difference.

Michael Jabez Foster: The right hon. Gentleman is talking about procedure rather than anything else. He speaks of common sense. Is he more interested in the right decisions, or in mere appearance? Is he saying that judges are less capable of reaching the right decision than juries, or is he just saying that that is how it appears?

Oliver Letwin: I think that there are two answers to that question. Like, I suspect, the House as a whole, I am interested both in the right decisions and in the way in which the law in general is seen by the citizenry. The House certainly needs to be interested in both those things. If what we are interested in is a criminal justice system that works, public confidence is critical. What counts is not merely the individual case, but the way in which the system is seen by the citizen.

Vera Baird: Is it not self-evident that the calibre of a jury decision will be higher than that of the decision of any individual? Twelve diverse, randomly selected people are listening, and have all the time in the world to debate and to cancel out each other's prejudices.

Oliver Letwin: I will not argue with the hon. and learned Lady about the term "self-evident", but it is clear that the system of applying 12 minds to a question of fact, operating on the basis of common sense, is a good system that has worked. We would at the very least be taking a risk by moving, on a large scale, to trial by judge alone.
	My next question is: do these proposals contain real threats to the prevalence of trial by jury? An important part of the Home Secretary's argument is his claim that he is not really undermining trial by jury. The problem with that argument is that it is wrong.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: Is it not a testament to the genius of juries that, especially in complex cases involving property, they currently convict in 86 per cent. of cases?

Oliver Letwin: Yes. I shall deal with that later, and when I do I will—if I may—cite the hon. and learned Gentleman's intervention.
	Are the Government's proposals really so different in effect, if not motives, from the earlier mode of trial legislation? That is an important question. If the Bill constitutes a minor adjustment to the jury system, we shall have one kind of debate; if it constitutes a wholesale attack on that system, we shall have quite another.
	Let us take the case of a jury that is held to be about to be tampered with. Let me point out to the Home Secretary—I am not saying that he did not know this, but he glossed over it in his speech—that we are making a critical distinction between two sets of circumstances. In one, a jury has been tampered with: amendment No. 13 deals with that. In the other, the jury has not yet been tampered with, but the prosecution successfully argues that it might be. The Home Secretary wants to let the prosecution argue that the jury might be tampered with, and, under his proposals, if the prosecution persuades the judge of that proposition, trial by jury will fall, subject to appeal.
	What means will the prosecution adopt to argue that the jury might be tampered with? It will allege that the crime of which the defendant is accused was very serious, very well organised, very violent, or something of the kind. Unless it has evidence of previous tampering on the part of the defendant, it will argue that the case should not be dealt with by a jury because such tampering might take place. I have just listed the most serious cases. In the most serious cases, the prosecution will be most likely to argue that the jury should not remain.

Simon Hughes: Is not this the real strength of the argument about tampering with juries? It is not just that certain cases lend themselves to such intervention; one thing we are all trying to do in the criminal justice system is persuade people to give evidence in the first place. Many people do not come forward because of threats and fear. In each of those cases, the jury might be interfered with because the first attempt to prevent the case from reaching the court failed. There are many such cases in many courts every year.

Oliver Letwin: I think that the prosecution will advance the argument that I have described in a fairly wide range of cases, not all of which will be the most serious; but it is an important part of the argument that I am about to advance that the prosecution will tend to present the judge with that proposition in the most serious cases. The hon. Gentleman and I need not be at odds about that.
	What about complex trials involving financial or property-related matters, often mis-described by the Government as fraud trials? I am not saying that fraud trials do not fall into that category, but the category is much wider. A major health and safety trial involving corporations will typically be finance-related, complex and involve property. It will presumably qualify. A strong attack by the criminal justice system on a serious drug-dealing gang may well involve complex financial and property-related issues. I am thinking not least of cases that we discussed in the context of another Bill.
	Of what variety are the cases I have just described? They are among the most serious cases.What pattern is emerging? We can anticipate from the Government's proposals, I think plausibly—I am at pains not to put this in hyperbolical or overblown language—that, in many of the most serious cases, the prosecution will persuade the judge that the jury should be removed. That will bring about a bizarre situation. I agree with the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) that this will not be the sole outcome, but I expect a large number of relatively minor cases to go on being tried by juries, while a preponderance of the most serious will not be.
	What will the Government tell the House then? They will say, "If we do not need jury trial for the most serious cases, why on earth do we need to preserve it for minor cases? Why should we be so inefficient"—I use the term of which the Lord Chancellor is so fond when referring to lay magistrates—"as to preserve the jury system for minor cases, having accepted that it is not necessary for major ones?" I fear that it would be difficult to resist that logic. This is not merely the slippery slope rightly described by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey; the Home Secretary is taking us well down the slippery slope.

Douglas Hogg: rose—

Ian Lucas: rose—

Oliver Letwin: I am spoilt for choice. I give way to the hon. Gentleman first.

Ian Lucas: Is the right hon. Gentleman not ignoring the fact that the vast majority of minor cases—if I may so describe them—are dealt with in the magistrates courts, without a jury, and that that will continue to be the case? The vast majority of criminal cases dealt with in our courts will therefore continue to be heard without a jury.

Oliver Letwin: That is precisely my point. There will be a bizarre situation in which a large number of very minor cases will be dealt with increasingly by district judges, and a large number of very major cases will be dealt with by judges in the superior courts. Sandwiched between the two will be cases that are rather more major than the most minor, but rather more minor than the most major. They will be dealt with by juries. The Government will tell the House, "This is nonsense. We can do without the juries in the middle section." I know that that will be true—if the Government think about it, they will know that it is likely to be true—but I hope to prevent us collectively ever from finding out whether it will be true, because it is too dangerous to contemplate.

David Blunkett: If we are going to argue the case rationally, as the right hon. Gentleman has been doing, we should not go into a kind of never-never land. We are dealing with a very specific group of cases—fewer than 100 a year—so we should not make presumptions that we did not make before, when 95 per cent. of cases were dealt with in the magistrates courts, higher courts dealt with cases on appeal without a jury, and the remainder were dealt with by jury trial. The removal of a few dozen cases does not materially change that position one iota.

Oliver Letwin: I had intended to deal slightly later with the Home Secretary's repeated claim relating to fewer than 100 cases, but I shall deal with it now in response to his intervention. If I may say so, I think that that figure is accurate and phoney. It is accurate because it is a reflection of the number of cases in which there was jury tampering or that involved fraud trials. My argument is that the Bill—the provisions in print are what will govern this matter, not what is in the Home Secretary's fondest imagination—allows for a far wider application of the principle than that restricted number of cases.

Douglas Hogg: Would my right hon. Friend allow me to reinforce his point by drawing to his attention the fact that, if we look carefully at clause 37—which I know that he has—we see that the grounds for securing a non-jury trial are the complexity or length of the trial? It is perfectly true that the Bill then attributes a cause for that complexity or length, but once we accept that complexity or length per se are grounds for a non-jury trial, why have the additional requirement? The Government will in due course ask the House to dispense with that additional requirement.

Oliver Letwin: That is another point relating to the slippery slope, and I can only gently complain that it was the next point that I was going to make. My right hon. and learned Friend is right. I will not labour this point further. There are three or four other grounds for supposing that this is a slippery slope. The point here is clear: jury trial matters. It matters because of the structure of justice in its relationship to the citizen, and this is the beginning of a slippery slope away from it. Perhaps it is more than the beginning.
	The next stage of my argument is also simple and clear. We have to ask whether any great gains will result from this great step. If the proposals were to result in great gains in the cause of justice—[Interruption.]—and if, as the Home Secretary suggests from a sedentary position, large numbers of criminals who would not otherwise be convicted were to be put behind bars because of these changes, without any significant risk of the innocent being convicted, I can see that there would be an opposing argument.
	But the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews), who reminded me that there is a very high conviction rate in the relevant sorts of trial, is right. The 92 per cent. conviction rate that has been adduced in relation to cases involving the Serious Fraud Office is also right. The evidence from jury-tampered trials is that, on the whole, people have been good at picking the problem up and defending those who are on the juries, and that the conviction rates that attend subsequently are high. I know of no serious empirical base for supposing that moving so far down such a slippery slope is justified by any great and immediate gain. There will perhaps be some gain, but it will not be so great as to be proportional.

David Winnick: I am not sure whether it will give the right hon. Gentleman any satisfaction to learn that I might vote with the Government tonight. I was on the Home Affairs Committee, we made our recommendation and I went along with it. But if I do, I shall simply be giving them the benefit of the doubt. The doubt remains, however, and the more I listen, particularly to the fine argument being advanced by the right hon. Gentleman—after all, if an Opposition spokesperson is making a good argument, why not say so?—the more that doubt reasserts itself in my mind.

Oliver Letwin: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who might be the sole example of anyone ever being persuaded by an argument of mine in the House of Commons.

John Mann: And the last.

Oliver Letwin: Perhaps so.

Lady Hermon: I have to admit to the right hon. Gentleman that I am not persuaded by his arguments this evening. I would be more sympathetic to his point of view if, in the light of the fact that his party supports the Belfast agreement, which we have had for five years, and that the IRA has been on ceasefire for the six years since 1997, he could assure me that it was now Conservative party policy to campaign for the restoration of jury trials throughout the United Kingdom, of which Northern Ireland is a vital part.

Oliver Letwin: Much as I should like, for all sorts of reasons, to buy the good will of the hon. Lady, I am astonishingly clear that, mercifully, my remit extends to England and Wales—not that I have any actual remit; that lies with the Home Secretary, but even my shadow remit covers only England and Wales. I ask the hon. Lady to contact my esteemed colleague, the shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who will have his own views on that difficult matter.

Lady Hermon: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way a second time. I find myself offended. He began his remarks by saying that the jury was a critical part of our liberal democracy and that if we removed it, we would have removed one of our democracy's foundation stones. I do not accept that he can simply shift the burden to the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Mr. Davies). The shadow Home Secretary must address the question this evening. As someone who gave an interview to The Independent in which he stated that jury trial was the bulwark of 800 years of our democracy, he cannot allow part of the United Kingdom not to have that pleasure.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I must ensure that the debate remains within certain bounds.

Oliver Letwin: Mr. Deputy Speaker, I have never been more grateful to you.
	The final stage of my argument is also clear and simple. The House must obviously take the Government's proposals seriously, and we must therefore ask whether there are any balancing arguments. Are the Government pointing out things to which we need to pay attention? I have already explained why I do not believe that the Government are justified in making any change on the basis of the purported gains from the proposals—I stress this for the benefit of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), among others—and that is why we shall press to a vote amendments Nos. 2 and 3, if you will allow us to do so, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and why that is our first preference.
	We have tried to identify the evil that the Government believe exists. We have also tried to produce constructive alternatives to deal with that evil, or, indeed, those two evils. We have done that in the spirit of compromise, and I want to explain to the Home Secretary quite personally the reason why. We will not compromise on the general principle. I shall ask my noble Friends in the other place to fight to the last breath on these matters, and if that means cratering the Bill, I am prepared to see it cratered.
	Because I am taking that position, I have sought every means at my disposal to ensure that there is an escape route, so that much that is good in the Bill can get through without a confrontation between the two Houses. That is why my hon. Friends and I tabled new clauses 1 and 2, incurring the odium of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, whose purity of mind I admire. That is also why we suggested the possibility of an empanelled, expert jury, and why we tabled amendment No. 13, which provides for the abandoning of a jury when there has actually been jury tampering. We did those things in the spirit of seeking a compromise solution that could avoid the Bill falling and which would preserve, in each case, the existence of the jury—I admit that, in the first, it would be an unsatisfactory jury—and point up the attachment of the House and of Parliament as a whole to the principle of jury trial, thereby preventing the descent of the slippery slope.
	I accept that the solution we are suggesting is second best and not fully satisfactory, but trying to prevent us from rolling down the slippery slope is better than allowing us to roll down it. For the sake of avoiding a confrontation between the two Houses, we are prepared to move to that compromise. That is the only basis on which we have put it forward.
	We will not press those proposals to the vote tonight, but I hope that the Home Secretary will see the light and accept the purport of amendments Nos. 2 and 3 when, as I profoundly hope, they are sent back to the House by the other place. I give notice now, however, that if he will accept neither those amendments when they return nor the compromise position, we are prepared to crater the Bill and force him to use, a year later, the Parliament Act so as to take a stand on what I continue to regard as one of the fundamental principles of this country's criminal justice system—our adherence to and belief in the jury system.

Chris Mullin: I shall be brief. The Home Affairs Committee addressed these issues in its report on the Bill, and we started by welcoming the Government's intention to retain jury trial in either-way cases. It is sometimes forgotten that they have form in this area, as they made a couple of attempts two years ago to abolish jury trial in either-way cases. I am glad to say that those attempts were seen off, and very wisely the Government dropped the proposal. I refer back to those attempts in relation to the argument on slippery slopes, because they are a sliver of evidence for the suggestion that something bigger—perhaps in the past, perhaps under another Home Secretary—might have been in the mind of the Home Office in respect of reducing the right to a jury trial.
	On balance, the Home Affairs Committee accepted the argument that, in cases of complex fraud, jury trial could be dispensed with, but we did so only on the basis that there was a difficulty in finding a suitably representative cross-section of jurors for a long trial. We did not accept that juries are incapable of understanding arguments in complex cases. We took the view that it is the job of counsel and the judge to make the issues simple enough for ordinary mortals to understand.

Douglas Hogg: Is there not another conclusion, too? The Crown has an obligation to ensure that the indictment is fairly simple and short, and to avoid extended conspiracy charges.

Chris Mullin: That is absolutely right, and it is in everybody's interest—the interest of the defendants, quite obviously, as trials that go on for months are time consuming and debilitating for all concerned, and the interest of the public, as such trials are enormously expensive. I have long believed that even the most complex arguments can usually be reduced for ordinary mortals to a few simple concepts that ought to be readily explicable for people as articulate as those who practise in our courts.
	So, we did not buy the argument, and I am glad to say that, ultimately, at least when he appeared before us, the Minister, Lord Falconer, did not advance the argument that the purpose involves the difficulty of finding jurors capable of understanding the argument. The argument made to us was on the difficulty of finding a representative cross-section of jurors who would be available for a long trial. On those grounds, and those grounds alone, we accepted it, albeit reluctantly and albeit without unanimity.

David Winnick: My hon. Friend says that we accepted the argument with some reluctance. Does he accept that although the majority, and that includes me, agreed to the recommendation, there was a general feeling of being somewhat unhappy and a wish that such agreement was not necessary? There was certainly no enthusiasm, and he has made that clear.

Chris Mullin: There was not unanimity. We thought about the issue carefully, although it is not for me to meter the degree of enthusiasm that existed during the discussion. The conclusion that we reached was an on-balance one on the lines that I have suggested.

David Heath: Is the hon. Gentleman, in saying that he rejects the arguments about a complex matter being too difficult for a jury to understand, saying also that he rejects clause 37, which provides for a jury being discharged in certain complex or lengthy trials—either condition is sufficient—and an alternative being put in place?

Chris Mullin: We accepted the argument presented to us by the Minister on the difficulty of finding juries to deal with lengthy trials, but the complexity argument I do not buy.
	It is hard to argue with the Home Secretary's point that where there is clear evidence of jury tampering the possibility of a non-jury trial ought to be provided for, because it clearly is in the public interest that villains should not be able to tamper with juries. I have heard nobody seriously dispute that. I would say only that it ought to be demonstrated, not just alleged, that such evidence exists. The police sometimes want to impress on the jury how heavy the villains are who are on trial. They do that sometimes by over-egging the security around the court so that everybody who comes into court has to see armed guards en route and all that sort of thing. That, of course, makes an impression on juries.
	I say again that it must be clearly demonstrated that tampering has occurred. There must not merely be an allegation at which everyone throws up their hands and the jury is immediately dropped.

Oliver Letwin: If the hon. Gentleman means what he just said and it was not a slip of the tongue, he supports amendment No. 13 rather than the clause, because the purport of that amendment is that tampering has to have occurred—the phrase he used—whereas the clause would allow the advancement of the argument that it might occur.

Chris Mullin: I believe that clear evidence has to show that tampering has occurred or that there is an extremely serious risk of it occurring. There has to be evidence, not simply an assertion.

John Bercow: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Chris Mullin: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I do not want to get bogged down on this point. The safeguard is in clause 41—the right of appeal will be allowed in cases where a jury trial is denied in relation to fraud and jury tampering. No doubt that right of appeal will be exercised.
	I have a couple of queries. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) touched on the question of a judge having had to rule in private on public interest immunity and having heard things that will not be discussed in open court. I have high confidence in our judges' ability to distinguish between evidence given in open court and knowledge obtained privately. I certainly accept that all our judges, or most of them, are independent of the state, but in my experience judges, even the most intelligent, can be a mite gullible.
	I have sat through major trials over which some of the finest judicial minds in the land have presided. No issue of fact and no detail advanced by counsel on either side was too small to be examined forensically by them but they missed the big picture entirely. Observing such trials, it occurred to me—it is true in other walks of life, not just the judiciary—that it is possible to be extremely clever and stupid at the same time. It is an observation that one could occasionally make about the profession of politics, too. Therefore, I have that reservation about the ability of judges to distinguish between what they hear and what is put to them privately.

Douglas Hogg: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Chris Mullin: I will in a moment.
	I think that the Home Secretary conceded that, in such cases, a judge should be ready to hand over to another judge, not only so that the evidence is not contaminated but so that the trial is seen to be fair. That reservation worries me. I accept the assurances of the Government that this is not a slippery slope and I am glad to hear Ministers reaffirm that proposition today.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: Before my hon. Friend leaves that point, may I ask him to address what seems to many of us to be a central point? If a judge hears prejudicial evidence, or any evidence, in private with the prosecution, they are the only two people in the court who are seized of that information—the defence does not have it—so how can that person, as a matter of principle, sit as a judge deciding guilt or innocence, and how can one possibly avoid contravening articles 6 and 12, to take only two, of the European convention on human rights, which require that there shall be equality between the parties?

Chris Mullin: I am not qualified to pronounce on the point about the European convention. No doubt Ministers have checked that very carefully but, on my hon. and learned Friend's first point, I am very sympathetic. I think that, in a case where the judge is party to a lot of evidence or information—some of it would not qualify to be evidence, which would be a bit iffy to put it mildly—that has not been part of the prosecution case, there is a strong argument for insisting that the case be heard by a separate judge.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Chris Mullin: Forgive me. I was in the process of winding up when my hon. and learned Friend intervened.
	I reaffirm the point on which I think everyone here agrees: these reforms, just about acceptable though they are, should not be carried further. There should be no further erosion of the right to trial by jury. We should go thus far and no further.

Gwyneth Dunwoody: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Chris Mullin: I am sorry. I have finished.

Simon Hughes: I am happy to take part in what is an important debate. My hon. Friends and I on the Liberal Democrat Benches are signatories to amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 3. In relation to each of the Government's three proposals to change and to reduce jury trial, we do not believe that the case has been made. We do not oppose the proposals because there is not a proper debate to be had; there is. We do not do it because there is no argument on the other side; there is. However, having seen the work by the committees that preceded the legislation—especially Lord Justice Auld's committee—having looked at the White Paper, having sat through the Committee that considered the Bill and having looked at the evidence, we do not believe that it would be right to do away with jury trial in those three cases. To use the obvious test, jury trial is so well established and works so well that the case would have to be made beyond reasonable doubt for that to be changed and it has not been, so we stand by the present position.
	The Chairman of the Select Committee on Home Affairs, the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin), referred to the fact that in the previous Parliament—my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) asked the Home Secretary a very good question about this—this House and the other place fought very hard to resist a wholesale, full-frontal assault on the jury trial system and Parliament won, thank goodness. This is not a wholesale, full-frontal attack on the jury trial system. It is a staged attack of a lesser nature. It proposes a little less jury trial rather than a lot less jury trial but, like the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin), his colleagues, many Labour Members and, more important, many non-politicians and non-lawyers out there whom we represent, we are persuaded that, once one starts to move away from such a well-tried and well-established system, it is very difficult to resist arguments for further change and there is little logic in going down a road so far and not going down it further.
	Roughly 29,000 people serve as lay magistrates in England and Wales and 200,000 people a year serve on juries—a significant cross-section of the British public, the like of which Parliament and the judiciary will never be. They are a very great protection to ensure that the criminal justice system is the people's justice system, not the professionals' justice system.
	I want to give six reasons why jury trial should be held on to, unless the case is so overwhelming that it should be changed. First, it works, and if it works we should not seek to replace it. In the cases that we are talking about, it also works. Figures have been cited in the Chamber about the conviction rates in the most difficult and most complex fraud cases, which arguably would be the least likely to secure the understanding of a jury such that it felt comfortable about convicting beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction rate in those cases is much higher than elsewhere.
	I represent a lot of people who have been defendants, and other colleagues will, to varying degrees, have done the same. No defendants have complained to me that they would rather have had a judge try their case than a jury. That has never been the cause of a queue at my surgery or a lot of letters in my postbag. In fact, I have had rather good reports of the jury system by those who participated in it. There are many criticisms of the criminal justice system, but the jury system has not attracted criticism. We should be careful to focus on the places where there is criticism.
	Secondly—we referred to this and I will not elaborate—jury trial, like the lay magistracy, increases public involvement in the criminal justice system. Trial by judge self-evidently reduces the involvement of ordinary people in that system. The more people are removed from it, the less they feel comfortable about it and confident in it because the less they understand it.
	In that context, I pay tribute to my local Crown court, Southwark Crown court, which looks after Middlesex Guildhall, Blackfriars and the old Knightsbridge Crown court, which has moved. It opened its doors on a Saturday recently to explain to the public what happens. It had mock trials, mock pleas and quizzing of judges. It is hugely important that the public feel that it is their place. There were queues at the door to go in, to people's surprise. The public have an interest—[Interruption.] The hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) smiles, suggesting perhaps that those people wanted to learn a few things in preparation for later life but they looked a law-abiding group to me.
	Thirdly, as we have said, jury trial is trial by the unpaid and the unprofessional but it is also trial by those who do not come with a reputation. The blunt truth is that judges have reputations—as a soft judge or a hard judge, a tough judge or a less tough judge. When one gets a jury, one cannot predict. One cannot say that it will come to a particular view because it is a cross-section. Judges do not have that lack of reputation, which is extremely important in terms of the confidence in each case.

Douglas Hogg: Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that, in a very restrained way, he is telling the House that many judges are unduly sympathetic to the Crown case?

Simon Hughes: There are certainly such judges, as there are stipendiary magistrates or district judges. The truth is that if one sits in court day after day, one's patience with defence cases may tend to wear thin. I could name a judge, but I will not, who used to sit in my local court and was the judge to avoid by any defendant, irrespective of their guilt or innocence. It was presumed that one would be lucky to escape that judge assisting the jury towards a conclusion of guilty. That does not apply to juries and never has done. The jury starts with a clean sheet, which is important.

Claire Curtis-Thomas: Will the hon. Gentleman concede that some juries do not start with a clean sheet? He will be aware of my interest in sex abuse cases. For many of the accused in such cases, the opportunity to go into a court without a jury might be of positive benefit, given the predisposition of the public in relation to such offences.

Simon Hughes: I do not accept the hon. Lady's view. There are proposals in the Bill that would make juries start their job without a clean sheet by allowing them to know of previous convictions and history, which would hugely prejudice them. It is proven that somebody with a previous conviction for a sex offence, whatever the new charges might be, will be thought much more likely to be guilty because the public, understandably, have a particular dislike of the offence. I do not accept what she says; juries do a good job when they start with a clean sheet.
	The next point, importantly, is that when we have a jury, the case must be put in language that ordinary people understand. With trial by judges, the whole thing can disappear from the realm of the ordinary person. One of the tests of a good case is whether it can be put simply, and I have seen complex cases presented very simply. There can be acres of paper in a complex fraud case, when the issue is very simple. Did somebody fiddle the books? Were they honest or not? Did they tell the truth? The jury understands that if it is put to them clearly, as do the public and reporters.
	The collective judgment of character by 12 people from different walks of life is clearly a better test of guilt or innocence than the judgment of character by one person from a very particular walk of life. I served as a judge's marshal soon after I qualified as a member of the Bar, and sat next to a great judge in the Liverpool Crown court. However, Mr. Justice Cantley came to the court with one view. It was important that the collective view of the jury was there to pronounce on guilt or innocence, as opposed to the judge, who then decided on the punishment.

Vera Baird: On complexity, an important allied point is that the presence of the jury requires that the whole of the case be capable of being understood and of being explained simply, not only for the benefit of the jury but for the benefit of the public. Anyone who goes to the Court of Appeal, where professionals are addressing professionals, will see that, very soon, it becomes difficult to follow the plot even if we do not descend into Latin, which lawyers do. The only words that might be understood if the proposals go through might be "guilty" or "not guilty" pronounced at the end. That is completely unacceptable.

Simon Hughes: I endorse entirely what the hon. and learned Lady says. It is important not only that the 200,000 who serve in the jury box understand what is going on, but that the public who read the papers and sit in the gallery, as well as families, friends and relatives, also understand.

Stephen Hesford: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Simon Hughes: I will not at the moment. I am not trying to be rude, but we have until 8 o'clock because of the guillotine and I am conscious that others want to speak.
	Each of the proposals—first, that defendants be allowed to seek trial without a jury, at their instigation; secondly, that complex or lengthy trials be conducted without a jury; and, thirdly, the proposals relating to the consequence of jury tampering—is too widely drawn. For example, in relation to a defendant asking to be tried without a jury, the judge has to decide whether the matters concerned
	"give rise to exceptional circumstances which make it desirable in the interests of justice for the trial to be conducted without a jury."
	That gives rise to a lot of questions.
	As my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome said, it is not just complexity, but length that could trigger a jury being done away with. That could be on the basis of
	"arrangements, transactions or records of a financial or commercial nature or which relate to property".
	All sorts of triggers could be involved and the decision in the interests of justice by the judge could mean that that matter comes out of the jury's control.
	The Government amendments on jury tampering are welcome, but we should not accept the principle; however, they seek to point out the deficiencies of the drafting. At the moment, there has to be a "real and present danger", which often occurs. The first of the other two tests—only one of which need apply—is that
	"it would be necessary to provide police protection".
	In the last two years, the Met alone spent £9 million on protection, so that hurdle could be got over quickly if there were a rumour of jury tampering. The second is that
	"the level and duration of that protection would be likely to place an excessive burden on the life of a typical juror."
	Others in this House—Ministers in particular—are under protection; I myself was for a period. If jurors are under protection, that imposes a burden. It would not be difficult for that test to be passed if the juror were trying to live a normal live while under protection.
	We must resist going down the road. One might say, superficially, that if a defendant wants trial by judge—the hon. Member for Crosby (Mrs. Curtis-Thomas) has argued this—they should be entitled to that. But that produces a two-tier justice system, and the decision of the judge as to guilt or innocence is far more likely to be open to criticism—including by the tabloid media—than the decision of a jury. I can think of many cases in which a jury trial has settled the matter where a decision by a judge would not have done; for example, a decision about a Member of the Houses of Parliament in front of a court but decided by a judge alone. Such cases, and many others, need the certainty that a jury trial would provide.

Lady Hermon: I shall keep this intervention short, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The hon. Gentleman, in the past, has taken a considerable interest in Northern Ireland affairs and is familiar with our non-jury procedures. I refer him to an article in The Times on 18 July 2002 by Sir Donald Murray, a Lord Justice of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Northern Ireland, who served in that capacity for several years. His conclusion about non-jury trials was that the possibility of an unsafe or unsatisfactory conviction being allowed to stand "is remote". I should add that our judges in Northern Ireland are clever and never stupid. Would the hon. Gentleman be persuaded to support the Government if they were to amend the Bill in line with what we have in Northern Ireland with regard to non-jury trials, with an appeal on points of law and points of fact and with the judge having to state the reasons for the decision?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. On brevity, the hon. Lady must see me afterwards.

Simon Hughes: In mitigation, the hon. Member for North Down gets frustrated because we can never debate such matters in Northern Ireland Bills, and I understand her frustration. That would be a less worse option than some of the present proposals, and I share her view. I understood why the Diplock courts came about, but we ought to be seeking to restore to Northern Ireland the system that we have had here. We ought to have the best system first, and only if that does not work should we go down another road.
	On the length and complexity option, the reality is that often, middle-class professional defendants would get a particular class of trial, while the rest would not. Long and complex cases involving fraud usually involve professionals. My hon. Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr. Burnett) knows more about this issue than I do, although not through first-hand experience, I hasten to add. Those without such a white-collar background would not be in the same boat. So often, there would be a particular system of justice for one category and a different one for another.
	On jury tampering, in some ways the provision would be an encouragement to tamper, not a disincentive. That would be extremely dangerous. Colleagues on both sides of the Chamber know that it would provide a perverse incentive that could lead us in the wrong direction. Instead, we ought to draw a line and say that jury trial remains and will not be moved, however hard one tries. People who tamper with juries should be punished—taken to court, prosecuted and imprisoned—but the system should not be fundamentally changed.

John Burnett: I hope that, like me, my hon. Friend takes no comfort in the analogy drawn by the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) on jury tampering and magistrates. There is always an appeal—in fact and law—in terms of a magistrate's decision.

Simon Hughes: My hon. Friend has saved me from the need to make that point.

John Bercow: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that although his point is valid in itself, it is the stronger by virtue of the fact that the Government have worded the clause so loosely that a very low threshold has to be overcome before jury trial is scrapped? It is absolutely and chronically perverse.

Simon Hughes: I accept that point absolutely. I understand the argument, advanced by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird), that if we are to go down this road we need much steeper steps. However, although the position that the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) takes, which is to suggest a compromise, is understandable in respect of some of these issues, it is the wrong one at the moment. The proposals are weak in terms of the width of the doors that they open; it would be far better to stand on the proven track record of the existing system. When we talk to our colleagues in the other place in the days to come, I hope that we discover that, on looking at the evidence, they share our view that the current system has much more merit than any of the alternatives.

Oliver Letwin: For the avoidance of doubt, let the hon. Gentleman be assured that I shall ask my noble Friends in the other place to take the same stance as we shall take tonight: to oppose these clauses as they stand. The compromise exists only if we reach ping-pong and the Government would otherwise fail to have an escape route.

Simon Hughes: The right hon. Gentleman must sometimes be less generous in providing escape routes for the Government. It is sometimes better to show them that there is no escape; that way, they might change their minds.

Gwyneth Dunwoody: Will the hon. Gentleman reiterate the fact that this House must take decisions on principle? If this House is defeated on matters of principle, by all means it is perfectly correct for Her Majesty's loyal Opposition to make it clear what their actions will be. This is the place that ought to be deciding on what happens in the law courts, whatever happens in an unelected second Chamber.

Simon Hughes: I should tell the hon. Lady, who knows that I respect her greatly, that that is absolutely our job. This is indeed an issue of principle, and somewhat unusually, we accord with the view of the majority of the people who send us here about the importance of it.
	I apprehend that we will have a debate tomorrow about the independence of the judiciary, and as I said to the Home Secretary earlier, some of us are going to ensure that we stand up for judges and their independence. Liberal Democrats are very clear that today's debate is about standing up for juries. Parliament should stand up for juries. They are tried and tested. They are one of the most popular institutions in the criminal justice system. If everything else in it were as successful and popular, we would not need legislation such as this. Nor would we have the difficulties or the disaffection that, sadly, much of the rest of our law and order policy provokes from the people whom we represent.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: I am aware that many Members wish to speak, so I will be brief. I shall of course confine myself to clauses 37 and 38, and to amendments Nos. 2 and 3. These provisions represent, as we all know, the most serious attack on the most fundamental of our civil liberties—jury trial —since the previous most serious attack, which took place during the previous Parliament. Even in the short time available, it is impossible not to reflect on the exquisite irony before us. During consideration of mode of trial legislation, we were repeatedly told that our fears were groundless because the most serious offences would always be sacrosanct in terms of jury trial. Now, of course, we hear precisely the reverse. It is impossible not to draw the conclusion that the Government, having got their hands badly bitten twice on that occasion, are now applying themselves to the dog from the other end.
	This issue is relevant to the entire question of the slippery slope. If these provisions go through, the Government will return to mode of trial. I listened very carefully to the Home Secretary talking about the wisdom of penitence, and saying that the Government have learned their lesson. I am sorry to say that I do not accept or believe a word of it. I also listened very carefully to the previous Home Secretary's speeches on mode of trial. If I were sitting as a recorder or Crown court judge, and if mitigation were being put forward—you will forgive a small incursion into parliamentary courtesy, Mr. Deputy Speaker—and someone came before me and said, "Jack doesn't believe a word of what he said then and he's very sorry," I would not accept a word of it. The plain fact is that jury trial is a shibboleth to this Home Office—and, indeed, to this Government—and it is time that we recognised that fact.

John Bercow: I entirely agree with the purport of the hon. and learned Gentleman's argument, which is that the Government do not seem to have learned their lesson. Does he recall, and think appropriate in this context, the observation of Kipling, who said:
	"And the burnt fool's bandaged finger goes wobbling back to the fire"?

Robert Marshall-Andrews: Indeed; in fact I was about to quote Kipling in that precise respect. [Laughter.] However, I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who does it so much better than I could.
	I should declare an interest, in that I have prosecuted and defended serious fraud cases for many years, some of which were extremely serious. I like to think that I prosecute and defend such cases with equal vigour, and if I ever had the misfortune to prosecute the Home Secretary—for an offence unidentified at the moment—I hope that he would find that that was indeed so. I dislike losing cases when I am prosecuting as much as I dislike losing them when I am defending, so I am not a wet liberal in that regard.
	Much has already been said, entirely justifiably, about the Government's motives and reasons, and I shall cut that discussion short, save in respect of the representative nature of juries. The truth is that we have cracked this problem. In the vast majority of serious fraud cases, we take a day or sometimes two. We never have panels of 700 jurors. Sometimes we have 100, and we always find juries that are comfortable with sitting for the time involved in serious fraud trials. The idea that they are not representative is a dream of the Government; it is wholly unsubstantiated by those who practise in the courts. There is no law or learning on this; there have been no studies—sociological, demographical or otherwise—to suggest that these juries are unrepresentative.
	The universal view of those who practise is that these juries are in fact more representative than any others. They include, it is true, slightly more women than men, which is no bad thing. They include, it is true, slightly more disabled people who are unable to work, which is no bad thing. Those drawn from a pool of people who are not working at that time include the highly successful—no bad thing if one is dealing with serious fraud—and those who have the misfortune to be unemployed. Again, that is no bad thing. These supposedly unrepresentative people have no difficulty whatsoever in convicting in nearly 90 per cent. of the cases that they hear. This Government would not suggest for one moment that that was due to some feebleness of intellect.
	Having dealt with the Government's case—that is the totality of it—I shall now move on to the offensive and state as a plain fact that the provision will not work and will be wholly unjust. I say that for two separate reasons—there are many others, but I shall focus on the two most important. First, judges sit as judges of law; juries sit as judges of fact. That is our system. We cannot simply remove the jury from our system and pretend that we have invented an inquisitorial system. As I have said before, it is the precise equivalent of removing the wheels from a car and pretending that a boat has been created. The jury is essential to the system, as are judges.
	The whole question of public interest immunity applies. The Crown claims public interest immunity for evidence that it believes should not, in the public interest, be put before the defence. The evidence is put before the trial judge, and the trial judge decides. The system works extremely well. The judge might say that the defence can see certain evidence, but not other evidence: the jury will then, in common with the defence, be ignorant of that evidence. A judge cannot hear PII claims—hear evidence that is not privy to the defence—and then try a case of guilt or innocence. That offends every single canon of natural justice and is a manifest breach of the European convention.
	The Government have advanced no argument—absolutely none—in favour of the position, only the postulation that there could be a second judge. I tell the House that that is impossible, because the nature of public interest immunity is that the judge has to keep the matter under review throughout the trial until it reaches a point at which the judge says that evidence that he hitherto decided should not be given to the defence, now should be given to it. The judge knows the case throughout the trial. Even supposing that having another judge were possible, what would happen in a PII case: it would have to start again with another judge, and then on it would go to another judge for another PII application. I repeat that that cannot work. What will happen in practice? Judges, asked if they would try a case on their own will end up asking the prosecution whether PII factors apply to that case. In money laundering cases, such factors always apply, and nearly always in cases of serious fraud. The legislation is deeply flawed in that respect alone.
	However, manifest injustice is evident in another respect. Frequently—or more often than not—trials involve more than one defendant. In serious cases— whether or not jury tampering has occurred—there may be a Mr. Big, a Mr. Not so Big and a Mrs. somewhere in the middle. Mr. and Mrs. might be bringing up the end and two or three misters are the minnows who have played hardly any part at all. They are all, quite rightly, tried together, but what will happen if an application is made to the effect that public interest immunity applies to one of them? They will all be tainted. What will happen if one of them tampers with a jury? They will all lose their jury trial—every single one of them. What will happen if complexity is postulated in respect of only one defendant, Mr. Big? They will all lose their right to a jury trial.
	When I asked the then Minister, he confirmed that that would be the case, but said that it would be subject to an application to split the trial. So now we have two trials—the same trial once tried by a judge, and once tried by a jury. What will happen if two conflicting verdicts result: the jury says guilty, the judge not guilty? What will happen when it goes to the Court of Appeal? Absolutely none of those issues has been thought out or answered by the Government. The Bill manifestly attacks the most fundamental of our civil liberties and is wholly unworkable in practice. It is unjust, offending against every single canon of our criminal justice system. I urge all hon. Members to support the cross-party amendments Nos. 1 to 3; let us have done with this very bad part of a pretty bad Bill.

Douglas Hogg: It is a pleasure to follow the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews). His point about public interest immunity is wholly conclusive. He has marshalled the arguments with great lucidity, so I shall be brief.
	There is a problem with jury nobbling in clause 38 and we have not tackled it sensibly. I should like to make three brief points. First, it is said that there is a right of appeal and there is, but it is subject to leave and the Bill is silent about the grounds on which that leave will be granted or withheld. We must deal with that problem.
	Secondly, and it is not quite the same issue that applies to public interest immunity, it is important that nothing on the application for a non-jury trial should be allowed to taint the subsequent trial. In the great majority of cases, that will mean that the application for the non-jury trial should be made by a judge different from the one who subsequently hears the substantive trial.
	Thirdly, I agree with the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) that before a non-jury trial is granted on the ground of tampering, it is essential that clear evidence is provided that either tampering has taken place or is likely to take place. A bald assertion to that effect is certainly not enough and will result in many non-jury trials being approved on the ground of likelihood alone.
	I shall now move on quickly to clauses 36 and 37. I find myself in substantial agreement—I am glad to say, on this occasion—with my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin). During the past six years since I was unfortunately driven from Government, I have taken part in several fraud cases, some of them long, which ultimately revolved around the question of whether the defendant was dishonest. Juries are singularly well place to determine that question. In common with the hon. Member for Sunderland, South, I do not buy the argument that jurors cannot address that question: they can and they do.
	I make my next point with a degree of caution and diffidence because I hope to be treated with courtesy in courts as well as in the House, but some judges are unduly predisposed in favour of the Crown. That is not surprising. Judges spend many years listening to spurious defence case after spurious defence case, which can make them jolly impatient with defendants. I regard the jury system as an important safeguard to protect the innocent citizen in a way that I do not believe is true of all judges. I regret to say that, but I believe it to be the case.
	My next point will be brief, because my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset expressed it so clearly. It is the slippery slope argument. Once it is accepted as a proposition that length and complexity provide good reasons for not having a jury trial, why extend it to a second condition and say that a jury is unnecessary because of the commercial or property nature of the case? Once complexity and length are conceded as appropriate grounds, we are heading towards getting rid of all jury trials.
	Other right hon. and hon. Members want to speak, so I shall quickly make two final points. First, it is not impossible to find jurors to deal with long cases. The hon. and learned Member for Medway has greater experience than me in that respect. Although it is sometimes difficult, jurors are always to be found and empanelled.
	Finally, as the hon. and learned Member for Medway said and as I mentioned at the outset, the public interest immunity point is absolutely conclusive. It is the nature of fraud cases that PII applications will be made, at least at the start. Once a judge starts hearing PII applications in the absence, as always, of the defence, how can we conceivably satisfy the requirements of article 6 of the convention? That point goes to the heart of the matter and demonstrates why the proposal is so ill thought out.

Vera Baird: Amendment No. 1 would leave out clause 36, which couches as a "right" the option to opt out of jury trial. That alleged right should be considered in context. It will be given to a defendant, by a Bill that has repeatedly been described as one that was intended to rebalance rights towards victims and witnesses. Nobody has ever asked for that right. No client has ever said to me, "When you get into Parliament, can you legislate to get rid of these bigoted jurors and get me trial by judge, please?" Nor can we ignore the Government's recent attitude to mode of trial, when the very idea that the defendant should decide whether he should have trial by jury was called a bizarre idea, often in this Chamber itself. It is not that I doubt the current Home Secretary, but in two years the argument has been stood totally on its head, and I fear the level of future acrobatic prowess that may be required.
	Will the Government be comfortable for long with a right for a defendant alone to opt for or against a jury trial, to be exercised arbitrarily with no recognition of the rights or wishes of the victim? The Home Secretary himself mentioned that point, but what about a black person in a racially aggravated case, faced with a white defendant who exercises his option to be tried by a white judge and not by anyone from a black community? What about a female rape complainant who comes to court to find that, in a highly gendered situation, the male defendant has the right to opt to exclude every other female from the case and for trial by a male judge? The perception of those two problems is dangerous enough, before one even considers the outcome. It is hard enough now to get rape complainants to come to court, and the very judges who will be given the responsibility are drawn from a group of men who have made the most appalling comments about rape complainants over the years.
	The new right will inevitably be abused by defendants—mostly by criminals, but probably by all defendants—in localities. For example, in Redcar particular judges are known to be particularly liberal, and others are known to be particularly tough. If anyone asked me what I thought about the right to trial by judge alone, I would ask, "Which judge?" What will happen will be forum shopping of the worst imaginable sort. Local witnesses will know that a defendant has opted at the last minute for judge X because he is softer than the jury, or has opted for a jury because judge Y, who is hard, has been allocated to the case. That will rightly scandalise victims. The Bill includes provision that the defendant must exercise the option at an early stage, but that is unenforceable. If a defendant has the right to opt for or against jury trial, that cannot be taken away by rules of procedure. It will remain an option until the last day, and will inevitably be exercised on the last day when the identity of the judge becomes known.
	What is the new right? It is a right for defendants in a Bill that is supposed to enhance the rights of victims. It is a right that no one has ever asked for. It is anti-victim, as I have described, and it will bring the courts into disrepute. It has no point and no purpose, because no one claims that juries do not work or are not valuable. Some 80 per cent. of the population supports them, so what is going on? It is the beginning of the end of trial by jury.
	A year from now, those who have opted for trial by judge alone will have been tried more quickly, and thus more cheaply, than those who have been tried by a jury. One has to proceed in court at the rate of the slowest juror, and one cannot even ascertain what that is, because one does not speak to them and they cannot ask their own questions to clarify the points. The judge can say, "Yes, Mrs. Baird, I've got that, so you can move on." He can also ask about issues that are troubling him.
	In a year's time, someone will say, "Hang on a moment, this burglary was tried by a judge alone in a week, but this almost identical burglary took two weeks to be tried by jury and cost twice as much." Why should somebody have legal aid for two weeks when it could be done in one? By then, cases will have had elections made at the last minute between judge and jury—forum shopping—to the scandalisation of victims, and the Government will say that that will not do. The Government will say that by analogy with the argument on mode of trial, it is bizarre for defendants to be able to make such decisions. The Government will say that they must take the decision about mode of trial away from the defendant and give it to the judge, who will exercise his discretion. However, the judge will be under pressure from disposal rates and financial factors, and there will be fewer and fewer jury trials. By that stage, the decision will be at the discretion of the judge, and therefore no one will any longer have the right to opt for jury trial—that is the important point. That is the destination towards which, inexorably, the Bill will take us—in clause 38, to a lesser extent; in clause 37; and, despite its apparent benevolence at first sight, in clause 36. If the clauses remain in the Bill, by the end of the decade we will be lucky to have a jury in the Eurovision song contest.

John Gummer: I have listened carefully to the debate, but I failed to hear the proof that juries were impossible to find, and that would have made a great deal of difference to the argument. We heard proof that it was difficult to get all cases to court, but that has nothing to do with an inability to find juries. We heard proof that some juries were tampered with, but that has nothing to do with the difficulty of finding juries in the first place. All the evidence that we have had has come from those who have explained that although it is not always easy to find juries, there is no example of a case that would have proceeded had there been a jury but was unable to do so because there was not.
	The Home Secretary gave his case away by developing an argument that although juries could be found in all cases, the juries were not as representative as he would like. However, I know of no jury that is utterly representative, because that is impossible. What juries need to be is as representative as possible. Evidence has been given in the debate to show that juries, in the sort of cases that we are discussing, are—if anything—more representative than juries in general. So the Home Secretary has failed to present the very case on which he relied to bring the House to agree with him.
	Instead, the Home Secretary has presented the argument that the cases involved are a narrow group—fewer than 100 a year—and that he has no intention of expanding that number. If the Home Secretary had no previous form, many of us might be willing to believe him, because he is an honourable man. However, in recent years—almost, in recent months—the argument has been that there should be no limitation on the number of cases in which the defendant should be denied a jury trial, except those that were very serious, which should be allowed a jury trial. So those that were not so serious would be refused a jury trial and those that were very serious would receive a jury trial—in defence of justice. The House denied that argument, but now—a few months later—the opposite argument is put before us. It is argued that any case that does not really matter—which is short, simple and uncontroversial—should have a jury trial, but any case in the group that previously would have been the only ones to get a jury trial will now be refused one.
	Now the argument is precisely opposite to the one that we started with, and hon. Members are supposed to suggest to our constituents that the House will go along with this proposal because we were sure that it would never be extended and that we would never find any other group. However, we know perfectly well that, if we were to agree to the new clause, all those cases that were thought so important as to be removed from the jury's ambit would come along pretty soon.
	The hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) is absolutely right. We know the argument—the proposal is cheaper, quicker and more certain. Yet in fact jury cases have delivered exactly the kind of proportion of guilty judgments that one would expect—not universal, but pretty high—because people do not bring such cases unless they have got a good case, so that is not the argument. I have to tell the Home Secretary that this case is not just not proven, but has failed even to be presented in a way that any sensible person could support, and I very much hope that the House will throw out this attempt as it has thrown out every previous attempt.

Ian Lucas: I will make only one very brief point. It is important to remember that the criminal justice system currently includes both trial by jury and trial before magistrates, so jury trial is not the only way in which justice can be reached. As the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) said, we have had a system in Northern Ireland, within the United Kingdom jurisdiction, for some 30 years—
	It being four and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the programme motion, Mr. Deputy Speaker pursuant to Orders [4 February, 5 March, 2 April and this day], put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.
	Question accordingly agreed to.
	 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
	Mr. Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of business to be concluded at that hour.
	Amendment proposed: No. 2, in page 25, line 10, leave out clause 37.—[Mr. Letwin.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—
	The House divided: Ayes 227, Noes 299.

Question accordingly negatived.
	Amendment proposed: No. 3, in page 25, line 38, leave out Clause 38.—[Mr. Letwin.]
	Question put, That the amendment be made:—
	The House divided: Ayes 223, Noes 304.

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 63
	 — 
	Cases that may be Retried

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 18, in page 41, line 7, leave out 'a qualifying offence' and insert—
	'murder or rape, contrary to section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take the following:
	Amendment No. 479, in page 41, line 7, leave out 'a qualifying offence' and insert—
	'murder, genocide consisting in the killing of any person, or corporate manslaughter'.
	Government amendments Nos. 462 to 465, 357 and 466.
	Amendment No. 480, in page 41, line 38, leave out
	'an offence listed in Schedule 4'
	and insert—
	'murder, genocide consisting in the killing of any person, or corporate manslaughter'.
	Government amendment No. 467.
	Amendment No. 19, in page 188, line 1, leave out Schedule 4.
	Amendment No. 129, in schedule 4, page 188, line 8, leave out paragraph 2.
	Amendment No. 130, in schedule 4, page 188, line 16, leave out paragraphs 5 and 6.
	Government amendment No. 423.
	Amendment No. 131, in schedule 4, page 188, line 23, leave out paragraphs 8 to 18.
	Government amendments Nos. 424 and 425.
	Amendment No. 132, in schedule 4, page 190, line 7, leave out paragraphs 21 to 29.
	Government amendments Nos. 474 and 475, 468 and 469, and 358 and 359.
	Amendment No. 20, in page 42, line 41, leave out 'is' and insert 'appears to be'.
	Amendment No. 21, in page 43, line 1, leave out 'is' and insert 'appears to be'.
	Government amendment No. 360.
	Amendment No. 22, in clause 66, page 43, line 2, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—
	'(c) it is material which a jury properly directed might reasonably convict.'.
	Government amendments Nos. 361 to 373, 470 to 472, and 374 to 376.
	Amendment No. 61, in clause 73, page 47, line 44, leave out 'and'.
	Amendment No. 62, in page 47, line 45, at end insert
	', and
	(c) has sought leave from a judge of the Crown Court on an exparte application.'.
	Government amendments Nos. 377 to 420.
	Government new clause 42—Restrictions on publication in the interests of justice.
	Government new clause 43—Revocation of bail.
	Government new clause 44—Armed Forces: Part 10.
	Government new clause 54—Application of Part 10 to Northern Ireland.
	Government amendments Nos. 421, 473 and 422.

Dominic Grieve: We shall now consider an area of the Bill that certainly caused me a great deal of anxiety in Committee. It was clear in Committee that there were vastly differing views about the correct approach that the House should have to the issue of retrial and double jeopardy.
	A principle was long enshrined in our law—it certainly went back to the middle ages—that a person should not be in jeopardy twice for the same offence. The underlying principles were sound ones. In an age when the state could often act oppressively and, indeed, intended to do so, it was the one protection that a person had against continuous oppression by the state. Once a jury had had the courage to return a not guilty verdict, the issue could not be reopened. Some of the accounts of state trials in the 14th century show that the jury that did return a not guilty verdict was exposing itself to fairly severe sanctions. Notwithstanding that, once the jury did it, it was accepted that there was nothing that the state could do to re-prosecute.
	We are talking, historically, about one of the great pillars of our liberties. We must therefore raise a question mark. Indeed, some Members have done so in Committee and in the House. Why has it been thought right to interfere with the principle by providing in the Bill the mechanism by which a person may be retried, having previously been acquitted, on the basis that new evidence has come to light on which he could properly be convicted?
	The approach that the Opposition have adopted is essentially a pragmatic one. We have said that we accept, especially with the arrival of much better scientific evidence, including DNA, that many people would regard it as offensive in regard to the most serious of crimes if a person, having previously been acquitted because of insufficient evidence, found themselves when that evidence emerged some time later, in a matter that had caused the public huge disquiet and anxiety, incapable of being prosecuted again, and protected against prosecution, when the public would consider that it was of great public importance that the individual should be retried for the offence and, if the evidence was good, convicted upon it.
	The matter has been considered over and over again. In particular, it was considered by the Law Commission. The commission's view—it has been reflected by the sorts of cases that have come to the public's attention—was that the mechanism for retrial should be confined to murder. However, Lord Justice Auld—I regret to say that it was in a fit of some deliciously woolly thinking, but perhaps I am allowed to say that nowadays, it being permissible since the Home Secretary has now allowed us to criticise members of the judiciary—

David Heath: It is compulsory.

Dominic Grieve: As the hon. Gentleman says, it is compulsory.
	Lord Justice Auld felt that it was necessary, or might be desirable, to apply the approach to other grave offences. The problem is that the Government, having considered what constitutes other grave offences in schedule 4, have come up with 30 offences that they consider should lead to retrial.

Simon Hughes: And an extra one.

Dominic Grieve: As the hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position, an extra one is being added.
	As in the previous debate on jury trial, there is the lurking anxiety and suspicion that this, in the inevitable way, will be only the start, and that once we go down this road we shall find in the years to come that there will be pressure to add other offences to the list.
	I shall give the Minister an example. Let us say that a group of people commit a vicious armed robbery with machetes. They terrorise their victims and seize huge amounts of cash. It is something that causes a sensation when it happens, and they are acquitted. Under the provisions of schedule 4, they could not be retried. On the other hand, someone who is convicted of, I regret to say, the somewhat prosaic offence of supplying, or offering to supply, a class A drug—something that can be found to be taking place in small quantities at King's Cross virtually every day of the week—will come within the schedule. The criterion is that the offence attracts a life sentence.
	Many offences attract life sentences on the statute book. Some offences do so because they are at common law and have never had a period of sentence defined for them.

Stephen Hesford: What about an offence of murder that is effectively a mercy killing? In the hon. Gentleman's mind, surely that would not come within the proper definition that he is seeking, which is a really serious offence.

Dominic Grieve: I accept the hon. Gentleman's point. It is a perfectly fair one. It might be said that there are different categories of murder in terms of the horror with which it is regarded by the public. Notwithstanding that, my impression is that the Law Commission selected the offence of murder for precise reasons. I suppose that short of high treason, murder has always been regarded as the most serious offence in the calendar. It is the malicious deprivation of another person's life, in circumstances where the jury convict. With mercy killings, juries have sometimes adopted a merciful view of the person who killed. In my experience, when juries convict in those circumstances, it is usually because they think that that which happened went rather beyond what a right-thinking person, being flexible with the law, would regard as proper.
	The Law Commission had some sensible views on the subject.

John Gummer: Is not the advantage of the Law Commission's restriction that it is objective? It refers to a specific class of crime which is seen universally as the most horrific crime. The difficulty with the Government's list—this is proved by the addition to the list—is that it is not objective. It tries to say that it relates to those things that shock people the most. Is it not a bad principle of law that we ask that that which shocks people should be subject to double jeopardy?

Dominic Grieve: I agree entirely. The argument for murder is that we must accept that someone who has a propensity to kill other people is potentially a serious public menace. I am sure that one of the reasons that weighed so heavily on the mind of the Law Commission was that there is enormous public interest in trying to ensure that such a person may not strike again. The sorts of cases that we have often heard about and commented about have been those where murder has been committed by an individual and other people are fearful that because of the murderer's psychopathic personality or other features, there might be a repeat offence.
	The Minister knows, and his predecessor in the post knew, that I was and am unhappy with the prospect of departing from the time-honoured protection provided by principle of double jeopardy, notwithstanding the fact that, adopting the pragmatic approach that I said at the outset was the hallmark of our party's approach to the matter, I was prepared to consider making an exception. As will be seen from amendments Nos. 18 and 19, we have suggested that the provision should be confined to offences of murder and rape only.

Stephen Hesford: The hon. Gentleman says that the Opposition's approach is pragmatic. He will recall from an interchange in Committee, when the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) was struggling to identify the serious offences to which similar wording might apply, that there was some banter about genocide. Should not genocide come within the definition?

Dominic Grieve: That is a fair point. As the hon. Gentleman knows, some of his hon. Friends, fellow Back Benchers, have tabled amendments separate from ours that take a slightly different approach. Those hon. Members have run through the entirety of schedule 4 and sought to identify what they consider to be the most serious offences. That is wider in scope than amendment No. 18.
	If the Minister suddenly stood up and said that the approach adopted by his hon. Friends was the correct one, in a spirit of compromise, I would not press my amendment to a Division, and we would go away and try to resolve the issue. There is an issue pragmatically and legitimately to be considered about eroding the double jeopardy protection. However, it is the Government who reiterated in Committee—the hon. Gentleman will remember the Minister's words—that they recognised that the double jeopardy rule was an important protection, and they wanted only to erode it slightly in those areas that they considered important to ensure that public confidence in the criminal justice system was maintained. When I look at the lists and compare them with what I consider to be the key areas of public disquiet, I think that the Government have got it wrong.

Humfrey Malins: My hon. Friend is advancing the argument well. Given that the principle of double jeopardy is so important, and the difficulties that we had in Committee in going through a series of offences that would be covered by the new rule, is not one of the strongest arguments for his amendment that we should move very slowly and one step at a time? By including only murder and rape at this stage, we can watch to see how the law develops before widening it. That, once done, is difficult to withdraw.

Dominic Grieve: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. One aspect that causes me disquiet is that, although the matter was considered carefully by the Law Commission—I cannot pronounce on Lord Justice Auld's approach—I do not believe that much thought was given to it before the Government embarked on it. One of my reasons for saying that was what happened in the Home Affairs Committee when it sat briefly and rather imperfectly, as the Committee itself admitted, to consider the wide range of changes that were being introduced.
	When Lord Falconer of Thoroton was giving evidence on 26 November 2002, the Chairman asked:
	"How many offences can be retried under double jeopardy?"
	Lord Falconer replied:
	"I think the number is 30, and aiding and abetting as well. It is Schedule 4, page 181 of the Bill."
	The Chairman responded:
	"Thank you. It does seem rather a lot more than most people previously anticipated—or indeed the Government suggested."
	Lord Falconer said, "Yes." The Chairman continued:
	"These things have a habit of growing, do they not?"
	At that point, Mr. Chisholm interrupted and said:
	"The Law Commission originally set it as being murder but Lord Justice Auld said it should extend to other grave offences. What we did was look at all offences that attracted a maximum of life imprisonment, and these are only some; these, ministers decided, were the most serious under that category and they were the ones that ministers agreed should attract the possibility of retrial."
	I note, first, that Lord Falconer did not answer the question but left it to an official to do so. I also note that the answer from the official gave no explanation or indication of a rationale behind the selection, apart from the reason that there were some offences that looked rather nasty to the Government when they looked down the list. That is not good enough, given that the measure represents such a radical departure from established practice.
	As the Minister knows, from the many amendments that the Government have introduced to try and improve this part of the Bill—I will go on to welcome some of the steps that they have taken—the mechanism of retrial will be complicated. It will be complicated to achieve a just result, and it will be complicated to implement the mechanism properly without trampling on the civil liberties of the individual being investigated. The measure is far from being one that will allow the Government to click their fingers and start again. Getting a fair trial, ensuring that the public have confidence in the process, and ensuring that at the end, criminals consider that they have been justly convicted, which is an important part of the criminal justice process, will be extremely difficult to achieve. Surely, that is all the more reason why we should restrict the scope of this experimental project to a limited number of offences. We could limit it to the murder offence only, as the Law Commission suggested, but we seek to include rape as well because we are perfectly aware of the dangers attendant on it, public abhorrence of it, anxiety about its increase and, in particular, the fact that scientific evidence is often key in determining at a subsequent date that an offence was probably committed when the scientific DNA evidence was not available at the time of trial.

Stephen Hesford: The hon. Gentleman has been generous in giving way. I wish to push him on the question of practicality or pragmatism. As I read things, if amendment No. 19 were agreed to, it would leave out attempted murder, manslaughter and attempted rape, which are currently included in schedule 4, which it seeks to remove. How does he deal with that point?

Dominic Grieve: Very simply. Attempted murder may well have many of the very unpleasant ingredients of the complete offence, but the fact is that it is a lesser offence and has always been regarded as such, and the line has to be drawn somewhere. That is the problem. The Government say, "Oh, well; we'll draw the line at 30 offences", but then tell us on Report, "Actually, we'll make it 31."
	Once the double jeopardy rule is got rid of, there is an inexorable logic for saying that every offence is capable of being retried. I can think of no philosophical reason why, once we open the floodgates, we should not go the whole way. It is perfectly justifiable to ask why somebody who escapes conviction should not be retried, but there are other arguments. One is that we need certainty, and another is that it is very undesirable that there should not be finality in legal proceedings—a point that has been accepted for many years and repeated in civil and criminal matters. Furthermore, there is a danger that people will feel persecuted, as well as a danger of miscarriages of justice. We all know that some people are convicted but found 18 years later not to have committed the offence. At some point down the road, when we bring back double jeopardy, we will find somebody who has been acquitted and convicted, but whose conviction is overturned 18 years on because it was unsafe and unsatisfactory. That will be a very bad day for the criminal justice system.
	The hon. Member for Wirral, West (Stephen Hesford) will also remember that, during the Bill's passage, I have highlighted a range of other issues, including the deprivation of liberty attendant on the process of retrial, which is inevitable and highly offensive to civil liberty concepts, as most people who have been acquitted are entitled to the benefit of that acquittal. The removal of that benefit is a draconian step. We cannot underestimate that, but I accept that once it is decided that that is not a draconian step, we might as well retry people twice or three or four times for anything on which we could not secure a conviction and on which further evidence came to light.
	That is abhorrent to me, I think that it is abhorrent to the hon. Member for Wirral, West and I am sure that it is abhorrent to the Government. That is all the more reason why we should limit the provision to what the Law Commission proposes and perhaps also include rape, as we have suggested, with particular regard to the issue of scientific evidence. We know that, in all likelihood, even though the new evidence is not limited to scientific evidence, the sort of cases that will be reopened will be those in which DNA evidence exists from the scene of the original crime and provides a strong and powerful link between the person who was previously acquitted and the commission of the offence. In itself, that is not without problems, and we explored them in Committee as well. DNA is not entirely foolproof and evidence can be contaminated and sometimes misread. Nevertheless, it provides a framework and perhaps a justification for reopening a case, and we are prepared to concede that. I come to the Minister in a conciliatory mood, but only up to a point.

Graham Allen: The hon. Gentleman is making a very strong case and I commend him for it, but he is missing out the public outrage. I know that he is well aware of the various cases that generate outrage in which a particular individual is known to have committed an offence and got away with it. In Committee, we referred to a case that arose in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook), in which a child molester and child killer got away with the offence in the first instance, but afterwards not only admitted having committed it, but made money out of a newspaper by selling his story. Such cases show the need for a balance, which the hon. Gentleman might want to bring to his remarks. Unless they are dealt with, they will bring the whole criminal justice system into disrepute.

Dominic Grieve: I clearly accept that argument—we are prepared to concede that it should be possible to reopen murder cases that fall squarely within that group.

Humfrey Malins: On the point made by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) about offences that cause outrage, is not it the case that one offence that causes outrage in small communities is causing death by dangerous driving? Families are so concerned that they never get over it—it can be much worse than anything else. Yet which of us would argue that double jeopardy should apply to it? Causing death by dangerous driving is not in the schedule, but once one moves into that territory, the arguments become very complicated.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend is right. Indeed, in recent times, Members of Parliament may have received more letters on that subject than on most others concerning the criminal justice system.
	There is no easy answer, which is precisely why I return to the point that I made to the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen). We would be wise to stick to a minimalist approach. Once the Bill is on the statute book, it will be extremely difficult to remove the provision. In that sense, the issue is simple. I concede that there are difficulties, and it is possible for thoughtful, right-thinking people to have different views on the subject. However, the more that we have reflected on it, the more strongly we have come to believe that the Law Commission was broadly right and the Government have gone much further than is proper.
	I turn now to the other amendments in this group in my name and those of my hon. Friends. Amendments Nos. 20 to 22 deal with the evidence on which a jury could convict. I am delighted that the Government have gone a long way towards addressing our concerns, and I will certainly not press the amendments to a vote. The nub of the issue was that the wording of clause 66 left the distinct impression that the Court of Appeal could order a retrial only in cases where it was satisfied that the person was guilty. It seemed to us that that prejudiced the possibility of a retrial further on, because the papers would be able to report it and, indeed, use the court's very words. That was a subject of deep anxiety in Committee, which is why we tabled the amendments. I accept, however, that Government amendments Nos. 358 and 359 deal with the issue through a simple rewording. Their wording is slightly different from ours and, I concede, rather better—they were probably helped by their officials. I am pleased with the change, and I welcome the fact that the Government accepted that there was a problem.
	Amendments Nos. 61 and 62 deal with judicial control. In this case, there may not be a meeting of minds, and the subject causes us considerable concern. We need to look at clause 73, which is about the authorisation of investigations. I hope not to detain the House too long, but this is an important issue and needs to be considered. Because of the unusual nature of the process, a person who, by virtue of being acquitted is free of the normal processes of criminal investigation—and should be, as long as he has not committed other offences—has to be criminally investigated with a view to a decision being made about whether a retrial should take place. That in itself is, if I may use the term, a very offensive procedure, because it means that someone with the benefit of an acquittal will suddenly have the police knocking on their door. A police officer may want to seize material, come into that individual's house, arrest him and take him away for questioning. All those actions would be regarded as a gross violation of his civil liberties, post-acquittal, if they were not to happen as part of the process of a possible retrial.
	The Government have provided a series of mechanisms, with which they have tinkered further in their amendments, that are designed to authorise investigations. That process is dependent on the police and on the Director of Public Prosecutions. I accept that the DPP has an enormously important role to play in the administration of justice, but he is exactly what his name suggests—a public official who brings prosecutions and investigations in the name of the Crown. He is not, in that sense, an impartial figure at all, even though he lays down very high standards for himself—the high standards that Parliament expects of him—as regards the way in which he carries out his duties. We have a long-standing principle in this country—although parts of the Bill seem to depart from it—whereby administrative actions that require a violation of somebody's civil liberties should have some judicial scrutiny. I am not saying that that scrutiny needs to be very intense, searching or far-reaching, but simply that it is a process by which someone goes to a judge to explain and to justify why such an investigation should commence.
	That mechanism would be provided by amendment No. 62, which would require the DPP to seek leave from a judge of the Crown court on an ex parte application for the process to commence. It would require him to say, "This is not frivolous. Here are the key components that we already have, which make us think that this individual was wrongly acquitted and committed this dreadful murder or rape"—I take the two examples in schedule 4 that I would continue to allow—"so we would like to initiate the investigation." The judge could then ask to be shown the relevant documents and papers. That would not necessarily take long: I envisage that such a hearing might take an hour to a couple of hours. We are told, I suspect correctly, that the likely number of such retrials in any given year is tiny: perhaps half a dozen. It would not place an onerous burden on the judiciary, but it would at least provide a mechanism whereby a judge could say, "No, you can't: this is completely frivolous", or indeed, "This is outrageous."
	The Government will tell us that the DPP is not going to act outrageously, frivolously or offensively, and I accept that most of us would expect that to be so. However, there is a terrible tendency in the House at the moment in that the Government are always telling us that we must take Executive power on trust. I am afraid that one of the things that makes me a Conservative is that I do not believe in taking Executive power on trust. One of the reasons why we have a system in which Executive power is, on the whole, wielded properly is that on every occasion it has been challenged, scrutinised and argued over in this House and by the judiciary in holding the Government in check.
	Why, therefore, should we not have the mechanism that we suggest in amendment No. 62? Can the Government give me one good reason why we should not have that extra check, which would provide great reassurance to the public that an investigation will not be mounted frivolously? It would also provide a protection for the police and the DPP. As certainly as night follows day, a reinvestigation will be undertaken in which the police re-arrest, re-search and carry out all those highly offensive acts against the liberty of an individual, but ultimately have to say, "We're terribly sorry, but we've decided that there insufficient evidence for this retrial and we won't proceed." At that point, great and possibly unjustified criticism will be levelled at them. What better mechanism to protect them than ensuring some judicial scrutiny before the process gets under way?

John Gummer: Before my hon. Friend leaves the point, will he cast his mind back to the Home Secretary's intervention on my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) to ask him to confirm that judges were not creatures of the state? Let us turn the proposition around and say that in the case that we are considering it is important that somebody who is manifestly not a creature of the state should make the final decision. The police and the DPP are, very properly by their nature, creatures of the state.

Dominic Grieve: I agree with my right hon. Friend. Of course, there is a mechanism for going to the Court of Appeal to get the original verdict set aside. However, by that stage, a considerable intrusion on civil liberties has occurred. They need to be protected. The more one examines the details of the procedure, the more apparent is the extent to which we are making massive inroads into what most people regard as the basic civil rights of an individual who has been acquitted or held to be innocent of a specific offence. I hope that the Government can respond positively to that.
	The Under-Secretary will speak about the many Government amendments. We welcome the desirable changes on reporting restrictions. For reasons that I outlined earlier, I am sorry that the Government propose including another qualifying offence. We are anxious about the changes on new and compelling evidence and the interests of justice test. I accept that the Government believe that the effect of the rewording will be identical to that of the previous wording but without allowing an opportunity for complex legal argument. However, the previous due diligence test appeared well worded to us.
	I am not persuaded that the Government's classic move of providing in one clause that a trial can be reopened in the light of new evidence but qualifying that with a due diligence test is as good as the previous provision. We argued that the provision had to go beyond the Government's proposal and ensure that the prosecution was not allowed two bites of the cherry through incompetence. I hope that the Minister can reassure us about that. In the other place, those who are better versed in law than many hon. Members in this place will be able to give their opinion on whether the Government amendment would not change much but lead to better wording. I remain unpersuaded, but I am open to persuasion.
	I am sorry that the Minister has not accepted our views on retrospection, but I shall not reopen the matter. I look forward to his comments on the voluminous Government amendments. I repeat that the fact that the Government had to devise so many highlights the subject's complexity and difficulty. That is all the more reason to confine their scope, as was originally intended, to our proposals in amendment No. 18.

Simon Hughes: We are holding another important debate and I am conscious of the fact that we are again strapped for time because of the guillotine. I shall therefore not repeat the points made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve).
	We took a straightforward position in our amendments. I refer specifically to amendments Nos. 479 and 480. Instead of schedule 4's long list of 30 offences, to which the Government have tabled a further, late addition, we propose to remove the schedule and accept the Law Commission's suggestion, which we incorporated in amendment No. 479, of
	"murder, genocide consisting in the killing of any person, or corporate manslaughter".
	"Corporate manslaughter" is the updated version of reckless killing, which the Law Commission originally proposed. We understand that the Government have adopted it; some of us argued for that for a long time. Our party now accepts that there is an argument for considering whether cases should be tried again. We did not approach the issue with a theological or absolutist view; we engaged in long internal debates, which were honest and open, and we were clear about the fact that this should apply only to offences in the general category of "most serious".
	The majority view in the party was that the provision should be prospective rather than retrospective. If all cases resulting in trial and acquittal could be retried, a generation or more of cases would be reopened, and every acquittal would become a provisional acquittal. We concluded, however, that unless an objective recommendation were followed, no obvious criterion could govern which offences could be subject to retrial and which could not.
	The reason given by the Law Commission for saying that murder and genocide should be included and other offences should not, and the reason it gave for not accepting that offences carrying a life sentence should be included, was that everyone accepted—I agree that this is accepted widely—that murder is in a category of its own, genocide is mass murder, and many offences at the bottom of the league that carry life imprisonment as a potential maximum are clearly not regarded as similarly serious.

Vera Baird: The hon. Gentleman is not the puppet of the Law Commission. I was shocked—nay appalled—to see that the amendment did not include rape. Does that mean that the Liberal Democrats do not consider that—in my view—heinous offence to be in what he has just described as the general category of "most serious offences"?

Simon Hughes: We do not say that rape is not in that category; we say that it is—that it is indeed a most serious offence. We had to decide, however, whether to suggest the inclusion of all serious offences, or to take the Law Commission's view as our starting point. For reasons that I understand, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said that the Conservatives had decided to take one of the commission's recommendations and add an offence to it, which was a bit of a "pick and mix" proposal. The Government went further than the commission, and indeed much further than the White Paper produced only a few months ago, in which they said:
	"For this reason we have decided that the change should extend to a number of other very serious offences such as rape, manslaughter and armed robbery."
	The shortlist has obviously grown since then.

Stephen Hesford: The hon. Gentleman used the phrase "pick and mix" in criticising the official Opposition's approach, but surely his own approach is "pick and mix". The Liberal Democrats have added corporate manslaughter to the list.

Simon Hughes: The Law Commission recommended the inclusion of three offences—murder, genocide and reckless killing. When the Bill began its life, "reckless killing" was the third offence on the list, but I understand that the Government are to update "killing" offences and term them "corporate manslaughter". We propose that offences whose objective and result are people's deaths should be included, for the reasons given by the Law Commission.
	I do not pretend that the Law Commission has an absolute right view, but it makes what are clearly objective recommendations to Parliament on what laws should be changed and how. We think it necessary, for reasons given by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, to start carefully. This is not just a break with tradition; it is, potentially, a risky and dangerous course. We think it best to begin with a category of offences that, by anyone's definition, are at the top of the list.

Graham Allen: I share the hon. Gentleman's concern about changing criminal law by Executive reflex. Tomorrow we will, I hope, have an interesting debate about the Sentencing Guidelines Council, which at least attempts to go beyond the megaphone diplomacy of the Home Secretary and the judiciary in the argument about sentencing levels. It is, however, incumbent on the hon. Gentleman to explain how we can go further than the Law Commission's recommendations. What mechanism does he envisage for adding offences legitimately, rather than just coming up with a list produced by someone in the Department? How can we reach a consensus on offences that should be added?

Simon Hughes: I do not think that there is much between the hon. Gentleman and me on this matter. The Liberal Democrats are starting with the recommendations of the Law Commission, a body that was set up to recommend changes to the law and that has a long-standing reputation for doing so. Had many of its recommendations been adopted by Parliament over the years, we would be much better off. Our proposal was not our invention; it was based on a proposition put forward by the body that has been given that job.
	In terms of the development of the provisions, the representatives of the Law Commission are the first people who should be asked, after a reasonable period, for their suggestions in the light of experience. I share the hon. Gentleman's views that there are representative bodies in this place that are appropriate to examine these issues. The Select Committee process would be an appropriate one, involving the Home Affairs Committee and the Select Committee on the Lord Chancellor's Department, for example.
	One of the bodies that we are going to discuss tomorrow may make recommendations on sentencing matters, and will involve a broader sweep of people—we would suggest not only those who judge but those who legislate—and that body could appropriately have a role in these circumstances. So we are open to a process for achieving that. Our proposal is that we should start with the proposition placed on the table by the body that has been given the job to do that, and that, at a later date, we should see how that is going.

David Kidney: The hon. Gentleman's argument relies on the recommendations of the Law Commission, one of which was to include the classification of "reckless killing". The hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) has pointed out, however, that the Government do not include causing death by reckless driving in their list. Why do not the Liberal Democrats include that classification?

Simon Hughes: To be fair, we are trying to be as exact as possible in following the Law Commission's recommendations. I am sympathetic to the proposal that the hon. Gentleman has just mentioned, and I think that the best way out of this debate is to see where there is agreement that we should go forward. That might not get resolved here tonight; it might be more clearly resolved in the House of Lords. I sense that the Liberal Democrats' view that we should not be retrospective or concentrate on trying to revisit the past, but that we should be prospective, has not found much favour.
	The consensus seems to be that there should be an ability retrospectively to examine cases, particularly in the light of DNA testing. I give the warning, however, that that does not mean that some of the cases most often cited in this context would be likely to be retried. I have said before that the two cases that even senior police officers have hinted could be, as it were, rescued and opened for retrial by this change, if we were to implement it—the Stephen Lawrence case and the Damilola Taylor case, both of which I have detailed knowledge of—would not be able to be reopened. I think that everyone agrees that a case cannot be reopened if it did not succeed because of a failure in the prosecution process or the investigation. It was very clear from the Lawrence inquiry report—and it seemed clear from the Damilola Taylor inquiry—that it was failures in the process that might not have delivered a verdict in either case, and that no new evidence had come to light.

Lady Hermon: The hon. Gentleman will know that the very last amendment, which we are unlikely to get to this evening, relates to the extension of part 10 to Northern Ireland. That proposal had built up hope for some people, particularly the group known as the disappeared. They are not in south America; they are in Northern Ireland. They are people who have been someone's son or father—or, indeed, someone's mother, as in the case of Jean McConville. Is the hon. Gentleman saying to those families that they have no hope, and that his party does not wish this provision to be retrospective? Does that mean that the families of the disappeared should have no hope of there ever being a prosecution of those who kidnapped or murdered their loved ones?

Simon Hughes: I will be completely honest with the hon. Lady: that was our original considered view, and it was originally my view. I am, however, being persuaded that there would not be any justice in that. I will own up to another change of view—that is why we have these debates. The case was made very effectively in Committee by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird), and I am persuaded that another exception to the general proposition that we should not retry is where there has been an admission of guilt by a person who has been acquitted. It is not compatible with justice that the issue cannot be revisited when someone is tried and acquitted, and then publicly says that they committed the offence.
	It seems to me that our constituents—the people whom we represent—such as the families of victims would expect the authorities to revisit an issue if there is an admission that, on investigation, looks like an admission that was intended to be made rather than just bravado. That should be the case if money is involved, as in the example given by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen), and even if it is not.
	I have been persuaded that both those arguments have merit, but I do not want us to make people think that that means that, suddenly, all those offences that have led to trials and not guilty verdicts will be reopened. That would mean no finality, no certainty and no end, and that everybody alive who has ever been acquitted of any such offence would suddenly be only prospectively acquitted. That seems to me to be an injustice equal to many others.
	I say to the new Minister, whom I very much welcome to the Home Office team, that there is a really big issue here, which the Government have partly addressed. They must try to ensure that we protect those who might be in a second trial from the risk of prejudice. The big debate is about how to enable a second trial to go ahead fairly without people knowing of the first. The Government have tabled amendments that will help with that, which we welcome, but they will not create any realistic guarantee that a juror—it needs only one person—will not remember that a case, which was well known due to the fact that it was shocking and reported nationally or because the defendant was well known—has been tried before.
	Someone on the jury might realise that the case is back in court again because it has been up to the Court of Appeal due to the fact that the Director of Public Prosecutions thinks that it can be reopened and because, therefore, a very high threshold has been passed. A juror might think, "It could not come before us unless there is a very good case." That person will start with that prejudice, and the matter needs to be addressed.
	One of the important matters that we looked at in detail in Committee, although I shall not trouble the House with it now, is the definition of the triggers for reopening a case. It is absolutely clear to all of us who have deliberated that they should not be released because of a failure of the earlier investigation. They must be released because new evidence, which was not available, has come to light.
	My colleagues and I shall seek to press our amendment to the vote. We think that it would be better to start with the Law Commission proposal, and that the Government's list is too long and would change the law too much in one go. We hope that Parliament moves forward in a considered and careful way, but one that reflects the injustice in respect of the position of certain people who clearly ought to be retried for an offence with which they are connected.

Paul Goggins: As has been pointed out, there are many amendments in this group, so, in the hope that some of my hon. Friends and others will be able to catch your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker, I shall concentrate on two specific areas: which offences should be qualifying offences under part 10, and the amendments on new and compelling evidence.
	In the first area, Government amendment No. 357 will ensure that the qualifying offences set out by clause 63 include those serious offences committed abroad for which the UK takes jurisdiction, so the arrangements for retrial in part 10 apply to acquittals for those offences. That applies in particular to offences of murder alleged to have been committed by a British citizen abroad. Government amendments Nos. 423 and 424 are consequential on the changes being made by the Sexual Offences Bill, which is updating and modernising the definition of a number of offences. The amendments account for those changes.
	I turn to amendment No. 425. During the Committee stage of the Bill, the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) raised a particular issue: whether officers of HM Customs and Excise should be included in the list of "forces" allowed to conduct an investigation in respect of part 10 procedures. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, Central (Hilary Benn) was grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising that matter. I agree that, in view of its responsibilities to investigate serious drug trafficking offences, it is right to include HM Customs and Excise as an investigating agency. Following consultation with HM Customs and Excise, we have decided to include the offence of fraudulent evasion in respect of a class A drug, to which hon. Members have referred. We are advised that that offence is the one that Customs and Excise uses most frequently to prosecute serious drug trafficking offences. That is why it has been added to the list.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister says that that offence is the one that Customs and Excise uses to prosecute serious offences. As a past prosecutor for Customs and Excise, I have to say that it is the one that it uses to prosecute virtually all class A offences. The seriousness is very variable.

Paul Goggins: If Customs and Excise uses the offence to prosecute many offences, it will also use it to prosecute serious offences. It is because it is a serious offence that it has been included in the list.
	As we have heard, Opposition amendments Nos. 18 and 19 would limit the proposed changes to the double jeopardy law to offences of murder and rape. We see absolutely no rationale for restricting the provision to murder and rape. That would rule out applications for acquittals to be quashed in a range of very serious offences such as manslaughter and attempted murder.
	While the Law Commission's initial recommendation was that a change to the double jeopardy rule should be made in respect of offences of murder, Lord Justice Auld's review proposed that the changes should apply more widely. Therefore, we have proposed in schedule 4 a range of serious offences that are punishable in the main with life imprisonment, that have a particularly serious impact on the victim or on society more widely, and to which the new proposed exception to the double jeopardy rule should apply. As such, we cannot accept those amendments.
	It is interesting to hear the debate about whether there is a small group of serious offences such as murder and rape and whether the Government want to introduce a rather woolly, wide list that includes perhaps some rather frivolous offences. It is interesting to look at some of the offences that would be omitted if the amendments tabled by the Opposition were accepted. They include attempted murder, soliciting to commit murder, grievous bodily harm, which in many cases is an unsuccessful attempt almost to take someone's life, kidnapping, taking hostages, attempted rape, unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 13, a range of serious drugs offences, armed robbery using a firearm, arson endangering life, causing explosion likely to endanger life or property and, as we have heard, offences of genocide and grave breaches of the Geneva convention. The Opposition suggest that such offences are somewhat frivolous and should not be included in our list. We strongly assert that the rationale for the list is the seriousness of the offence.

Dominic Grieve: I never used the expression that they were frivolous offences. Any offence in that list is a serious matter. What I did say was that I did not consider that they justified departing from the established rule: the protection of the individual under the double jeopardy rule.

Paul Goggins: I accept that the hon. Gentleman did not use the word "frivolous" but it could be implied in the debate that those were less serious offences. I am asserting that all those offences are very serious indeed.

Graham Allen: I am delighted that my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook) is now in the Chamber because on several occasions in Committee we raised the case of a child molester and child murderer who, after being released and found not guilty of those offences, commented that he had committed them and was paid money by a newspaper for his story. Presumably, my hon. Friend the Minister knows of many cases where we could use the double jeopardy change to bring such people to justice. Obviously, I do not expect him to rattle off a list now. Presumably, the Home Office has done considerable research on the number of people who could be brought to book.

Paul Goggins: Certainly; my hon. Friend is right. There are a number of such cases and the individual to whom he refers would be caught not only by the double jeopardy provisions, but by some of the proposals that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will bring to the House tomorrow.

David Heath: I am worried that the Government might be raising expectations of the result of this measure way beyond what can be sustained. In Committee, the Minister's predecessor told us that very few cases were likely to be brought before the courts under this proposal. When one looks at the thresholds to be applied and the difficulty of getting a fair trial—which may, I fear, take out some of the most notorious cases—the possibility is that very few cases will be retried on this basis.

Paul Goggins: The hon. Gentleman will note that I said that the Home Office was aware of other cases, which was the only claim that I made.
	Amendments Nos. 129 to 132—tabled by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) and others—are in a similar vein to the amendments that I have just mentioned. Although the list in the amendments is drawn more widely than the list offered by the Opposition, I cannot accept the amendments for the same reasons.
	Schedule 4 has been considered carefully by Ministers and although there is clearly an element of judgment over exactly which offences should be included, we believe that the current list includes a range of very serious offences for which it is right that there should be a retrial if new and compelling evidence becomes available. I do not accept the arguments made in Committee and this evening by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) that the list of qualifying offences leaves too many acquittals with, in effect, a provisional rather than a final status. For any case to be reopened, there must be new and compelling evidence against the acquitted person. We have put in place a range of safeguards to ensure that only in these cases are re-investigations and new charges to be justified. Frankly, only guilty people who know that they have got away with it will need to be worried about the prospect of a retrial.
	I wish to refer to the amendments on new and compelling evidence. Clauses 66 and 67 are in many ways the very heart of part 10 of the Bill, where we articulate the tests that we want the Court of Appeal to apply in considering whether to quash an appeal and order a retrial. As in many other aspects of the Bill, the test has to hold some important considerations in the balance. It has to hold in the balance the need to impose a high threshold on reopening an acquittal to ensure that that is not done except in the most compelling cases, with care of course not to set the test so high as to amount to a virtual imputation of guilt, which could prejudice a retrial.
	The test must guard against giving our investigators and prosecutors the slightest encouragement to think that they can skimp on the preparation of a trial on the basis that they can always have another go if the defendant is acquitted. The test has to be scrupulously fair to acquitted persons and must deliver visible justice to the victims of extremely serious crimes. Finally, the test has to ensure that justice is not brought into disrepute either by the unwarranted harassment of the innocent or by allowing the guilty to flaunt their guilt, safe in the knowledge that the law is powerless to act. In the end, the court must deal with an individual case on its own merits and decide as the interests of justice require.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: I apologise for not being here for part of this debate, although I have been here since 3.30 pm. The Minister will be aware that the objection that many of us had for many years to double jeopardy was not on the basis of civil liberties—I do not think it is a civil liberties issue—but on the basis of policy, which is what he is talking about at the moment; the policy that dictates that one gets it right first time. I am persuaded that that is no longer a consideration. However, what I do not understand is why, under those circumstances, we should be limited to two. If precisely the same test is to apply—namely, that evidence was not available—why should we stop at two? Why cannot it be three, four or more?

Paul Goggins: My hon. and learned Friend will recognise that the reason for stopping at two is that it is one of the safeguards that the Government offer to prevent a sense of repeatedly reopening old cases.
	In Committee, some very cogent suggestions were made for improvements to the test that I just mentioned. I am happy to introduce Government amendments that bring about those improvements. It was suggested in Committee that the test of new and compelling evidence went too far in imputing guilt to an acquitted person, and was therefore potentially prejudicial to a retrial. We have considered that point carefully and introduced amendments that will remove references to "guilt", and refer instead in clause 66(1) to evidence
	"against the acquitted person in relation to the qualifying offence",
	and in clause 66(3)(c) to evidence that is "highly probative" of the case against the acquitted person. That will not only make it clearer that the Court of Appeal is taking a decision in relation to the strength of the new evidence, but will be less likely to create an impression of prejudice.
	At the same time, we propose to revise the definition of "new" evidence to make the test both clearer and simpler. That is because we believe that the current wording of clause 66(2) would provide scope for endless legal argument about whether evidence was, or should have been, "known or available" to the police at the time of the original acquittal.

Dominic Grieve: When we debated this issue in Committee, I got the distinct impression from the Minister present that the form of words that this Minister wants to jettison was regarded as one of the really important and essential safeguards to prevent—[Interruption.] I got the distinct impression that that Minister saw it as important in ensuring that the two-bites-of-the-cherry principle did not follow, and that it was not there to cure prosecution incompetence.

Paul Goggins: The hon. Gentleman points to the importance of scrutiny in our Committees.
	We therefore propose a new, straightforward, factual definition: the evidence is new if it was not adduced at the original trial. Linked to that, we also propose to clarify the "due diligence" tests set out in clause 67 to help to guard against the possibility of poor police investigations giving rise to a second bite of the cherry.
	Given those circumstances, I believe that we have addressed the concerns raised by the Opposition amendments and provided a package through which the Court of Appeal can take a balanced view on whether an acquittal should be quashed and a retrial ordered. For that to happen the evidence must be new, in that it has not been before the court before; it must be compelling; and the court must consider it to be in the interests of justice for a retrial to be ordered. Those are the right tests and they strike the right balance.
	Therefore, amendments Nos. 20 and 21 are not necessary. The Court of Appeal must assess whether the new evidence in a case is reliable and compelling. I can see that the purpose of the Opposition amendments is to make that judgment appear more guarded, and clearly, we would wish to avoid any ruling that might appear prejudicial to a potential retrial. But we must remember that the court is considering only the nature of the new evidence, not the entirety of evidence as it will be presented in a retrial, nor the guilt or otherwise of the individual. We therefore believe that an assessment of whether the evidence is reliable and substantial, taken together with our other proposed changes, is the right one.
	I believe that the case for retrial in relation to serious offences is now widely accepted. The Government amendments introduced this evening will help to apply this principle more successfully in practice.

John Gummer: I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his first speech as a Minister—I am only sad that we lose him as a campaigner on certain issues on which he and I have much in common. It is a pleasure to follow him.
	I have concerns about this part of the Bill not because I do not find the Minister's arguments compelling, but merely because they go too far. They go too far because we have not yet had the experience of introducing to our legal system the concept of double jeopardy, which, after all, we excluded from it for centuries. Perhaps this is a moment for a little care and reticence—a view commonly held by many on both sides of the House. That is the reason for questioning the long list that has been produced.
	The list is rather less compelling when read in its totality. I have no doubt that an offence arising out of article 4 of the Channel Tunnel Security Order 1994 is extremely serious, but there are other hijacking offences that might be thought at least equally serious. That example was chosen because of the maximum penalty involved. That is the fundamental difficulty with the Government's proposals. The list provides a series—though not an exhaustive one—of penalties for offences. However, they are not characterised by their objective seriousness, but appear because someone decided in the past that they were serious enough to warrant the maximum punishment of life imprisonment.
	That makes for a rather peculiar series. The Minister is right that, among them, are highly serious offences that we would all agree should be included as the most serious that could be committed. The question remains whether, because they are serious offences, they reveal themselves to be of a different class and category from other offences. I find it difficult to view the list in those terms, so I return to the notion of objectiveness.
	We must decide how the seriousness, shock and horror should be measured. Surely we have to look not at individual cases, but at classes of cases. I am concerned at the idea that we need to include an offence because of people's horror at a particular case. One of the reasons for having a formal legal system is to remove the decision in the case from the immediacy of the horror at the offence in order to judge the case with impartiality and objectiveness. I am concerned at the argument that certain offences should be included because the public could be so affronted by a particular case that they would be appalled if it were not re-tried.
	We should view the case rather differently, which brings me back to the position of the Law Commission. It may not necessarily be right, but it has put forward a proposition that can be recognised as sensible by all. Its approach was to take one particular crime that was universally viewed, without question, as unique in its horror—the taking of someone else's life purposefully. It is possible to stop just there, but my right hon. and hon. Friends believe that the crime of rape should be added. I value the comments of the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). She is right to say that rape is a proper addition to the list, but it perhaps opens the door to many others. Those two, however, would universally be seen as crimes of a particular severity and horror.
	In those circumstances it is surely sensible to do what the Law Commission suggested. It argued that, if double jeopardy were necessary, it should be restricted to those crimes. After some experience, I am not one who believes that it could not safely be extended to other offences, but I am saying that we cannot safely extend to all the others, without any experience, something that we have found inimical to our legal system for hundreds of years.

Stephen Hesford: The right hon. Gentleman was a member of the Government who brought measures before the House to categorise offences that deserved to be punished with life imprisonment. He now seeks to belittle that policy. How does he square his past with what he is now saying?

John Gummer: We are talking about a wholly different position, so I do not have anything to square. We are now discussing the issue of which crimes should be treated in a way that is wholly novel in British law. I do not find it objectionable therefore to say that I wish to apply that, as the Law Commission suggested, to a very select group of crimes.
	If the House is to overturn something that we have held as being very important to the principle of justice for centuries, it is a good idea—it is much safer—to do so little by little, so that we may even decide that we went too far in the first place. That is a simple matter of sense, and it is why I agree with my right hon. and hon. Friends in their amendments.
	I am also concerned about how the system should be triggered, so I want to end by returning to a comment made by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). The crucial issue that faces those who might be pressed in such circumstances is that they will be under investigation for a second time. Of course the Minister said—I cite him as accurately as I can—that only guilty people who know that they have got away with it will need to be worried. I have to tell him that there is a slight assumption in that, is there not? The assumption is that everyone who is tried a second time is a guilty person who has got away with it.
	My concern—the House ought to be concerned with this—is the small number of people who have been found innocent, but new evidence turns up that casts doubt on that finding. They are still innocent and may in the end be found to be innocent, but in the meantime they have to be reinvestigated. The Minister has assured us that he is doing everything in his power to protect the innocent.
	I return to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield: the decision must be seen to be triggered not primarily by the state, but much more by the independent judiciary. That is why I, too, hope that the House will accept those amendments that would put a judge in the position of taking that triggering act, because the public would then see that it is a judicial, not a state, decision. That would also protect those emissaries of the state who have the grizzly task of reopening cases that have been closed until then.

Lady Hermon: I am very sorry to put on record how much I disagree with the statement made by the Minister, whom I warmly welcome to the Dispatch Box. Not just the guilty need be afraid of the Bill. The Minister and the right hon. Gentleman will know that some of the amendments being considered this evening extend part 10 to Northern Ireland, so those who are guilty of murder in the most heinous circumstances in Northern Ireland should face the rigour of the Bill. However, the right hon. Gentleman might be interested to know that the recent Hillsborough declaration includes proposals for on-the-run terrorists who have committed murder to be given a clean bill of health—they will not face prosecution. Will the right hon. Gentleman comment on that?

John Gummer: Well, I could comment on it, but it would be very inadvisable if I were to do so at this stage in this debate on these issues. We are dealing with the interrelation of a whole series of issues and I would be probably closer to the hon. Lady than to others on the fundamental issues that we are discussing.
	What I want to say very clearly is that this is an extremely serious step even if, as Members on both sides of the House have argued against double jeopardy for many years, we decide to introduce double jeopardy in a very limited way. I should like that limitation to be clearly objective and clearly sensible in its distinction between the crimes that it covers and all other crimes, and it seems to me that the Law Commission has got it about right, although I am prepared to go one stage further and add the offence of rape.

Frank Cook: The right hon. Gentleman in some ways quite properly says that the Government are seeking to introduce double jeopardy. I would dispute that statement by saying that double jeopardy was introduced by Billy Dunlop when he turned round and admitted that he had killed Julie Hogg and hidden her behind the bath for her mother to find a decomposing body. Billy Dunlop introduced double jeopardy, and it is up to us to deal with that kind of situation.

John Gummer: However horrific the case, and that was one of the most horrific, the House would none the less be better advised to make its decisions about changes in the law in general rather than in particular. That is the history of good law making. The general case is that it appears unacceptable to many people that if later evidence shows that those found innocent of murder may not have been innocent, they should, because of the process of law, be excluded from prosecution. We are suggesting—

David Winnick: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

John Gummer: No, I must bring my remarks to an end.
	I merely suggest that we would be better advised to restrict the provision to those two limited offences and to ensure that the trigger mechanism is in the hands of the judiciary and not in the offices of the state.

Claire Curtis-Thomas: I have listened to Members on both sides of the House debating which cases should or should not be referred to the Court of Appeal for review. The criteria being used by my hon. Friends and by other Members are at odds with mine. My criteria would be based on the suitability and the nature of the evidence.
	Where the available physical evidence gives cause for concern about the original conviction, the case should be eligible to be referred back to the court. Where there is no physical evidence to support such a referral or where the evidence is purely verbal, the case should not go back to the court. That view arises from my, unfortunately, extensive work with a very unpopular part of the criminal community—sex offenders.
	For the past three years, I have been chair of the all-party group on abuse investigations. Unfortunately, we have had to look into the processes involved in the conviction of sex offenders. Many of the people caught up in such cases assert their innocence of the crimes of which they are accused. I am not remotely interested in whether those people are innocent or guilty, but I am deeply concerned about the way in which the evidence against them in court has been collected.
	Hon. Members will recall that, in 1993, a set of protocols was developed to manage physical evidence, following the cases of the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four when there were clearly problems in that regard. There are about 133 requirements for the management of physical evidence, all of which we fully support and all of which underpin our view that in cases involving rape or murder, where physical evidence is obtained many years after the event, it should be used as the basis of an appeal. That makes us feel far more comfortable.
	Unfortunately, no such protocols exist for the management of verbal evidence. In the vast majority of the cases with which I am concerned, all the evidence against the individuals has been collected in prison.

Dominic Grieve: I disagree slightly with the hon. Lady about the protocols on physical evidence. One of the problems that will have to be faced when the measure goes through is that the protocols on the preservation of evidence 20 years ago were very different from those that exist today. As a result, the dangers of contamination of, for example, DNA testing of old evidence collected by the police are real, which may inhibit or prevent many of the prosecutions that certain hon. Members would like to see go ahead.

Claire Curtis-Thomas: I do not disagree with that point, but at least there are some protocols for the management of physical evidence. Since 1993, we can feel reasonably confident that the physical evidence gathered has been managed efficaciously. However, that is rather different from the verbal evidence that is collected in prisons every day for a variety of cases, when prisoners are interviewed by the police as they pursue their inquiries. Frequently, there are no independent persons to witness conversations that can lead to the conviction of an individual. In the cases with which we have been dealing, there could be dozens and dozens of witnesses appearing against a suspect, all of whom were interviewed in prison. I am not happy that the evidence collected from those individuals, who are there because they have broken the law, might subsequently convict a man for the rest of his life. Moreover, there have been exceptional cases in which an individual has faced allegations from as many as 58 men, and all those allegations have been set aside. Those men, however, could face in the future further allegations and the possibility of a retrial. If further new evidence is brought to light, I would suggest to right hon. and hon. Members that it will have been gathered in exactly the same way: with no independent witnesses being available. I must add that the vast majority of complainants involved in those cases go on to receive significant amounts of compensation.
	Therefore, cases exist, I am afraid, in which to introduce double jeopardy would endanger and lead to more innocent people being convicted of crimes that they did not commit.

Graham Allen: The House always listens to my hon. Friend with great respect when she talks about these matters. Is she not reassured, however, that the Court of Appeal would have to hold that such evidence was both new and compelling before any such action was even considered?

Claire Curtis-Thomas: Yes, that would be so. I must say, however, that my knowledge of the police and the way in which they investigate this crime leads me to believe that if they can interview 800 people in relation to an individual, they will not be deterred from searching out more individuals to support a view that they have about a particular person. That is what many involved in the care sector and social services are facing: allegations not from one or two people but from dozens. Frequently, we find that the police have been unable to realise all the witnesses that they would have liked to have realised for one reason or another: they may be frightened or they may have disappeared or vanished from society for some while. That does not preclude them, however, from coming back at some point in the future. In relation to this measure, therefore, I have great concerns. The police can say, "We realised this number of complainants on this occasion, but by the methods that we are allowed to employ, we will return for others if we are unsuccessful, so assured are we that this particular man is guilty of the crimes of which he is accused."

Vera Baird: I do not know whether my hon. Friend appreciates that by saying that retrial should only be available in a trial in which there is physical evidence, she would rule out being retried the case to which my hon. Friends the Members for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook) and for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) have already referred, in which the man, Dunlop, killed a lady, Julie Hogg, was acquitted of her murder, and then confessed in the pub, not in the paper, that he had done it. That man is so much a liar that he is currently serving a sentence for perjury, for saying in the first trial that he did not kill her. My hon. Friend would rule out a retrial in that case, and I therefore suspect that she is wrong.

Claire Curtis-Thomas: We have not had the opportunity today, or on any other day, to talk about the credibility of witnesses and how we determine whether witnesses are credible to give evidence. I wish that we had had that opportunity. I know that the Crown Prosecution Service is consulting on the matter.
	I return to my original submission, however, that cases that can be substantiated with physical evidence should be brought forward for retrial, whereas those cases that are substantiated with the methods that I have described this evening should be turned down, simply because an integrity of process with which this House would feel comfortable does not exist. The House does not feel, and did not feel, comfortable with the way we managed physical evidence, and we introduced protocols to manage that.
	I believe that the time has come to address the vacuum in the recording and management of verbal evidence. Many people have been convicted on the back of verbal evidence, and thousands of families are sitting at home in fear of what we may confirm this evening. They realise that they are in an indefensible position, knowing that they cannot win in these cases.

Lady Hermon: I am disappointed and surprised that not one member of the Democratic Unionist party is in the Chamber this evening. They were in their places last week on a different matter. However, when it comes to significant changes to criminal justice, it is disappointing that they are not present. Perhaps they will surprise us and bounce into their usual places. I am glad to see my hon. Friend the hon. Member for South Antrim (David Burnside) in the Chamber, united in spirit and body on this occasion.
	I am pleased also that the Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is on the Government Front Bench this evening. Most of my remarks will be directed to both the Northern Ireland Office and the Home Office. It has been a particular concern over recent months that there has not been joined-up thinking between them. I am especially pleased to see Ministers from both Departments in the Chamber.
	Members of the Committee who considered the Bill each received a copy of a useful letter from the Minister for Criminal Justice, Sentencing and Law Reform in another place, which explained why part 10 was being extended to Northern Ireland. The letter stated that Northern Ireland should not be perceived as becoming
	"a safe haven for individuals who are seeking to avoid retrial under the new provisions."
	The perception that Northern Ireland could be a place of refuge for those seeking to avoid the operation of part 10 would have a greatly detrimental effect on the confidence of the community and the ability of the criminal justice system. I say hear, hear to that concern.
	I suggest that the Minister photocopies that letter and sends it to the Northern Ireland Office and even to the Prime Minister, because at the same time we have proposals relating to those who are on the run. It is a serious issue. We cannot say on the one hand that where there is new and compelling evidence a person should be prosecuted after a retrial, and on the other that he or she should be free to return to Northern Ireland without risk of arrest for questioning or charge in relation to a series of serious offences. Please, will the Northern Ireland Office and the Home Office come to a mutual arrangement so that they understand what both hands are doing at the same time? That would be extremely helpful.
	There is no justification for singling out only part 10 in terms of new and compelling evidence and retrials. Northern Ireland is guaranteed by the Belfast agreement, which the Prime Minister and the House generally have regularly told us how much they want to implement, to remain part of the United Kingdom unless and until the people of Northern Ireland say otherwise and vote in a referendum. If that is the case, why are the sentencing provisions in the Bill not extended to Northern Ireland? Why should those who riot in Bradford be sentenced to months or years of imprisonment, while in Belfast, where there was a dreadful history of rioting last year, on a good day someone might be remanded for 30 days? There is no justification for treating people so differently in different parts of the United Kingdom. Departments must get their heads together and treat the people of Northern Ireland fairly and equally with people in the rest of the UK.

Martin Linton: I make a plea for a less restrictive approach to double jeopardy. No one puts forward the case now against any relaxation of double jeopardy, but we are deciding where the threshold should be. The Law Commission suggested that we should start with any offence that attracted three years' imprisonment. In its final document, it tightened up its proposal to only murder, genocide, and reckless killing.
	I would argue that we should look to the organisation that represents victims in the legal system, which is Victim Support. It argues that we already have a high threshold for retrials. Under the Bill, to get a retrial, evidence has to be reliable and substantial so as to make it highly probable that a person is found guilty. That has to be in the interests of justice and to make a fair trial likely. The Director of Public Prosecutions has to be satisfied that it is in the public interest. Finally, the Court of Appeal must quash the acquittal and order a retrial, so there are already several high thresholds in the system.
	Victim Support argues that we should not unduly restrict the categories of offence that can lead to a retrial. It calls for retrials to be possible in the case of all arrestable offences. I am not endorsing that, but we are being far too restrictive in arguing, as the Opposition do, for only murder and rape cases. The Liberal Democrats argue for murder, genocide and corporate manslaughter cases.
	There is a stronger case to be made for rape victims. If a rape victim sees her assailant acquitted, she will know that her assailant is free, immune from prosecution, and may commit the offence again. She may be imprisoned in her own house by the fear of a repeat of that offence, in the same way as somebody wrongfully convicted is imprisoned for that offence. It is important that we go beyond murder and rape cases to kidnapping, attempted rape and class A drugs cases. Many such cases would come over the threshold and should not be ruled out on the grounds of the type of offence.
	I mention one famous case, that of Ronnie Knight, whom a jury found not guilty of the gangland murder of Alfredo Zomparelli, who was gunned down in the Golden Goose restaurant. Many hon. Members will remember the case. He was one of the many people who wrote kill-and-tell memoirs, where he boasted of a murder of which he had been acquitted—
	It being six and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings, Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Orders [4 February, 5 March, 2 April and this day] put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—
	The House divided: Ayes 189, Noes 330.

Question accordingly negatived.
	Mr. Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of business to be concluded at that hour.

Clause 63
	 — 
	Cases that may be Retried

Amendments made: No. 462, in page 41, line 8, leave out 'in England and Wales'.
	No. 464, in page 41, line 10, leave out 'on indictment' and insert
	'in proceedings on indictment in England and Wales'.
	No. 463, in page 41, line 9, at end insert 'in England and Wales'.
	No. 465, in page 41, line 27, leave out
	'England and Wales or Scotland'
	and insert 'the United Kingdom'.
	No. 357, in page 41, line 30, after 'Kingdom' insert 'or elsewhere'.
	No. 466, in page 41, line 31 leave out
	'England and Wales or Scotland'
	and insert 'the United Kingdom'.
	No. 467, in page 41, line 38, after 'in' insert 'Part 1 of'.—[Paul Goggins.]

Schedule 4
	 — 
	Qualifying Offences for Purposes of Part 10

Amendments made: No. 423, in page 188, line 22, at end insert
	'or section 1 or 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003'.
	No. 424, in page 188, line 25, at end insert
	'or section 1 or 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003'.
	No. 425, in page 189, line 12, at end insert—
	'Fraudulent evasion in respect of Class A drug
	12A An offence under section 170(1) or (2) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c. 2) alleged to have been committed in respect of a Class A drug (as defined by section 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (c. 38)).'.
	No. 474, in page 191, line 4, after 'in' insert 'this Part of'.
	No. 475, in page 191, line 4, at end insert—
	List of Offences for Northern Ireland
	Offences against the Person
	Murder
	30A Murder.
	Attempted murder
	30B An offence under Article 3 of the Criminal Attempts and Conspiracy (Northern Ireland) Order 1983 of attempting to commit murder.
	Soliciting murder
	30C An offence under section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100).
	Manslaughter
	30D Manslaughter.
	Wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent
	30E An offence under section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100).
	Kidnapping
	30F Kidnapping.
	Sexual Offences
	Rape
	30G Rape.
	Attempted rape
	30H An offence under section 2 of the Attempted Rape, etc., Act (Northern Ireland) 1960.
	Intercourse with a girl under fourteen
	30I An offence under section 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (c. 69) of unlawfully and carnally knowing a girl under fourteen.
	Incest by a man with a girl under fourteen
	30J An offence under section 1(1) of the Punishment of Incest Act 1908 (c. 45) alleged to have been committed with a girl under fourteen.
	Drugs Offences
	Unlawful importation of Class A drug
	30K An offence under section 50(2) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c. 2) alleged to have been committed in respect of a Class A drug (as defined by section 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (c. 38)).
	Unlawful exportation of Class A drug
	30L An offence under section 68(2) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c. 2) alleged to have been committed in respect of a Class A drug (as defined by section 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (c.38)).
	Fraudulent evasion in respect of Class A drug
	30M An offence under section 170(1) or (2) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c. 2) alleged to have been committed in respect of a Class A drug (as defined by section 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (c. 38)).
	Producing or being concerned in production of Class A drug
	30N An offence under section 4(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (c. 38) alleged to have been committed in respect of a Class A drug (as defined by section 2 of that Act).
	Supplying or offering to supply Class A drug
	30O An offence under section 4(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (c. 38) alleged to have been committed in respect of a Class A drug (as defined by section 2 of that Act).
	Theft Offences
	Robbery
	30P An offence under section 8(1) of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 where it is alleged that, at some time during the commission of the offence, the defendant had in his possession a firearm or imitation firearm (as defined by Article 2(2) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 1981).
	Criminal Damage Offences
	Arson endangering life
	30Q An offence under Article 3(2) of the Criminal Damage (Northern Ireland) Order 1977 alleged to have been committed by destroying or damaging property by fire.
	Causing explosion likely to endanger life or property
	30R An offence under section 2 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c. 3).
	Intent or conspiracy to cause explosion likely to endanger life or property
	30S An offence under section 3(1)(a) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c. 3).
	War Crimes and Terrorism
	Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes
	30T An offence under section 51 or 52 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c. 17).
	Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
	30U An offence under section 1 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (c. 52).
	Directing terrorist organisation
	30V An offence under section 56 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11).
	Hostage taking
	30W An offence under section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (c. 28).
	Hijacking of aircraft
	30X An offence under section 1 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (c. 36).
	Destroying, damaging or endangering the safety of an aircraft
	30Y An offence under section 2 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 (c. 36).
	Hijacking of ships
	30Z An offence under section 9 of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c. 31).
	Seizing or exercising control of fixed platforms
	30ZA An offence under section 10 of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c. 31).
	Destroying ships or fixed platforms or endangering their safety
	30ZB An offence under section 11 of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c. 31).
	Hijacking of Channel Tunnel trains
	30ZC An offence under article 4 of the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (S.I. 1994/570).
	Seizing or exercising control of the Channel Tunnel system
	30ZD An offence under article 5 of the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (S.I. 1994/570).
	Conspiracy
	30ZE An offence under Article 9 of the Criminal Attempts and Conspiracy (Northern Ireland) Order 1983 of conspiracy to commit an offence listed in this Part of this Schedule.'—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 64
	 — 
	Application to Court of Appeal

Amendments made: No. 468, in page 42, line 4, leave out 'England and Wales' and insert 'proceedings within section 63(1)'.
	No. 469, in page 42, line 7, leave out
	'England and Wales or Scotland'
	and insert
	'the United Kingdom'.—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 66
	 — 
	New and Compelling Evidence

Amendments made: No. 358, in page 42, line 37, leave out
	'that the acquitted person is guilty of'
	and insert
	'against the acquitted person in relation to'.
	No. 359, in page 42, line 38, leave out from 'it' to end of line 39 and insert
	'was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if those were appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related).'.
	No. 360, in page 43, line 2, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—
	'( ) in the context of the outstanding issues, it appears highly probative of the case against the acquitted person.'.
	No. 361, in page 43, line 5, leave out 'are' and insert 'were'.
	No. 362, in page 43, line 6, leave out 'relates' and insert 'related'.—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 70
	 — 
	Restrictions on Reporting

Amendment made: No. 372, in page 44, line 31, leave out Clause 70.—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 71
	 — 
	Offences in Connection with Reporting

Amendment made: No. 373, in page 45, line 26, leave out Clause 71.—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 72
	 — 
	Retrial

Amendment made: No. 470, in page 46, line 32, leave out
	'England and Wales or Scotland'
	and insert 'the United Kingdom'.—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 73
	 — 
	Authorisation of Investigations

Amendments made: No. 471, in page 47, line 8, leave out 'England and Wales' and insert 'proceedings within section 63(1)'.
	No. 472, in page 47, line 9, leave out
	'England and Wales or Scotland'
	and insert 'the United Kingdom'.
	No. 374, in page 47, line 9, leave out 'England and Wales and Scotland'
	and insert 'the United Kingdom'.
	No. 375, in page 47, line 30, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert
	'an officer who—
	(a) if he is an officer of the Metropolitan police force or the City of London police force, is of the rank of commander or above, and
	(b) in any other case, is of the rank of assistant chief constable or above.'.
	No. 376, in page 47, line 35, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
	'(a) he is satisfied that new evidence has been obtained which would be relevant to an application under section 64(1) or (2) in respect of the qualifying offence to which the investigation relates, or
	(b) he has reasonable grounds for believing that such new evidence is likely to be obtained as a result of the investigation.'.
	No. 377, in page 48, line 3, at end insert
	'or specified team of customs and excise officers'.—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 74
	 — 
	Urgent Investigative Steps

Amendments made: No. 378, in page 48, line 6, leave out from 'investigation' to end of line 23 and insert 'if—
	(a) the action is necessary as a matter of urgency to prevent the investigation being substantially and irrevocably prejudiced,
	(b) the requirements of subsection (1A) are met, and
	(c) either—
	(i) the action is authorised under subsection (1B), or
	(ii) the requirements of subsection (8) are met.
	(1A) The requirements of this subsection are met if—'.
	No. 379, in page 48, line 28, at end insert—
	'(1B) An officer of the rank of superintendent or above may authorise the action if—
	(a) he is satisfied that new evidence has been obtained which would be relevant to an application under section 64(1) or (2) in respect of the qualifying offence to which the investigation relates, or
	(b) he has reasonable grounds for believing that such new evidence is likely to be obtained as a result of the investigation.'.
	No. 380, in page 48, line 29, leave out '(2)' and insert '(1B)'.
	No. 381, in page 48, line 32, at end insert—
	'(8) The requirements of this subsection are met if—
	(a) there has been no undue delay in applying for authorisation under subsection (1B),
	(b) that authorisation has not been refused, and
	(c) taking into account the urgency of the situation, it is not reasonably practicable to obtain that authorisation before taking the action.
	(9) Where the requirements of subsection (8) are met, the action is nevertheless to be treated as having been unlawful unless, as soon as reasonably practicable after the action is taken, an officer of the rank of superintendent or above certifies in writing that he is satisfied that, when the action was taken—
	(a) new evidence had been obtained which would be relevant to an application under section 64(1) or (2) in respect of the qualifying offence to which the investigation relates, or
	(b) the officer who took the action had reasonable grounds for believing that such new evidence was likely to be obtained as a result of the investigation.'.—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 75
	 — 
	Arrest and Charge

Amendments made: No. 382, in page 48, line 35, leave out subsections (1) and (2) and insert—
	'(1) Where section 73 applies to the investigation of the commission of an offence by any person and no certification has been given under subsection (2) of that section—
	(a) a justice of the peace may issue a warrant to arrest that person for that offence only if satisfied by written information that new evidence has been obtained which would be relevant to an application under section 64(1) or (2) in respect of the commission by that person of that offence, and
	(b) that person may not be arrested for that offence except under a warrant so issued.
	(2) Subsection (1) does not affect section 77(3)(b) or (Revocation of bail)(3), or any other power to arrest a person, or to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person, otherwise than for an offence.
	(2A) Part 4 of the 1984 Act (detention) applies as follows where a person—
	(a) is arrested for an offence under a warrant issued in accordance with subsection (1)(a), or
	(b) having been so arrested, is subsequently treated under section 34(7) of that Act as arrested for that offence.'
	No. 383, in page 49, line 1, leave out from first 'of' to 'there' in line 2 and insert 'that Part'.
	No. 384, in page 49, line 4, after 'above' insert
	'(who has not been directly involved in the investigation)'.
	No. 385, in page 49, line 15 at end insert—
	'(5) Section 37 of that Act (including any provision of that section as applied by section 40(8) of that Act) has effect subject to the following modifications—
	(a) in subsection (1)—
	(i) for "determine whether he has before him" there is substituted "request an officer of the rank of superintendent or above (who has not been directly involved in the investigation) to determine, in accordance with section 75(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, whether there is";
	(ii) for "him to do so" there is substituted "that determination to be made";
	(b) in subsection (2)—
	(i) for the words from "custody officer determines" to "before him" there is substituted "officer determines that there is not such sufficient evidence";
	(ii) the word "custody" is omitted from the second place where it occurs;
	(c) in subsection (3)—
	(i) the word "custody" is omitted;
	(ii) after "may" there is inserted "direct the custody officer to";
	(d) in subsection (7) for the words from "the custody officer" to the end of that subsection there is substituted "an officer of the rank of superintendent or above (who has not been directly involved in the investigation) determines, in accordance with section 75(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, that there is sufficient evidence to charge the person arrested with the offence for which he was arrested, the person arrested shall be charged.";
	(e) subsections (7A), (7B) and (8) do not apply;
	(f) after subsection (10) there is inserted—
	"(10A) The officer who is requested by the custody officer to make a determination under subsection (1) above shall make that determination as soon as practicable after the request is made.".
	(6) Section 40 of that Act has effect as if in subsections (8) and (9) of that section after "(6)" there were inserted "and (10A)".
	(7) Section 42 of that Act has effect as if in subsection (1) of that section for the words from "who" to "detained" there were substituted "(who has not been directly involved in the investigation)".'.
	—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 76
	 — 
	Bail and Custody Before Application

Amendments made: No. 386, in page 49, line 17, leave out from beginning to 'must' and insert—
	'(1) In relation to a person charged in accordance with section 75(3)—
	(a) section 38 of the 1984 Act (including any provision of that section as applied by section 40(10) of that Act) has effect as if, in subsection (1), for "either on bail or without bail" there were substituted "on bail",
	(b) section 47(3) of that Act does not apply and references in section 38 of that Act to bail are references to bail subject to a duty to appear before the Crown Court at such place as the custody officer may appoint and at such time, not later than 24 hours after the person is released, as that officer may appoint, and
	(c) section 43B of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c. 43) does not apply.
	(1A) Where such a person is, after being charged—
	(a) kept in police detention, or
	(b) detained by a local authority in pursuance of arrangements made under section 38(6) of the 1984 Act,
	he'.
	No. 387, in page 49, line 19, leave out from first 'and' to 'not' in line 20 and insert
	'section 46 of the 1984 Act does'.
	No. 388, in page 49, line 21, after '(1)' insert 'or (1A)'.
	No. 389, in page 49, line 28, after 'is' insert
	'to appear before the Crown Court as mentioned in subsection (1) or, where subsection (1A) applies, is'.
	No. 390, in page 49, line 29, at beginning insert
	'Where a person appears or is brought before the Crown Court in accordance with subsection (1) or (1A),'.
	No. 391, in page 49, line 30, leave out
	', with such conditions as it sees fit,'.
	No. 392, in page 49, line 31, leave out 'before the Crown Court'.
	No. 393, in page 49, line 32, after '68(2)' insert
	'before the Court of Appeal at the hearing of that application'.
	No. 394, in page 49, line 35, leave out subsection (4).
	No. 395, in page 49, line 37, leave out from 'may' to 'revoke' in line 39.
	No. 396, in page 49, line 41, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
	'(6A) In subsection (6B) the "relevant period", in relation to a person granted bail or remanded in custody under subsection (3), means—
	(a) the period of 42 days beginning with the day on which he is granted bail or remanded in custody under that subsection, or
	(b) that period as extended or further extended under subsection (7).
	(6B) If at the end of the relevant period no notice of an application under section 64(1) or (2) in relation to the person has been given under section 68(1), the person—
	(a) if on bail subject to a duty to appear as mentioned in subsection (3)(a), ceases to be subject to that duty and to any conditions of that bail, and
	(b) if in custody on remand under subsection (3)(b) or (5), must be released immediately without bail.'.
	No. 397, in page 50, line 5, leave out '(6)(b)' and insert '(6A)(a)'.
	No. 398, in page 50, line 5, after '(6)(b)' insert 'until a specified date'.
	No. 399, in page 50, line 8, leave out subsection (8).—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 77
	 — 
	Bail and Custody Before Hearing

Amendments made: No. 400, in page 50, line 13, leave out '(5)(b)' and insert '(5)'.
	No. 401, in page 50, line 15, leave out '(5)(b)' and insert '(5)'.
	No. 402, in page 50, line 19, at end insert—
	'and a warrant under paragraph (b) may be issued at any time even though a summons has previously been issued.'.
	No. 403, in page 50, line 28, at end insert
	', and section 81(5) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (c. 54) does not apply.'.
	No. 404, in page 50, line 29, leave out from '(6)' to 'the' in line 30.
	No. 405, in page 50, line 34, leave out
	', with such conditions as it sees fit,'.
	No. 406, in page 50, line 36, leave out subsection (8).
	No. 407, in page 50, line 38, leave out 'from time to time'.
	No. 408, in page 50, line 41, leave out from '(7)(a)' to end of line 42.—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 78
	 — 
	Bail and Custody During and After Hearing

Amendments made: No. 409, in page 51, line 10, leave out
	'with such conditions as it sees fit,'.
	No. 410, in page 51, line 26, at end insert—
	'(3A) Section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 (c.63) applies in relation to the grant of bail under this section as if in subsection (2) the reference to the Crown Court included a reference to the Court of Appeal.'.
	No. 411, in page 51, line 30, leave out from beginning to 'or'.
	No. 412, in page 51, line 32, leave out subsection (5).—[Paul Goggins.]

Clause 81
	 — 
	Interpretation of Part 10

Amendments made: No. 413, in page 52, line 12, at end insert—
	'"the 1979 Act" means the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c. 2),
	"the 1984 Act" means the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60),'.
	No. 414, in page 52, line 14, at end insert—
	'"customs and excise officer" means an officer as defined by section 1(1) of the 1979 Act, or a person to whom section 8(2) of that Act applies,'.
	No. 415, in page 52, line 16, leave out
	', subject to section 71(6),'.
	No. 416, in page 52, line 16, after 'force' insert
	'or a customs and excise officer'.
	No. 417, in page 52, leave out line 19.
	No. 418, in page 52, leave out line 22.
	No. 419, in page 52, leave out line 24.
	No. 420, in page 52, line 31, at end insert—
	'(3) References in this Part to an officer of a specified rank or above are, in the case of a customs and excise officer, references to an officer of such description as—
	(a) appears to the Commissioners of Customs and Excise to comprise officers of equivalent rank or above, and
	(b) is specified by the Commissioners for the purposes of the provision concerned.'.—[Paul Goggins.]

New Clause 42
	 — 
	Restrictions on Publication in the Interests of Justice

'(1) Where it appears to the Court of Appeal that the inclusion of any matter in a publication would give rise to a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in a retrial, the court may order that the matter is not to be included in any publication while the order has effect.
	(2) In subsection (1) "retrial" means the trial of an acquitted person for a qualifying offence pursuant to any order made or that may be made under section 65.
	(3) The court may make an order under this section only if it appears to it necessary in the interests of justice to do so.
	(4) An order under this section may apply to a matter which has been included in a publication published before the order takes effect, but such an order—
	(a) applies only to the later inclusion of the matter in a publication (whether directly or by inclusion of the earlier publication), and
	(b) does not otherwise affect the earlier publication.
	(5) After notice of an application has been given under section 68(1) relating to the acquitted person and the qualifying offence, the court may make an order under this section only—
	(a) of its own motion, or
	(b) on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
	(6) Before such notice has been given, an order under this section—
	(a) may be made only on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and
	(b) may not be made unless, since the acquittal concerned, an investigation of the commission by the acquitted person of the qualifying offence has been commenced by officers.
	(7) The court may at any time, of its own motion or on an application made by the Director of Public Prosecutions or the acquitted person, vary or revoke an order under this section.
	(8) Any order made under this section before notice of an application has been given under section 68(1) relating to the acquitted person and the qualifying offence must specify the time when it ceases to have effect.
	(9) An order under this section which is made or has effect after such notice has been given ceases to have effect, unless it specifies an earlier time—
	(a) when there is no longer any step that could be taken which would lead to the acquitted person being tried pursuant to an order made on the application, or
	(b) if he is tried pursuant to such an order, at the conclusion of the trial.
	(10) Nothing in this section affects any prohibition or restriction by virtue of any other enactment on the inclusion of any matter in a publication or any power, under an enactment or otherwise, to impose such a prohibition or restriction.
	(11) In this section—
	"programme service" has the same meaning as in the Broadcasting Act 1990 (c. 42),
	"publication" includes any speech, writing, relevant programme or other communication in whatever form, which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public (and for this purpose every relevant programme is to be taken to be so addressed), but does not include an indictment or other document prepared for use in particular legal proceedings,
	"relevant programme" means a programme included in a programme service.'.—[Paul Goggins,]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 43
	 — 
	Revocation of Bail

'(1) Where—
	(a) a court revokes a person's bail under this Part, and
	(b) that person is not before the court when his bail is revoked,
	the court must order him to surrender himself forthwith to the custody of the court.
	(2) Where a person surrenders himself in the custody of the court in compliance with an order under subsection (1), the court must remand him in custody.
	(3) A person who has been ordered to surrender to custody under subsection (1) may be arrested without a warrant by an officer if he fails without reasonable cause to surrender to custody in accordance with the order.
	(4) A person arrested under subsection (3) must be brought as soon as practicable, and, in any event, not more than 24 hours after he is arrested, before the court and the court must remand him in custody.
	(5) For the purpose of calculating the period referred to in subsection (4), the following are to be disregarded—
	(a) Sunday,
	(b) Christmas Day,
	(c) Good Friday,
	(d) any day which is a bank holiday under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 (c. 80) in the part of the United Kingdom where the person is for the time being detained.'.—[Paul Goggins.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 44
	 — 
	Armed Forces: Part 10

'(1) Section 31 of the Armed Forces Act 2001 (c. 19) (provision in consequence of enactments relating to criminal justice) applies to an enactment contained in this Part so far as relating to matters not specified in subsection (2) of that section as it applies to a criminal justice enactment.
	(2) The power under that section to make provision equivalent to that made in relation to qualifying offences by an enactment contained in this Part (with or without modifications) includes power to make such provision in relation to such service offences as the Secretary of State thinks fit.
	(3) In subsection (2) "service offence" means an offence under the Army Act 1955 (3&4Eliz.2 c. 18), the Air Force Act 1955 (3&4Eliz.2 c. 19) or the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (c. 53).'.—[Paul Goggins.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 54
	 — 
	Application of Part 10 to Northern Ireland

'(1) In its application to Northern Ireland this Part is to have effect subject to the modifications in
	this section.
	(2) In sections 63(1)(a) and (b), 64(2)(a), 67(3) and 73(2)(a) for "England and Wales" substitute "Northern Ireland".
	(3) For section 63(2)(c) substitute—
	"(c) in respect of which, in proceedings where he has been found to be unfit to be tried in accordance with Article 49 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (S.I. 1986/595 (N.I. 4)), a finding has been made that he did the act or made the omission charged against him."
	(4) In section 63(8) for "Part 1" substitute "Part 1A".
	(5) In section 69(1) for "Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (c. 19)" substitute "Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (c. 47)".
	(6) In section 69(2)—
	(a) for "33" substitute "31", and
	(b) for "An" substitute "Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act, an".
	(7) In section 69(4)—
	(a) for "34(2)" substitute "32(2)", and
	(b) for "33(1B)" substitute "31(1B)".
	(8) In section 72(1) for "preferred" substitute "presented".
	(9) After section 72(6) insert—
	"(6A) Article 29 of the Legal Aid, Advice and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/228 (N.I. 8)) applies in the case of a person who is to be tried in accordance with subsection (1) as if—
	(a) he had been committed for trial for the offence in question, and
	(b) the reference in paragraph (2)(a) of that Article to a magistrates' court included a reference to the Court of Appeal."
	(10) In section 79(1) for the words from the beginning to "does" substitute "Sections 30(4) and 36 of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 (c. 26) do".
	(11) Until the coming into force of section 36 of that Act of 2002 the reference to that section in subsection (10) is to be read as a reference to Article 4(8) of the Prosecution of Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 (S.I. 1972/538 (N.I. 1)).
	(12) In section 80(2) for "the Criminal Appeal Rules and the Crown Court Rules" substitute "rules under section 55 of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 (c. 23) and Crown Court Rules".
	(13) In section 81(1) for the definition of "police force" substitute—
	""police force" means—
	(a) the Police Service of Northern Ireland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland Reserve,
	(b) the Ministry of Defence Police,
	(c) any body of constables appointed under Article 19 of the Airports (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 (S.I. 1994/426 (N.I. 1)), or
	(d) any body of special constables appointed in Northern Ireland under section 79 of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 (c. 27) or section 57 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 (c. 16);".
	(14) Omit section 81(2).'.
	—[Paul Goggins.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Clause 279
	 — 
	Extent

Amendments made: No. 421, in page 156, line 17, leave out line 17 and insert—
	'section (Restrictions on publication in the interests of justice);'.
	No. 473, in page 156, line 31, at end insert—
	'sections 63 to 69;
	sections 72 to 81 and (Application of Part 10 to Northern Ireland);
	Schedule 4.'.
	No. 422, in page 156, line 31, at end insert—
	'(4A) Section (Armed forces: Part 10) has the same extent as section 31 of the Armed Forces Act 2001 (c. 19).'.—[Paul Goggins.]
	More than six and a half hours having elapsed since the commencement of proceedings on the Bill, further consideration of the Bill stood adjourned, pursuant to Orders [4 February, 5 March, 2 April and today].
	Bill, as amended in the Standing Committee, to be further considered tomorrow.

DELEGATED LEGISLATION

Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 118(6)(Standing Committees on Delegated Legislation),

Local Government Finance

That the Local Government Finance (England) Special Grant Report (No. 121) (HC 640) on Invest to Save Budget Round 5 Projects, Local e-Government Programme and e-Voting, which was laid before this House on 11th April, be approved.—[Jim Fitzpatrick.]
	Question agreed to.

REGULATORY REFORM

Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 18 (Consideration of draft regulatory reform orders),

British Waterways Board

That the draft Regulatory Reform (British Waterways Board) Order 2003, which was laid before this House on 28th April, be approved.—[Jim Fitzpatrick.]
	Question agreed to.

WELSH GRAND COMMITTEE

Ordered,
	That—
	(1) the matter of the Economy in Wales be referred to the Welsh Grand Committee for its consideration;
	(2) the Committee shall meet at Westminster on Tuesday 24th June at five minutes to Nine o'clock and between Two o'clock and Four o'clock to take questions under Standing Order No. 103 (Welsh Grand Committee (questions for oral answer)), and to consider the matter of the Economy in Wales under Standing Order No. 107 (Welsh Grand Committee (matters relating exclusively to Wales)).—[Jim Fitzpatrick.]
	Question agreed to.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered,
	That at the sitting on Thursday 22nd May, the Motion for the adjournment of the House in the name of the Prime Minister relating to matters to be considered before the forthcoming adjournment may be proceeded with, though opposed, for three hours, or until Six o'clock, whichever is the later, and shall then lapse.—[Jim Fitzpatrick.]
	Question agreed to.

PETITIONS
	 — 
	Street Crime (Canvey Island)

Bob Spink: The scourge of youth nuisance, violence, vandalism and street crime is deeply damaging to our communities. We must take back ownership and control of our streets for decent people, young and old alike. We must tackle yob behaviour. The good people of Canvey Island have raised a petition with that in mind.
	The petition states:
	"To the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Parliament assembled.
	The Humble Petition of Councillors Norman Banbridge, Frieda Cridland, Dorothy Best, Lance Munt and others of like disposition sheweth
	That residents of Canvey Island and particularly Winter Gardens are increasingly concerned about the threatening and criminal behaviour that is being experienced around Canvey Island, including Winter Gardens, and believe that firm action should be taken to increase policing of the area and to pursue a zero tolerance approach to crime on the streets involving young people.
	Wherefore your Petitioners pray that your honourable House shall urge the Government to ensure that police foot patrols are provided for Canvey Island and particularly the Winter Gardens and other problem areas, especially at night time.
	And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will every pray.
	To lie upon the Table.

Mobile Phone Masts

Bob Spink: Mobile phone masts and other antennae have become a source of great anxiety to our constituents. It is yet another subject about which the Government are not listening to people and the Opposition are listening to them. Our constituents want more say about the location of mobile phone masts. They want to protect their interests and those of their children, hence the petition, which states:
	To the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Parliament assembled.
	The humble Petition of Mrs. Hughes, Councillor Kate Meager, Councillor David Cross and others of like disposition sheweth
	That local residents seek greater controls over the siting of mobile phones and other antennae and are concerned about the impact of these on the health and well being of residents, particularly children, and on the street scene.
	Wherefore your Petitioners pray that your honourable House shall urge the Government to give more control over mobile phone masts and other such antennae to local communities through local planning procedures and local councillors.
	And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.
	To lie upon the Table.

Dangerous Driving

Neil Turner: I present the petition of Mr. Frank Round and his daughter, Mrs. Paula Sharrock on behalf of his other daughter, who was killed in a road accident. Death was caused by dangerous driving, but the person responsible was given only a one-year sentence.
	The petition states:
	The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons increase the maximum sentence available to the courts for this offence and call upon the Lord Chancellor to ensure that the courts use this increased maximum when passing sentence.
	And the Petitioners remain etc.
	To lie upon the Table.

ZIMBABWE

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Jim Fitzpatrick.]

Chris Grayling: I am grateful to the Minister for being present at this late hour. I requested the debate because I have had contact for some time through the churches in my constituency with people who are doing work on the front line in Zimbabwe. They have valuable intelligence about the reality of events in some rural areas in Zimbabwe and also identified an aspect of information from the Department in Africa that perhaps does not portray a true picture of the position in Zimbabwe. I want to share some of the feedback from those people with the Minister and ask whether she can take action through our offices in Zimbabwe to try to improve the predicament that undoubtedly faces people in rural areas.
	The specific concern arose through information from the Department for International Development office in Harare about the amount of food support that is being provided to rural areas through non-governmental organisations. Some people in my constituency who expressed anxiety to the Department were recently reassured that the position was not as bad as they had believed and that some 90 per cent. of the people in the affected areas were receiving food support from the UK through NGO partners. The people with whom I am in contact said that that was not the case and that the aid was not getting through.
	I want therefore to share with the Minister some of the feedback that I received from those people. I am sure that she understands that, since we are in a public forum, I want to protect the identities of those involved. However, I hope that she accepts my assurance that the reports are well founded and from people who are genuinely in the front line of the affected areas.
	The Binga district is the area of especial anxiety. It is close to Lake Kariba in western Zimbabwe and is one of the areas that was most affected by political, socio-economic and drought-related developments in recent times. I shall read the response from the head of a church denomination in Bulawayo who has been in contact with people in Binga. He said:
	"The Binga district, covering around 100 square kilometres, is arguably the most underdeveloped part of Zimbabwe. The Tonga people are disadvantaged educationally and in every other way. It is a malarial area and people have low incomes . . . The people feel neglected and there is enormous resentment against the government. Before the Presidential elections food was sent to Binga and it was made clear that this was an incentive to vote for Robert Mugabe. There were threats and intimidation but the biggest vote for the MDC was polled in this area. The mayor actually spoke out against the President in public. Before the local elections there was widespread intimidation, violence, killings and the destruction of homes by government-sponsored agents. All food distribution by NGOs was suspended but still the people voted for MDC. There is very little food now in Binga and this is a deliberate political decision on the part of the government in retaliation for the MDC vote."
	One of my constituents' contacts on the ground in western Zimbabwe put questions to a Binga resident. One question related specifically to the Department's comments about the supposed supply of food through NGO partners. The questioner said:
	"It is claimed that this area is supported at a much higher level than many other districts. Is this true?"
	The response was:
	"No it is not true. Many people are starving in Binga. I have come to Bulawayo to get help for desperate people. The District Administrator was attacked last month because the people are hungry."
	The question was asked:
	"What evidence do you have of the problem?"
	The gentleman replied:
	"Firstly I am closely connected to the local task force for drought relief. Secondly I know the situation in the church I attend. One quarter of the people in that church are desperate. They have been living on local wild fruits for two and a half months and many of them are getting sick and dying. The rest of the church have very little and are malnourished. People are continually bringing starving children to my door asking for help. I have connections with 15 other churches within a 30 km area and the situation is the same in every one."
	The question was asked:
	"Are the NGOs operating in your area?"
	The reply was:
	"I think that CADAC has resumed giving school children some relief but there is only limited distribution by other agencies. There are some important factors here. People at the top of these organisations may not realise the true nature of the situation. When the government came to power the traditional structures of authority in the rural areas were ignored by the government. Now the local chiefs are on the government pay-roll."
	I met one of the relief workers who had come back to England 10 days ago. She said that the chiefs as a group had always been relatively independent from the Government, and as such were a trusted conduit for aid. Recently, however, the Government had started to pay many of them, and as a result there was much closer centralised control of the distribution networks.
	The contact explained:
	"Most NGOs do not have a grass-roots network in this area. They rely on the chiefs and their assistants to supply a list of people eligible to receive food. The chiefs are under instructions that food should go to card-carrying Zanu-PF people. So many people never receive food even when a distribution occurs. In an area where the infrastructure is so poor and people are scattered over a wide area linked only by dirt roads, it is hard for the agencies to monitor what is happening effectively. At the present time 90 per cent. of the people of Binga are not being fed by the UK through NGOs or by anyone else."
	That is the key concern. It may appear at first glance to Ministers and officials at the centre that food supplies are being provided through the local networks and the tribal chiefs and are ultimately being received, but feedback from the ground suggests that that is not the case. It appears that the food that is being distributed is going to people on approved lists, which are under the control of the tribal chiefs—who themselves are now salaried employees of the Government. The mechanism exists in local communities to cut off those seen as hostile to the regime.
	I do not doubt the motivation of our officials on the ground, but although they may believe that the food is being channelled through the NGOs, ultimately—because the grass-roots networks do not exist—they are operating on hearsay. They are relying on the word and confirmation of the tribal chiefs. Evidence from the few people who are still working in humanitarian areas in that part of Zimbabwe—I admire their bravery—suggests that the food is not getting through to those who need it most.
	Let me also share with the Minister some feedback from a western aid worker on the ground in Zimbabwe, who is still doing extremely important work in the communities there. She said to me:
	"I am confident that you will protect my identity for the sake of the work I am doing."
	I am doing just that tonight. She, too, has talked about the NGOs feeding people in the Binga area of Zimbabwe. She says:
	"I am involved in relief work and know that this is not the case. The distribution of this information presents a challenge to our credibility. Please bear with me asking for your help to put the record straight on behalf of the starving people in Binga District, Matabeleland North, Zimbabwe."
	The aid worker goes on to give further political background information on the nature of the population in the area. They are people who were displaced as a result of the flooding to create the Kariba dam. She says:
	"most of the government officials, teachers and other important roles in that area have been filled by Shona speakers brought into the area from Mashonaland—the northern provinces of Zimbabwe, the heartland of the ruling ZANU-PF party. This has resulted in the marginalizing of the Tonga and Ndebele peoples"—
	—the traditional occupants of that area. She goes on:
	"The Shona speakers have continued to be given food during the famine and those who are registered by the local headmen have also been assisted."
	That relates to the point that I was making a moment ago. She continues:
	"Food distribution in every area is based on lists of registered people provided by the traditional leaders. These traditional leaders, ignored by the government for many years, are now well paid and therefore tend to comply with government demands. Hence the needy are still marginalized as, if they do not speak Shona or carry a ZANU-PF party card, it is assumed they belong to the MDC."
	One of the tragedies in all this is that there are people who are genuine victims who have no interest or involvement in politics at all, and who perhaps did not even vote in the recent elections. They might be illiterate or cut off from other communities. They are being treated as political pariahs and, as a result, do not receive food. The aid worker goes on to say:
	"Amounts of food are being increased but politics not vulnerability is the measuring rod for eligibility. In some areas people who do not belong to the party will buy a card but still many will not compromise with murderers, thieves and liars."
	She goes on to restate the point about the amounts of food available.
	"Only a few weeks ago we received an urgent cry for help because many people still had no food. They have been surviving by crushing a small wild fruit, mixing it with water to make a thin soup. Now there are no more fruits. This diet has made many sick. The fact that we were contacted means that food supplies are inadequate."
	The aid worker also confirms the point made about the activity of the NGOs. She says:
	"The main NGO in Binga has always been the Catholic Church through CADAC. Around election time CADAC's distributions were stopped and so were those of Save the Children UK. This was largely because the mayor of Binga spoke out against the government during a pre-election visit by Robert Mugabe. The Catholic church has also taken a firm stand against human rights abuse. There is no doubt in anyone's mind that food deprivation was used as a punishment. CADAC is operating again distributing a high-protein drink in schools and Save the Children is doing some work. ORAP"—
	the Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress—
	"under the World Food Programme have taken in seed and fertilizer but we know that in many cases the seed was washed and eaten rather than sown."
	She goes on:
	"We do not dispute that Britain is assisting the hungry people of Zimbabwe and we are very grateful for all that is being done. It is not the fault of the NGOs as they can only go where the government allows access and it is hard to accurately monitor the situation without independent grass-roots contacts. This letter is just to put the record straight. Britain was definitely not providing food for 90 per cent. of the people of Binga . . . We are convinced that there is still a great need for further help in that area as in other parts of Zimbabwe. Matabeleland, comprising the southern provinces of Zimbabwe, has not benefited from the rainfall that the north has received and will therefore continue to need a lot of assistance in the months ahead."
	There is a concern at the heart of the matter: the Government are sending one message about the support that we are providing through the NGOs—the Department is saying that it is all fine and all sorted—but smaller NGOs are still looking to operate almost under the radar, which they can do on the ground because they are small and not noticed, while turning to their supporters in this country and saying, "Please provide us with extra support." If the Department is sending such a message, that support will not be forthcoming.
	That is the real worry of those NGOs. They believe that they are operating on the front line, and that they have a distinct and unique ability to make a difference on that front line in a country where some hardships are creating desperation. They are extremely concerned that Ministers get the message, "It's not all working according to plan. The things you are trying are not getting to the front line in the way that you hope they are." If the Department gives out the wrong message, that will make it more difficult for those who are there to secure the support—financial and otherwise—from within this country to help them to carry on with their work.
	It is very much my hope that that information from the front line in Zimbabwe gives the Minister an additional backcloth to events and helps her to provide a briefing to her office in Zimbabwe on the issues on that front line. I hope also that it enables her, her Department and the NGOs, both large and small, working in Zimbabwe to make a difference in a country where there is undoubtedly huge human hardship. We may not be able to do all that we would like to ease that hardship because of the nature of the regime, but every small thing we can do is clearly not only desirable, but necessary.

Sally Keeble: I congratulate the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling) on securing the debate and his presentation of the issues, which was clear and helpful. I assure him of two things: first, the concern about the plight of the Zimbabwean people, especially in the rural areas that he described, is shared equally across all parties. We on the Government side certainly are not complacent about the position of people in Zimbabwe, and I welcome the chance to set out some of our approach, because quite a few issues are worth rehearsing and explaining.
	Secondly, I understand why the hon. Gentleman is protective of the contact with his constituents. I pay tribute to them and the work that they do in extraordinarily difficult circumstances and at considerable risk to themselves to meet profound humanitarian needs. Labour Members would not look to increase the pressure on them any further.
	I shall deal with the hon. Gentleman's points, but, perhaps at the end of my speech, I will give reassurances on how the information that he has provided will be treated and fed back into the system. Zimbabwe's humanitarian crisis is, of course, part of a wider political and economic crisis. Unfortunately, the suffering of ordinary Zimbabweans will continue, despite the best efforts of the international community, until the appalling failures of the Mugabe regime are reversed. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman agrees that at the heart of the matter is a profound political problem. It is not just humanitarian.
	I assure the hon. Gentleman of the Government's commitment in relation to Zimbabwe. We have pressed extremely hard for reform and will continue to do so, but we cannot secure change on our own. Therefore, we strongly welcome the recent initiatives that have been taken by the Presidents of South Africa, Nigeria and Malawi to start a dialogue between Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change. Pressure from the African Governments is essential to deliver the change of policies and a return to legitimate democracy that Zimbabwe so badly needs.
	As the hon. Gentleman knows, the Zimbabwean Government's disastrous land reform programme is at the heart of the crisis. Far from improving agricultural productivity or helping the poor, it has contributed to a humanitarian crisis that is deeper than any in recent times; far from learning from elsewhere, it ignores international recommendations and the Zimbabwean Government's own principles, which were adopted at international conferences.
	It was clear at independence that land reform was needed. Since independence, Britain has provided £500 million in bilateral support for development work in Zimbabwe and £47 million specifically for land reform, of which £3 million was returned because of a lack of specific proposals on land reform. We have not reneged on the Lancaster house commitments and we continue to want land reform, but Zimbabwe needs reforms that benefit the poor, not Mugabe's henchmen, which is one of the reasons why there are particular problems in rural areas.
	The situation of the ordinary people in Zimbabwe in rural and indeed urban areas is increasingly difficult. Food shortages affecting nearly 7 million people—more than half the population—have been well publicised but that is just one aspect of the crisis facing the poor. Access to official assistance for education, Government food aid, justice and medical treatment can depend on where people live and, as the hon. Gentleman said, which party they support. Constitutional rights are being abused by the very institutions of state responsible for their protection.
	Zimbabwe has the fastest collapsing economy in the world. Falling exports mean that there is little foreign exchange to buy food, fuel or power. Jobs are disappearing. Officially, inflation is 228 per cent. and growing at about 10 per cent. a month. Even for those with cash, prices are rising rapidly and basic goods are often unavailable except on the black market. Attempts to control prices and to operate subsidies without making financial provision have served only to distort markets and cause shortages and fuel inflation.
	In total, about 70 per cent. of people live below the poverty line. People are increasingly dependent on informal livelihoods and food aid. Many skilled Zimbabweans are opting for emigration in the hope of a better life.

Nigel Evans: Will the Minister give way?

Sally Keeble: Yes.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. It is not the convention to have interventions from the Opposition Front Bench.

Sally Keeble: Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
	I will come on to some of the specific points about food aid. It is also important to set some of the difficulties in the wider context. I know that hon. Members have raised questions about the Government's approach more generally to what is happening in Zimbabwe. It is important to take this opportunity to deal with those concerns, but I will of course deal with the remarks of the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell, too.
	As the hon. Gentleman said, my Department provides substantial support for Zimbabwe. We are the second largest bilateral donors and have made substantial increases in assistance to protect the poor and vulnerable. Our programme is now entirely focused on humanitarian assistance.
	The new maize harvest is improving the position in Zimbabwe in the short term but the Zimbabwean Government have failed to import significant volumes of food or to help some areas for many months. Areas where there has been no harvest will continue to depend on international aid throughout the year. We expect a serious national food shortage to re-emerge by the end of the year. As yet, the Zimbabwean Government have not given any plan for tackling it.
	The international relief effort over the past year, led by the United Nations World Food Programme, has been substantially successful within the terms in which it can operate: providing humanitarian assistance. The US, the EC and the UK have been the major donors.
	A national survey of health and nutrition status shows that there has been only a slight increase in the rate of malnutrition overall. Of course, any loss of life is extremely harsh. Many lives have been lost through AIDS—about 3,000 a month—but there has been little evidence of deaths related solely to malnutrition,. Of course, many other conditions are associated with the circumstances and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe, which will, sadly, produce deaths.
	In addition to funding food assistance, the donors have funded monitoring programmes to examine carefully the way in which our assistance is provided and its effectiveness at reaching people in the front line. We have difficulties, because the Zimbabwean Government also produce a large amount of food aid, about which I shall speak briefly later. We are not provided with information about the way in which that aid is distributed, and there is a substantial question mark over it.
	The Zimbabwean Government must play a major role in providing food assistance but, as has been said, that role is biased. The Zimbabwean Government were the largest importer of food overall in 2002, but—as the hon. Gentleman highlighted—there was no transparency in the way in which they distributed their food stocks and there were widespread complaints that they were both biased and corrupt.
	By contrast, the food aid provided by the UN and by donors, including DFID, is not distributed through Government channels and is allocated strictly on the basis of humanitarian need. The international efforts are closely monitored to ensure that this humanitarian approach is maintained. All of DFID's humanitarian effort has been independent of the Zimbabwean Government.
	I note the hon. Gentleman's concerns about the Binga area. We were aware of the disruption caused to food distribution there, in particular the distribution through Save the Children and the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, which have been feeding about 90 per cent. of the local population. We understood that the concerns had been resolved to a great extent and that the food aid had been resumed. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman will not want to disclose the identities of those who provided him with information, but I shall check what he said and provide him with written assurances about the area. However, our information was that the problems had been resolved, or at least that the feeding programmes had been resumed.

Chris Grayling: That is the nub of the point. It is my constituent's belief that her information is precisely that. However, it is simply a question of whether the sources of information are giving a true reflection of the realities on the ground. It may not be easy to check that, but it would be helpful if the Department looked at ways of doing that.

Sally Keeble: I take the hon. Gentleman's point. He will understand that, in such a situation—where people are operating in an extremely difficult environment and depend on donors who have to operate under great pressure—we are confident that we have monitoring regimes in place. Our food aid does not go through the corrupt political channels; but if there are allegations to the contrary, they must be looked at and checked and I shall certainly make sure that that happens. I have the greatest respect for the work that our people do in Zimbabwe and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that our information is the best we have, based on careful distribution and monitoring arrangements.
	One of our concerns about the coming year is that the Zimbabwean Government's food imports are likely to be reduced because the economic crisis means that they have fewer resources available for foreign purchases. The task for the international community might be as large as, or greater than, it has been during the last year.
	I wish to deal briefly with the pressure that the UK has applied, a concern raised by the Conservative party. The British Government have spoken out for a long time about democratic rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. We have supported EU and Commonwealth attempts at dialogue and eventual censure, and debate at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. The EU renewed targeted sanctions against 79 members of the ZANU-PF leadership in February.
	The EU issued declarations on Zimbabwe in February and March, expressing concern at the increasing incidence of arrests, inhuman treatment and torture of members of the opposition and of civil society, and called on the Government of Zimbabwe to respect human rights and to end the harassment and violence that have become such a part of the political landscape. We are also working with others in the international community to lobby for change in the economic and social policies that are at the root of the crisis. We will of course continue to bring pressure to bear. The recent increase in violence and political retribution has shocked other African leaders, who have publicly supported Zimbabwe until now. We therefore very much welcome the efforts of the Presidents of South Africa, Nigeria and Malawi to generate genuine inter-party dialogue and to find a way forward for the people of Zimbabwe.
	Zimbabwe's crisis and the increase in poverty are the results of adherence to ill-judged and failed policies, and of the disastrous regime of Robert Mugabe. Economic mismanagement has led to shortages of food and fuel, high and rising inflation, a rapid increase in unemployment, a fall in real incomes and, as the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell has outlined, disastrous consequences for some of the poorest people in Zimbabwe. The failed land reform—
	The motion having been made after Ten o'clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. Deputy Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
	Adjourned at nine minutes to Eleven o'clock.